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ABSTRACT OF THESIS (Regulation 7.9)
The present thesis examines aspects of European Ccjmmunity law and
especially the work of the European Court of Justice in the light of
recent jurisprudence.
The concepts of legal norm, sources of law, legal order and legal
system are analysed in the context of European Ccaranunity law. The
thesis next considers the relevance of judicial decision-making in the
interpretation and application of the law and examines the possible
approaches to its study, opting for the justificatory approach.
Legal justification is seen as a special case of Rational
Practical Discourse. But hew is justification in the law possible?
The distinction between clear cases and hard cases is introduced at
this point. Justification in clear cases proceeds on the level of
formal, procedural or internal rationality: a judicial decision is
legally justifiable when it can be shown to follow from certain
premises which go relatively undisputed (acte clair doctrine).
Justification in hard cases refers to the establishment of the
premises from which decisions are drawn and focuses on problems of
interpretation.
This thesis follows the method of Rational Reconstruction of
authoritative doctrines of legal reasoning and argumentation in the
operative interpretation and application of community law by the
European Court of Justice. It examines doctrines about legal
reasoning and argumentation as implicitly or explicitly found in the
judgements of the Court and other legally relevant information, in the
light of contemporary theories of legal justification, namely the
theories of Neil MacCormick and Jerzy Wroblewski.
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The purpose of this chapter and of all Part One is to discuss
seme of the classical topics of analytical jurisprudence in relation
to a particular law, the law of the European Communities (EC) i.e. of
the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), of the European Economic
Community (EEC), and of the European Atomic Energy Community (EAEC or
Euratam), especially of the EEC. Much of the work in the General
Theory of Law or jurisprudence has talked about law in a general way,
about law tout court instead of centering the discussion on this or
that particular law. It is even the case that certain authors mate
universal claims about the law but have in mind a particular law e.g.
Anglo-American law. In the present work I do not intend to mate any
such universal claims, but rather I shall apply same recent
developments in jurisprudence to EC law. The law of the European
Communities cannot be considered law tout court. It is not clear to
me that there can be any such thing. One of the interesting things
about EC law from the jurisprudential and comparative-law point of
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view is that it is considered to be - and is applied as - valid law
within the twelve Member States of the Cammunities which form two of
the great families of law: the Common Law and the Code Law traditions.
Although making universal substantive claims about law is highly
problematic, it would still be possible to mate universal claims about
certain analytical features of law: theories of the legal system, the
study of the sources of law and the concept of norm, structural
principles of the legal order, relationships between norms and other
lite matters can be dealt with in a formal way. Analytical
jurisprudence, as a way of dealing with legal theoretical questions
such as these, is somehow related to legal positivism; and the
approach of the present work to the analysis and explanation of EC law
takes sides with what is sometimes called Institutional Legal
Positivism (Bankcwski; 1989).
1. Legal Positivism as the starting point?
"Legal Positivism can hardly be regarded as an entirely
homogeneous theoretical construction from a temporal point of view any
more than from the point of view of its content" (OLR: 29). But what
do certain theories and doctrines of law share that allows one to
group them under such heading? There are two essential features of
legal positivism:
(a) the motto that "the existence of the law is one thing; its merit
or demerit another". This catdhphrase in Austin's 'Ihe Province
of Jurisprudence Determined means that the existence of norms
(laws) does not depend on their satisfying any particular ethical
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values or criteria other than those expressly referred to by the
law; in Hart's words, there is no necessary connection between
law and morals although, as Simmonds says (1986: 79), positivists
deny neither the importance of morality nor that it influences
the content of the law, nor that judges sometimes decide cases by
reference to moral values and considerations of social policy;
and
(b) the doctrine of the social sources of law i.e. that the existence
of laws depends upon their being established (in different ways)
through the decisions of human beings in society (CIS: 1980, and
ITL: 1986). The legal positivist proceeds from the assumption
that the law is a constituent element of social reality, that sill
laws emanate from authoritative sources (Simmonds; 1984: ch. 2).
There have been and still are many disputes about legal
positivism. It is not rare to find disagreements or differences of
attitudes underlying such disputes. One of legal positivists1 best
kncwn and liveliest disputes was conducted against partisans of
Natural Law. The present work will not enter into that battlefield.
Nielsen's Pure Theory of Law tries to study law as it is and not as it
ought to be; it tries to rule cut any evaluation of positive law
(1970: ch. 3). Immediately after World War Two proponents of Natural
Law accused legal positivist doctrines of being responsible for the
legal aberrations and arbitrariness of the Nazi period in Germany.
Frcm the standpoint of the Pure Theory Nazi law was law. Garzon
(1985) has pointed out a paradox in this respect: during the Nazi
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tyranny Kielsen's positivist theory was considered contrary to the
principles and spirit of Nazionalsozialismus. Nazi jurists considered
racist law as an idea of natural law. Only a few legal philosophers
sought refuge outwith Germany. One of these was Kelsen himself.
2. Aspects of legal positivism
Rather than continuing on these lines it seems more appropriate
to take a more analytical standpoint and distinguish, along with
Norberto Bdbbio, different aspects of legal positivism (1972: 124-
126). Once these aspects are clarified the bridge between legal
positivism and natural law will seem less unstable, for "the contrast
between naturalists and positivists is a contrast between persons that
speak different languages" (ibid). The question will be whether these
languages are inter-translateable.
(a) The methodological aspect: legal positivism as an approach to the
study of law (analytical legal positivism) treats law as an
institutional fact (MacQjrmick-Weinberger; ITL). A major problem
arises in this connection: hew to knew whether this or that fact
is law? Positivism will attempt a neutral representation of the
law of a given community as far as a -value-free description is
possible. By separating the issue of law and ethics, an ulterior
evaluation of the law is made possible, indeed necessary at all
moments. A positivist adepts an anti-idealist ontology of law
using seme criteria of recognition operative within a legal
community in order to identify the law. Concerning questions of
a more sociological nature, positivism as a methodology can adept
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an interpretative approach (hermeneutic method; see chapter 3).
The ontology of legal positivism can accept principles (see
belcw) as part of what is to be recognised as law. It
distinguishes between norms as thought-objects - referring to
seme state of affairs relevant for human action - and norms as
reality. Norms became real by operating as guidelines (Raz
wouuld say as reasons) in a system of human action. One of the
loci where this action-guiding function of norms becomes most
patent is judicial decision-making.
The meaning contents of norms can be stateable in normative
sentences (Rechtssatze is Kelsen's term), as in the language of
legal texts; "p", or in descriptive, second-order or
metalinguistic sentences of the form: "there is a norm to the
effect that p", or "behaviour p is lawful according to the norm
N", etc. as in the language of legal dogmatics (legal rules for
Kelsen; these ideas reappear in Chapter 2). Legal dogmatics will
analyse the first-order norms, describe their meaning and their
interrelations, interpret them if need be, and try to construct
from them a structured system. And in doing this it moves on a
second-order level. For all these activities the methods of
analytical jurisprudence will prove useful. Criteria of
identification, individuation or validity of norms, as well as
criteria for the systemic relationships between the norms are
necessary to any attempt at describing a legal order.
This aspect of legal positivism has been described by Hart
(1958) as the thesis that the analysis of basic legal concepts is
worth pursuing and is to be distinguished from historical
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enquiries into the causes or origins of laws and from
sociological enquiries into the relations between law and other
social phenomena, and from the criticism or appraisal of law
whether in terms of morals, social aims, functions or otherwise.
The theoretical aspect of legal positivism, or legal formalism.
As a theory or conception of law, legal positivism tries to
explain the reality of law as an emanation of the sovereign, or
of society organised in a State which monopolises the sources of
ncmogenesis, or alternatively as an emanation of seme other
institutional arrangement different frcm the state. This theory
is usually associated with the doctrine of the separation of
powers and consequently affirms the need for a mechanical
jurisprudence (formalism). Most legal positivist theories have
been state oriented. A slightly different version of legal
positivism as a theory of law concentrates on the judicial
process, regarding the judicial decision as a momentous aspect of
law (Igartua; 1986) although this turn only amounts to a switch
of emphasis, not a new conception of law.
The state theory usually implies five at least dubious and
perhaps fallacious dogmas: (1) the dogma of the coerciveness of
law, i.e. that the legal order is first and foremost a coercive
order; (2) the imperative dogma of the legal norm (even
permissive norms) as a command; (3) the statute, la loi, as the
main or the paradigmatic source of law, other sources being
secondary; (4) the postulate of the unity of the legal order and
the dogmas of completeness and consistency and (5) the dogma of
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mechanical interpretation, the science of law and formalism in
the application of the law. Two basic features of the state
theory are thus the pre-eminence or supremacy of the law of the
"State" over the norms of any other law, and the supremacy of la
loi over any other "residual" source.
As will be seen below, these two features of "statalist"
legal positivism cannot possibly be accommodated to a theory of
European Community law. The state theory is just one version of
legal positivism, although at the present time it seems difficult
to envisage a theory of law which is not state bound. Scarpelli
(1965: ch. 9) has noted that other versions are compatible with a
subordination of the state and its law to international law e.g.
Kelsen's theory which aimed at a transformation of international
law giving it a structure similar to that of the state: a
political organisation where a political will is manifested in
the form of a law. Kelsen would have rejoiced at the
contemplation of the European Community legal order. For Kelsen
International Law too is a coercive order. What is distinctive
about it is not the absence of sanctions, but the fact that the
sanctions involved are decentralised. As Bull (1987) points out,
legal positivism in international law has been under considerable
attack from all fronts throughout this century, especially from
the Yale school of sociological jurisprudence which sees law as a
process of decision that is both authoritative and effective
rather than as a body of rules. As regards EC law, the two
conceptions are not incompatible: it is possible to accept that
European Qmnnunity law is a body of norms which are concretised,
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given meaning, clarified and applied (when appropriate) through a
process of decision-making by the European Court of Justice (ECT)
and by domestic courts, that is both authoritative and effective,
even though in the case of the ECT, centralised sanctions are
lacking. The criticism of the imperative or coercive conception
of law runs along the lines of international law and also of
customary law. These laws cannot cater for coerciveness.
Likewise EC law could hardly be amenable to the dogma of
coerciveness for want of any kind of enforcement agency or
mechanism at least vis-a-vis the Member States. Modern
restatements of the dogma of coerciveness by Kelsen and Ross see
the law as a group of norms that regulate the use of force, but
rather than the norms themselves it would be the legal order as a
whole which has a coercive character. Still, the legal order or
the law cannot be adequately accounted for by isolating one of
its features, essential as it may be, and elevating it to the
rank of exclusivity. The law is a coercive normative order, but
it is also an institutional means of organisation of a social
group for given purposes (Romano) and it is rather by virtue of
this latter characteristic that claims as to the legitimate
authority of the law are usually made.
By means of the laws and with a view to their application
the modern'state' strives to monopolise the use of physical force
or coercion. It is behind this veil of coerciveness as
postulated by positivist theories of law that a state-oriented
ideology of the law can hide. It is this conception of the law
as the means by which the state monopolises coercion that so many
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moralists and ideologues have had in mind when prophesying or
vindicating the withering away of the law. Coercion is seen as
evil. But after coercion had withered away, there would always
remain the need for society to organise itself. The emphasis on
organisation makes law more readily amenable to the inter-state
sphere and for our concerns, to the European Community, a legal
organisation to which its Member States have surrendered certain
spheres of their sovereignty.
Along with coercion cones the conception of legal norms as
commands. A command is a linguistic expression produced by (a)
determinate utterer(s) and directed to (an) addressee (s)
concerning certain behaviour, and arousing in the addressee(s) an
impulse to the prescribed behaviour. The obligatory character of
commands stems from the fact that they are dictated by an
authority; commands are dependent on the commanding authority,
von Wright (NA: ch. 1) has sorted out two other types of
fundamental norms apart from commands: permissive norms and
competence norms. There would also be other types of norms that
would not fit well into the scheme of commands such as
definitional, hypothetical and customary norms. It is especially
difficult to see customary norms as commands. The same
difficulty goes for principles of law, for contracts and
treaties, and for that matter, for many norms contained in legal
texts.
If one considers the Treaties establishing the European
Communities, one wonders who the commanding authority of those
treaties is, who the addressees are and what the proscribed or
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prescribed behaviour is. A proponent of the ccenmard theory might
suggest that the commanding authority is constituted by the
signatory contracting states. But the Treaties are an
interesting instance of performative speech acts, as studied in
the philosophy of language, which institute their cwn authority
through the mere formal act by which they come into being
(negotiation, signature, ratification). Before the Treaties are
formalised there is no instituted commanding authority of EC law.
From the moment of their coming into being, the commanding
authority is instituted or constituted. But then which is the
commanding authority? In order to explain this paradox recourse
is usually had to the presupposed customary norm pacta sunt
servanda. Similar considerations would apply to the constituting
power of a state constitution. This is one of the paradoxes of
the theory of commands as applied to the EC Treaties. Ihe second
paradox concerns the addressees of the Treaties. These include
the nationals of the Member States as well as the Member States
themselves, but in this case we find the commanding authority
(the Member States) commanding itself. This is at the very least
counterintuitive. If regard is had to the behaviour commanded,
one does not stop running into difficulties, for the Treaties
contain only a few norms comparable to commands. Much of the
Treaty (especially the EEC Treaty) sets up or constitutes an
institutional framework and organisation, solemnly makes formal
statements of principle or of good intentions (another
interesting speech act) and lays down programmes for action that
any command theorist, no matter hew heterodox, would think odd.
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The theory of the sources of law, in the modern state,
asserts the supremacy of the statute, la Loi, all the other
sources of law being not only subordinated to it, but even
ontologically depending on the statute. It is the statute which
recognises their existence and regulates their conditions of
application. Thus the statute does not constitute eastern, but
it regulates it, declaring and specifying when it can work as a
legal source, and in case of a clash between the two the statute
always takes precedence. This doctrine of the sources and of
statutory supremacy is linked to the theory of the state and to
the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty. Hie acts of
Parliament (lois de 1'Assembles Nationale) are the primary
written source. In case of delegated legislation for instance,
the delegated power is supposed to be controlled by the
directives and indications dictated by the power-delegating
statute. This doctrine of the sources of law is more problematic
in "common law" systems where custom plays a weightier role and
precedents are undisputed sources of law. Common law rules enjoy
whatever status they possess not because of the circumstances of
their origin (or pedigree, to use Eworkin's catchword), but
because of their continued reception. Common law norms (rules
and principles) are settled as far as there is agreement upon
their existence and content, not because they satisfy certain
tests (Simpson; 1973). But even in common law systems statutes
take precedence and no precedent can overrule them, and many
common law systems are endowed with a written Constitution
(Australia, Canada, U.S.A.). The role principles play in both
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canman law and code law systems is also subordinate to the
statute.
The doctrine of the sources of law in so far as it assumes
the primacy of state Parliaments' legislation is especially ill
adjusted to EC law. The European Parliament does not (yet) have
normative powers. The EC legislator is the Council of Ministers
and subsidiarily the Commission. The type of norms they enact
are neither acts nor lois hut regulations or reglerrmts,
directives or decisions (apparently the use of the word loi was
ruled out by the drafters of the Treaty in order to avoid a
possible "offence" to the tradition of parliamentary supremacy in
the Member States). The Treaties themselves are not unlike the
Constitutions of sane of the Member States, and this also
constitutes a threat to the classical doctrine of the legal
sources, centered around the statute, which has traditionally
disregarded the value of the constitution as a source cf law,
lacking in determinacy as it is. This explains the fact that
judicial review of legislation suppposedly in conflict with the
Constitution is not universally accepted. As for the EC, the
Treaties are the constitution of the legal order of the European
Communities, and they are the supreme source of its law, and
cannot be contradicted by any inferior source, judicial review of
such derived legislation or domestic legislation being available
before the ECJ.
The fourth dogma of the state theories of legal positivism -
i.e. the dogmas of the unity, coherence and completeness of the
legal system - will be discussed below in relation to the
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question of the legal order and the legal system. The rule
formalist dogma is the subject of analysis and criticism of the
present work as a whole.
Recent theoretical versions of legal positivism consider the
judicial process as the most important or central aspect of the
law. Why the judicial process, why not legislation? This
emphasis is not unrelated to certain ideological elements of the
liberal theory of the state and to the doctrine of the separation
of powers. The courts are supposed to apply the law, not to
create it. The dynamic aspect of the law finds its expression in
the judicial process. The static aspect of law is in a certain
sense uninteresting because it is not applied, it is too "pure"
so to speak. One of the main innovations of legal realism
consisted in this shift of interest frcm the static and purely
formal aspect of law to the law in action, to the study of what
the courts actually do with the "static" law - i.e. with the
sources - and of how they do it.
Roughly legal positivism as a methodology chooses positive
or posited law and not ideal law as the material or subject study
of a theory of law. Through the formal performative speech act
of legislation, that which is not yet law becomes what is law
from then onwards. Cases of retroactive legislation are treated
with extreme care and dislike, when not prohibited. We can take
the legislative process and the norm-making process as synonyms.
The study and analysis of this process is usually carried cut by
political and constitutional scientists, as far as its socio¬
political aspects are concerned, by constitutional or
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administrative law scholars regarding its formal aspects, and by-
legal dogmatics or legal "scientists" as far as the content of
the end result, the norms, is concerned. Surely this is only a
rough approximation, such a strict division of labour is a
hyperbolical representation to illustrate the point that the
study of many such aspects of the norm making process has not
been a primary concern of jurisprudence. The task of proposing
new laws or of advocating "laws" not yet in force does not form
part of the legal positivist programme. The sccpe of legal
positivism turns around de lega lata arguments, i.e.
prepositions about what the law is on a particular point, or
premises frcm which deductions are made in accordance with the
logic of norms. On the other hand de lege fererda arguments -
about what the law ought to be on a particular point - have been
negligently ignored by traditional legal positivism. These have
a teleological structure, they consider the ends and weigh the
consequences of possible legal measures. Of course legal
scientists and jurists often also have recourse to such arguments
and they are characteristic to legal reasoning in hard cases,
i.e. cases where it is not clear what the law on a particular
point is.
An attempt could be made to distinguish natural lav theories
and positivism along the following lines. Legal positivism
stresses the law as it is and Natural Law theories the law as it
ought to be. These two arguments are not necessarily in
conflict. They are formally different arguments. Natural law
does not deny what positivism affirms or vice versa. This
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approach is not free of nuances. Many utilitarian positivists
have been involved in proposals for law reforms (Bentham and Hart
are two good examples), and legal positivist theories have often
made anthropological presuppositions about human society and
human nature (again Bentham and Hart are good examples; as for
Bentham, see Escamilla; 1987; 1., and as for Hart consider the
minimum universal content of primary rules, CL: ch. 5 and
MacCormick; 1981; chs. 8 and 9). Still, the "positivist
programme of keeping distinct the description and the evaluative
appraisal of legal system" remains "an essential requirement of
clear thought about and discussion of law" (LRU: 239).
When the attention focuses on the legal process, the
distinction between the two types of argument dwindles, at least
in hard cases, which call for judicial interpretation where
arguments from principles and from consequences are resorted to.
It is a matter of dispute (ITL; 5.1.) hew far natural law
assumptions are inherent to such arguments de lege ferenda, but
it is beyond dispute that certain evaluative choices always
underlie such arguments, and evaluations generally call for
ethical, political and ideological criteria. As Ross (OLJ:
ch.10) says, the "reality" of law is to be found in judicial
activity. A norm will .be considered valid if there are
sufficient reasons to suppose that it will be accepted as such by
the courts, as a basis for their decisions, according to a given
normative ideology about hew to decide cases; a point repeatedly
made by Perelman. In the judicial process the operations and
methods of the law become more noticeable; the systematisation
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and interpretation of norms, legal reasoning in legal
interpretation, evaluative and discretionary lee-ways, and in the
last resort, ideology. Ideology, that phantom constantly chasing
traditional legal positivists and continually despised by them,
has penetrated through the back door in the study of the law in
action.
The ideological aspect of legal positivism. Legal theory moves
in a metatheoretical level, it deals with an object - law - which
is already theorised (Sirrtmonds; 1984: 1). We can have a norm in
legal language as e.g. part of a legal text. From a metalanguage
we can say whether that norm is valid in one system or not. This
is an internal legal evaluation. But the proposition we make
from the metalanguage is not about a brute fact but about an
institutional fact. What the ideological aspect of legal
positivism does is to give moral overtones to that legal
validity, thus committing an ideological fallacy: the internal
legal obligation to comply with the law and observe legal rules
becomes a moral imperative, and a moral obligation to obey the
law is postulated. Let us examine hew this jump is produced.
Metalinguistic discourse can be normative or descriptive.
Normative discourse in a metalinguistic level makes statements
such as: "you must consider as valid such and such norms of the
system, or those other norms which conform to such and such
criteria to be found in such and such other norms or in judicial
practice or in other recognised sources". This type of second
order normative discourse represents the internal point of view
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of those who accept the norms of a system as guidelines or
reasons for official action and as criteria for adjudication. A
descriptive second order or metalinguistic discourse would be
that of an external observer looking at the attitudes of the
members of a social group towards the norms and of the law
officials' common practice. Frcm a factual statement of an
external point of view one cannot logically derive an internal
normative statement. In order to accept the validity criteria of
a system of law one needs to take an internal point of view, and
this is a political choice (Scarpelli; 1965: ch. 7). This does
not rule out the possibility of detached internal statements as
will be seen in Chapter 3.
There is a moderate version of legal positivist ideology.
It gives a positive value to the law as a means of obtaining
desirable ends. It would run along these lines. Legal
positivism is at the service of the dominant (i.e. the majority)
political will in the political organisation of modern society as
a state or seme interstate organisation, and has assumed an
attitude and elaborated a method - analytical legal positivism -
which presuppose or do not question the production of norms in
its characteristic form. That method does not depend on a theory
of state. The problem .arises when one moves to theories of law:
the concept of the dominant political will is quite problematic,
not least because it takes for granted a homogeneous reference
group from which a majority flews. The acceptance of the
internal point of view which applies those criteria of validity
and goes along vdth the formal features of the legal system
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depends on a political choice, the choice of taking part and
collaborating with the political organisation structured in and
creating positive law, the choice of a legal science and a legal
practice which, having identified positive law, is willing to go
along with it, consciously leaving aside evaluative judgments
about its content. This moderate version is still state
oriented, and it would need reformulation if it were to be
applied to the EC.
The state aims to monopolise three main spheres; (1) the
state is the only agent entitled to decide who may use physical
force or coercion, and hew and when it may be used, (2) it gains
and retains the monopoly to posit norms and to define the
conditions of application of other legal sources, and it controls
the legal process and the enforcement of those norms, and (3) the
state has the monopoly to decide what is lawful, and puts moral
overtones into the notion of lawfulness, and it claims to have
the monopoly to decide what is in the interest of society
organised as a state (ethical monopoly). All these features of
ideological legal positivism are hard to adapt to political and
legal organisations such as the European Communities which are
based on the principle of a distribution of competences between
the Member States and the common institutions. The reason why I
am taking such pains at criticising the state oriented legal
positivist theories and ideologies is that positive law is all
too often identified with the law of the state. Thus Raz claims
(AL: 99) that "a theory of law must be based, at least partly, on
a theory of state ... However a theory of state is partly based
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on a theory of law". It is difficult to disagree with this
moderate statement of Raz's, and many will think I am contending
for a lost cause. But the "law" instituting the European
Communities (international treaties) and the "law" emanating from
the (immunities' Institutions' normative power (derived Ccmmunity
law, case-law and acquis ccmmunautaire) as well as the other
sources from which the ECJ draws legal arguments to ground and
motivate its decisions and rulings can all be considered
(positive) law, and a theory of this law can proceed at seme
remove from a theory of state, although seme theory of state
underpinning the European communities will be inescapable.
Another feature of strong ideological versions of legal
positivism is related to the theory of law as coercion and finds
the essence of law in social order. This conception has been
held by functionalist theories. These theories do not take into
account the content of law, but rather place a positive value on
the so-called "functions of law" namely, to achieve and maintain
social order. They stress the value of stability to the
prejudice of social change which is seen as pathological.
MacCormick (1982: 235) has identified three forms of coercion:
coercion through direct threats, direct physical coercion and
coercion through indirect threats. In the three types a real
possibility of choice by the person who suffers the coercion is
absent. Whereas coercion seems essential to criminal law, it
does not seem to be a major characteristic of private law, but
rather a complement to the legal rights the parties in private
law have constituted. This complement consists in the
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possibility of the courts enforcing those rights. Law is not
merely punitive, law is also introduced to regulate, facilitate,
confer and distribute benefits. The coercive feature of the law
of the EC is not very salient. Hie Community does not have at
its disposal an enforcement machinery comparable to that of the
Member States, and even the enforcement of the decisions of the
ECJ is left to the Member States' enforcement agencies guided in
their activity by the principles of the rule of law. In this
sense the EC is grounded upon the good will to cooperate of the
Member States and is more readily explainable on the model
offered by social contract and consensus theories.
But there is a sense in which law too, and not only
conceptions of law, is ideological for it regulates social
relationships and it is the product of power relations and it
reflects certain (ideological) views on hew certain goods and
burdens are to be allocated and redistributed. It has been said
for instance that the Treaty establishing the EEC is the
"product" of a free-market ideology (Holland; 1980). Another
interesting example can be seen in the ideological conceptions
confronted at the present time concerning the European Social
Charter and the Draft Statute for European Companies. The
debates in question concern which rights and with which content
are to be included in the Charter and how far workers'
participation in the running of their employing companies ought
to be safeguarded by the said Statute. Because law in this sense
is essentially ideological, it is very important not to lose an
ethico-critical standpoint on the law. This is why the question
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whether the law ought to be accepted or obeyed should always
remain open. Practical philosophy must be the eternal companion
to law. In order to maintain that critical outlook on the law,
it is very important to adept legal positivism as a methodology
so that one always knows what is being analysed.
A further mildly ideological aspect of law can be found in
those theories that conceive of the law as coherence. Such
theories imply a commitment to a certain conception of law as
order, as a coherent body of norms. As coherence is a matter of
degree, the extreme conception of law as coherence - Dworkin's
conception of law as integrity - will be a more ideologically
loaded conception of law than other alternative conceptions -
whether based on softer versions of coherence or on views of law
as conflict or as the instrument to further class interests - in
the sense of evaluating law positively and conceptually relating
it to a certain axiology.
3. A Plausible legal positivism?
There is no necessary connection between the three aspects of
legal positivism although they have historically gone hand in hand.
The present work follows Bbbbio (1972) in taking sides. It adepts the
positivist approach to the law and sees legal science as a normative
science describing legal norms, with the proviso that a theory of law
centred around the legal process has to account for the ideological
elements in the application of the law and in judicial discretion and
has to deal, at least in part, with political theory. The present
work is critical of the state theory of law especially with regard to
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the law of the EC which takes precedence over domestic law and because
the doctrine of the division of powers and of parliamentary
sovereignty so dear to the state theory are not appropriate to it.
One of the postulates of this doctrine in the field of legal dogmatics
is that of the rationality and sovereignty of the legislator which, as
Ost and van de Kerchove explain (1988), has three branches: the
legislator is supreme, i.e. independent vis-a-vis any other state or
international authority or any other normative order; indivisible,
sovereignty cannot be shared even if the organisation of its exercise
allows scams distribution of the powers between various authorities and
groups; and unitary, all powers, whatever their mode of
implementation, are derived frcm a unique source whether it is the
State, the Nation, the Constitution, the social compact or same basic
norm. The authors say these principles are actual and operative as
practical principles in the functioning of the legal system, they
confer on every legal norm a unique criterion of belonging to the same
system and a unique core of validation and authority, but they cannot
work as theoretical principles supposed to reflect legal data
adequately. These principles tumble in the EC legal order, based as
has been said above, on the principles of the sharing of sovereignty
and the attribution of competence, of the co-operation of the Member
States and the Community institutions toward greater integration (EEC:
arts 3, 5, and 6). Perhaps only the principle of the unity of the
legislator in a revised version is operative as a practical principle
because the Treaties are the main and central source of the EC legal
order and could thus be seen as its constitution or basic norm (in
Jellinek's sense) and any other source will be referred to the Treaty
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directly - through derived norms - or indirectly - as being coherent
and harmonious with the new legal order created therein.
As to the ideological aspect of legal positivism, Bobbio embraces
its moderate version. From the standpoint of an open rationality the
question of the moral value of the law depends on many a factor, seme
of which overlap with Fuller's eight requirements (1969) and Finnis'
list of basic goods (1980). "It is not because the law does not
encapsulate, at least in part, a morality that it is open to moral
criticism. That it does always and unavoidably encapsulate seme
elements of positive morality is a powerful additional reason why it
must always be subjected to the searching criticism of critical
moralists" (MacCormick; 1981: ch. 12).
To recapitulate, if legal positivism is defined along Scarpelli's
lines (1965: ch. 12, with minor alterations), the present work can be
taken as an exercise in legal positivism to analyse EC law: legal
positivism is a conception of law as a system of norms, norms of
behaviour and norms of structure or organisation, posited by acts of
will of human beings or abstracted frcan these in the form of
generalisations, and made up of general and abstract norms, coherent
or reducible to coherence and tentatively complete and at least partly
coercive. It is also a treatment of law according to that conception,
drawing from its norms guidelines or reasons for certain behaviours
(not conclusive reasons from an external point of view) and criteria
for adjudication, with a margin of flexibility as to the modes of
procedure determining the meaning of the expressive signs of norms
(interpretation). It is also a practice of law which adepts that
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treatment of the law in its application, and a science of law oriented
to that treatment and preparing that practice. But the scientific
character of law is dubious.
There is a further aspect of legal positivism which calls for
further criticism, this is its epistemological aspect. As Atias says
(1988), "legal science was admired when other sciences were scorned.
It could not become a positive science when the others succeeded: it
resisted the temptation to reduce its subject matter in order to
improve its performances, its precisian and its certainty, even if
certain jurists thought and think that they did. And afterwards legal
science could not succeed in leaving this positivism when all sciences
left it: many jurists continue to believe that other sciences are
excellent, absolutely excellent in the rational discovery of truth and
in the rational organisation of certainty, excellent for reasons which
all scientists would new understand they do not exist [sic]". When
the words "legal science" are used throughout the present work, what
is meant is (Vernengo; 1987) a recognised and institutionalised
conceptual elaboration of legal materials, a determination of their
possible meanings, a discussion of their logical consequences and a
critical assessment of their adequacy. Legal science fails in other
respects e.g. in its criteria of systematisation, for its language
formation rules are vague, and its rules of transformation are
imprecise - one can sometimes arrive at antinomic solutions not only
from different legal sources, but even from the same "obscure"
sources.
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LEGAL SYSTEM and LEGAL ORDER
These two concepts are used in a variety of ways and are often
taken to be synonymous. The present work uses these terms
indistinctively. But strictly speaking the two concepts can be
differentiated; any talk of legal systems assumes scare metalogical or
systemic properties - closure, consistency, completeness
(ccmpletedness) - which one does not necessarily expect to find in the
legal orders. The concept "system" has a richer intension than the
concept "order". Those authors who adhere to a "scientific" view of
the law will normally assume such systemic properties to be present in
the law. But logicians since Tarski and Godel have seriously
questioned the theoretical possibility of any logical system. Other
authors often conceive of legal orders as living legal systems. My
criticism of the theories of legal system run along those metalogical
lines. The term "legal order" (ordinamerrto qiuridico, Rechtsordnung,
ordenamiento juridico, ordre juridique) is often used by the EGJ in
their judgments, and is in my opinion more adequate to refer to EC law
than the term "system". Other criticisms of theories of the legal
system have plunged into their ideological features. The legal order
is often seen as a coherent whole, the role of traditional legal
dogmatics being to do away with inner conflicts. The differing values
underlying different rules are hidden behind a system of legal
principles which is said to be generally accepted. Behind this
thinking lies the more or less articulated assumption that the values
prevailing in society at a given time can be considered as a
homogeneous whole. The alternative legal dogmatics proposed by such
critics would admit the conflicts within the law, and abandon the
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claim to build a "neutral" system merely upon the strictly legal
material. These ideas are very interesting, but they do not clearly
distinguish legal systems from legal orders (Wilhelmsson; 1984,
refers to movements such as Magqistratura Democratica, and the
Critical Legal Studies Movement, and one could include all related
movements that call for an uso alternativo del diritto).
A preliminary point needs to be made about the different levels
of discourse on which the present analysis proceeds. The legal order
is composed of sources or norms in the form of legal precepts i.e.
legal or normative statements e.g. the positive sources of EC law:
Treaties, regulations, directives, etc. Norms will be dealt with in
the next chapter. Legal dogmatics, also called legal science, makes
norm-prepositions i.e. assertions susceptible of verification; it
describes and organises the sources of norms of the legal order, which,
as they are found, lack structure, coherence and simplicity. An
example of legal dogmatics could be a doctrinal work on the EEC law of
competition. Susskind (ESL: 3.1) provides a list of the different
terms different authors have used to refer to this activity. The
methods of legal science are drawn from the general theory of law or
jurisprudence which - among other things - makes theoretical
statements about the legal order toward its rational reconstruction.
Some of the content of the statements made in the law (legal order)
and in legal dogmatics may coincide, but the difference between them
lies in the fact that a different speech act is involved in each case;
a descriptive-informative speech act in the second case and a
normative speech act in the first (see also Chapter 3).
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1. The whole and the parts
In order to decide the case before them, the judges have to
select a legal norm or group of legal norms from the valid law they
have been appointed to apply or interpret. Article 164 of the EEC
Treaty reads: "The Court of Justice shall ensure that in the
interpretation and application of this Treaty the law is observed".
The reference to "the law" in this provision is very general and even
vague. Which is that law? Article 1 (2nd paragraph) of the Single
European Act specifies that "The European Communities shall be founded
on the Treaties establishing the [ECSC,EEC and EAEC] and on the
subsequent Treaties and Acts modifying or supplementing them". This
valid law is made out of a congeries of different legal sources, seme
more determinate than others. From this congeries the law-applying
organ will extract or select the relevant norms or sources to decide
the case or question put before it.
The totality of such sources is usually called legal order or
legal system. The legal order must be recognised as socially existing
positive law, as having factual existence. Seme sources can exist
without ever having been explicitly formulated e.g. legal principles
or customary law (ITL: ch. 1). These sources or norms can be seen as
reasons for action applied and recognised by a system of courts
according to their own practices and customs (CIS: 212). "It is by
examining the courts' opinions that one finds the laws on which they
act" (AL: 80). As J^rgensen points out, this view was stressed by Alf
Ross: "... law is a real phenomenon and is therefore of importance
only as existing law, i.e. the rules of law, which are actually
applied, as they are stated in the grounds of a judicial decision"
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(1987: 337). A similar view was expressed by Perelman in 1971:
"c'est en 6xaminant les decisions des tribunaux que nous saurons ce
qu'eux considerent ccmme une regie de droit. C'est pour le for charge
de dire le droit que les regies de droit existent". Does this mean
that the addressees of the norms are only the courts? If the rules
(norms) did not exist for the public at large hew were they to
regulate their activities in legally relevant affairs? It must
therefore be accepted that the norms can have an existence before they
are applied by the courts. On other occasions, an authoritative list
of sources can be found in a legal text, as in the above mentioned
article of the SEA, and in these cases, the practice of recognition by
the courts is not the sole nor perhaps the main criterion of
identification of the law.
Does this view of Ross, Raz and Perelman mean that a source
cannot be recognised or identified as law until it is found in a
judicial decision? It seems rather odd to hold this extreme view, for
there might be a number of norms that have not yet been applied by the
courts, and one would not deny them their existence because of that
reason. Can one reasonably claim that article 119 which lays down the
principle of equal pay for equal work did not exist as law until it
was "interpreted" and "applied" by the EGJ in the Defrenne case
(infra)? Would the situation immediately subsequent to the entry into
force of the Treaties be that there were no norms of European
Community law because it had not been applied by the ECT yet? These
authors would not hold such extreme views, because a distinction is
made between the source (validity) and the content or output of the
source. The validity of the source does not depend on its being
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recognised by the courts. This is somewhat clearer where there are
legal texts that deal with the question of the sources of law. But
where the decisions of the courts are most relevant is in the
determination of the content of those sources.
Although analysing the ECJ's grounds for its decisions is one
important way to determine what are the sources of EC law especially
as regards general principles of law, a list of the sources of EC law
can be obtained frcra written norms such as the Treaties themselves,
and from doctrinal works; in particular those written by judges of the
EGT, because from such works one can grasp the internal point of view
of the ECJ and see what it regards as binding even before it publicly
pronounces upon it (see Chapter 2). Pattaro (1984) has made it clear
that Ross is really making a methodological or epistemological point.
One cannot consider as proven the assertion on the validity of a norm
until that assertion has been verified (or not falsified) by the (non)
application of that norm by the courts. This application does not
grant the norm its validity since the norm is already valid and that
is precisely why it is applied. What it does is to determine its
meaning and scope. Article 119 itself provided that it was effective
from the end of the first transitional period, and in Defrenne what
the Court of Justice did was not to give it validity - which because
of its "constitutional" status it undoubtedly enjoyed - but rather to
recognise that it conferred direct effect.
"Legal norms are components of a system ... the law is a system
of interrelated components ... Legal norms constitute a hierarchy:
higher norms decide about the proper way to create lcwer norms"
(Peczenik; 1983: 3.1 and 3.2). It is often considered that a formal
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characteristic of legal systems or legal orders is that the whole is
something more than just the sum of its parts. According to this
view, the whole (IS or ID) would consist of its components - the group
of norms - plus something else, most likely seme structural or
systemic principles not explicitly mentioned in the component norms.
These structural principles are usually formulated by legal science.
They are clearly not part of the positive group of norms, which is
given as an unstructured congeries. They are presumably different
from other legal principles, which although not explicitly formulated
as black letter rules would still be recognised as norms of the
system. Whether they are taken to be norms at all will depend on the
concept one has of norms. Austinian legal positivism has been accused
of holding too restrictive a concept of the legal norm as a "posited"
or laid dewn norm, a product of the will of seme sovereign.
Principles would hardly fit into such a concept of legal norms. But a
legal positivist need not hold such restrictive views and there need
not be any contradiction in holding that principles too, whether
systemic-formal or substantive, are norms (MacCormick; 1981: passim
and ch. 10).
The systemic aspect of law means that the group of norms acquires
its normativity and validity by means of some criteria of validity or
recognition, and that the norms enter into systemic interrelationships
by means of such criteria. Good examples of these systemic principles
are what Hart calls "secondary rules" and which will be considered
below, ana Harris calls (1979: 1.2) the four principles of the rule-
systematising logic of legal science: exclusion, subsumption,
derogation and non-contradiction. These principles might be sometimes
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found in legal documents such as treaties, constitutions or codes or
acts on statutory interpretation but mostly they are to be found at
work in judicial practice through an analysis of what sources the
courts regard themselves to be bound by. Of course at this point one
runs the risk of circularity, for the existence of the courts itself
presupposes legal sources from which they derive their authority.
This risk is considerably reduced in EC law since the Treaties can be
regarded as the ultimate foundational source or Constitution. As the
ECJ said in Les Verts (infra), "la Ccmraunaute Ecancmique Europeenne
est une ccmmunauty de droit: ni les Etats Membres ni ses institutions
n'echappent au controle de la conformity de leurs actes h la charte
constitutionnelle de base qu'est le Traite". This is the source of
validity of all other norms in the chain of validity it itself
institutes. But what is the source of this ultimate norm? It is in
part a practice of the ECJ and domestic courts (social source) that
regards this Constitution as valid, but it is moreover a formal
(constitutive) speech act i.e. the ratification by the signatory
States. The theory of speech acts combined with an institutional
theory of law perfectly suits and explains, in my opinion, the legal
order of the European Communities. What are then the structural
principles that allow us to talk about a legal order?
2. Can there be a Legal System?
A view common to many authors is that a legal system (IS) or
legal order (ID) may be identified by reference to legal sources or
standards (Harris; 1979: 9, Raz; 1979: ch. 8). For Ross too, the
unity of law is guaranteed by the legal sources recognised according
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to a common normative ideology, something not unrelated to the
volitionally internal point of view as analysed by Hart and
MacCormick. In a very broad sense a source would be any standard upon
which courts base their arguments to ground a decision. Seme of these
standards might be, as Cworkin claims (TRS: passim) principles of
political philosophy. In this general sense, law is a system of
interrelated components: legal norms and various other entities to
which norms are related such as acts, mental processes of various
persons involved in legislation, interpretation (intention), and some
other norms and each interpreter's weak evaluative endorsement
(Peczenik; 1984), but it would be a "Herculean" task to systematise
such law. In a narrower, more workable, sense, sources are the items
from which norms are constructed. Pescatore (1960: ch. 1) calls them
"formal" sources (see next chapter on sources).
The legal order tends towards a coordination of numerous legal
rules into a harmonious and coherent system. The factors of unity and
order which allcw us to speak of a legal system are the constitution,
which contains the fundamental notions of the branches of law;
Jurisprudence, which elaborates the fundamental principles and
elementary notions of the system such as the doctrine of the sources
and of interpretation or the ccmmon elements of the branches of law -
legal acts, legal formalism, legal rights, legal personality, etc. -
and finally, the unity of jurisdiction (ibid: 225, 229). In my
submission, these formal factors only contribute to the ordering of
the sources. For there to be a system, stricter requirements are
needed i.e. the requirements of completeness, closure, consistency and
decidability. When Raz (AL: 106) sorts out three characteristics of
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legal systems namely, (i) that they claim authority to regulate any
type of behaviour, (ii) that they claim to be supreme and (iii) that
they are open, he is presumably not talking about systems in a
«
metalogical sense but in a looser sense analogous to legal order. The
notion of system as elaborated by logicians is too restrictive to be
able to explain legal systems and the notion of system as elaborated
by "systems theories" h. la Luhmann, in spite of seme interesting
contributions, is too vague to be able to explain the legal order or
legal system.
(a) There can be three kinds of completeness of the legal system:
(1) Completeness of validity (decidability). In legal systems
there is a closure principle (norm) according to which a norm
belongs to the system if and only if (iff) it has been enacted in
accordance with a veilid norm of the system or it is the
consequence of a valid norm or group of norms of the system.
This type of completeness presupposes a notion of systemic
validity, and it can be said that it is a feature of legal
systems whether explicitly formulated in seme legal text or
implicit in a practice of recognition, or both. In EC law this
closure principle can be found in the practice of the ECT and
also indirectly in article 1(2) of the SEA.
(2) The completeness of qualification is more questionable. It
means that for any "relevant" case there is a deontic (legal)
solution i.e. one can say whether it is permitted, obligatory or
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forbidden. It is important to stress the word "relevant" because
there are no gaps in abstracto for cases that are part of the
environment of the law, but which it does not deal with. In same
branches of the law there are scams norms which solve the problem
of completeness e.g. the principle nullum crimen, nulla poena
sine lege in criminal law. But in other branches, same legal
theories and ideologies of the judicial application of the law
postulate this feature: there are no gaps in the law, the courts
must act as if the law were gapless. But such gaps are
inevitable: it is generally accepted that the law does not
qualify deontically every single case with which it deals.
Two classical legal theories deal with this problem of
completeness. The theory of the "legal vacuum" as put forward by
Santi Romano and Bergbahm is based on the principle of excluded
middle or tertium non datur: the norms make up the law, all the
law. If there is a norm there is a legally occupied space. If
there is no norm there is no legally relevant space and therefore
no legal gap. This idea of an occupied space and a void is not
unrelated to Luhmann's distinction between the legal system and
its environment. It is either a petitio principi; or a
tautology. The second theory, held by Zitelmann, Donati and the
earlier Kelsen postulates the existence of a general exclusive
norm implicitly accompanying all particular legal norms and which
excludes the regulation of all other possible contents not
explicit in that norm. This theory undoes more than it purports
to correct for it rules out the possibility of analogical
reasoning or of many norms such as exemplary norms, norms that
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provide lists or enumerations, etc. and it is very problematic
because of its ontological commitment - the postulate of the
existence of a general exclusionary norm implicit in every norm.
The theory would succumb to Oakham's razor: entia nan sunt
multiplicanda praeter necessitatem.
The EEC Treaty contains provisions saying that the Council
shall regulate this or that question, e.g. article 75 on
transport policy, but no steps are taken in that direction. In
such cases there is a normative gap. The Treaty talks about a
certain case: the Council is to lay dcwn ccmmon rules, but it
does not provide even minimum guidelines on what they could be.
All it tells us is that the Council is to act. This view holds
even if we leave aside the problems of vagueness or obscurity of
the norms since in those cases legal interpretation clarifies the
meaning of the norm selecting one of its several possible deontic
qualifications and it also holds if we say that there are no
"diacritical" gaps because the judge must pronounce on all cases,
for many of the cases that could in theory be covered by article
75 are not legally relevant yet and the courts cannot pronounce
upon them (Conte; 1968, and Alchourron-Bulygin; 1971).
But other discourses on gaps are evaluative: they postulate
that it would be desirable to have a norm on seme point, but
since there is not one, an axiological gap exists. Examples of
such axiological gaps would be the energy policy, the protection
of the consumers and of the environment and monetary policy at
the time when the Treaty came into force. It can plausibly be
held that the EEC Treaty foresees the possibility of there being
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such axiological gaps in its article 235, but this is not an
article addressed to the ECJ: "If action by the Community should
prove necessary to attain, in the course of the operation of the
common market, one of the objectives of the Community and this
Treaty has not provided the necessary powers, the Council shall,
acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission and after
consulting the Assembly, take the appropriate measures". In our
case, it is taken for granted that the law of the EC has
normative gaps (gaps of qualification) apart from semantic
indeterminacies, and that therefore it is not a complete system.
(3) Most legal theories agree that (procedural) completeness of
decision is a feature of law. According to this notion the law
is complete because any dispute that arises before a court has to
be decided. There might be a positive norm imposing such a duty
on the judge such as article 4 of the French and Belgian civil
codes, article 1(7) of the Spanish civil code, or, according to a
general doctrinal opinion, article 164 of the EEC Treaty under a
purposive interpretation. On seme occasions a legal norm can
provide criteria for filling in normative gaps or antinomies
(articles 53(3) and 9(1) of the Spanish Constitution and article
3(4) of the Spanish civil code). In same other cases a legal
norm can even suggest that in order to fill in those gaps the
j\adge step outwith the posited norms (the said article 53(3) and
9(2) and article 1(2) of the Swiss civil code). These can be
regarded as instances of a legal order that presents itself as a
"system". If not explicitly incorporated into positive law,
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jurists customarily postulate decisional completeness and thus
require judges to assume the legal order is complete. This
postulate can be deduced frcm three principles: the principles
(a) that judicial decisions are unavoidable, (b) that they have
to be well grounded or motivated (c) by reference to general
norms of the legal order. Alchourron and Bulygin rightly point
out that although the postulate only holds, if at all, in the
criminal law, it is still a practical requirement of legal
science which strives to regard the legal system as rational.
But, in my opinion, and here is where I differ from the authors,
it is an ideological practiced, requirement. As Foriers rightly
points out (1968) provisions such as the above mentioned article
4 of the French and Belgian civil codes do not impose on the
judge a duty to fill in the gaps of the law but only a duty to
judge. The court might decide that the claim brought before it
is not grounded and thus dismiss the claim for it cannot be based
on any legal norm (it cannot be well grounded). In such cases
the courts are no less judging, they are deciding that the claim
is ill-founded. As will be seen in chapter 5, legal reasoning
can be regarded as a "game" of justification. The rules of the
"game", as accepted by a social interpretative practice and
regulated in part by jurisdictional norms, have it that legal
arguments be ultimately grounded on legal sources (authority
reasons), be they ought-sources, should-sources or may-sources.
If no legal source at all can be put forward by the claimant, the
claim is dismissed (see Chapter 7).
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Non-contradiction or consistency of the norms of the system
This is a dogma of all theories of legal system: all legal
systems are ex definitione consistent and any "apparent" antinomy
is to be done away with by legal reasoning in legal
interpretation. In practice there are scrae relative or limited
antinomies. In order to solve these, systemic interpretation or
even same norms of the legal system might provide with criteria
for the resolution of antinomies: the criteria lex superior
derogat inferiori, lex specialis deroqat qenerali, lex posterior
derogat priori. The question of antinomies is related to the
completeness of qualification, for sometimes so called
axiological gaps are really cases of apparent antinomies: a norm
of the system would imply consequences that are evaluated as
undesirable or contrary to the system, and thus the norm is
blanked out and a gap is predicated of the law. The availability
of such reasonings is very doubtful.
A more real problem about the solution of antinomies arises
when there is a clash between the different criteria. One then
needs second level criteria: lex prior superior deroqat lege
inferiori posteriori, etc. But, of all the thinkable second
order criteria only this one is generally accepted. As Bobbio
says (1965) it is not a settled question whether hierarchy
overrules speciality nor whether speciality overrules temporality
(see also Wrbblewski; 1985 a). The court will solve the
antinomies case by case. But then in this case too, the
consistency of the IS cannot be assured a priori but only a
posteriori by means of the arguments of consistency and coherence
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vised in legal reasoning (IRUT: chs. 4 and 5). In the case of EC
law, besides possible internal antinomies i.e. clashes between
norms of the EC legal order, there is the further problem of
conflict between Community norms and norms of the Member States.
Whereas the classical criteria - hierarchy, speciality and
temporality - for the resolution of antinomies apply within each
legal order, they do not solve conflicts between two norms of
different legal orders (Pescatore; 1973: 262).
In such cases one needs the further criterion of competence.
In an area where the Community has been attributed and has
assumed competence, Community law takes precedence over the
domestic law of the Member States (principle of supremacy of EC
law). In an area reserved to state competence no conflict can
arise since the Community will not have been attributed authority
or competence (article 4(1) of the EEC Treaty states the
principle of the attribution of powers: "Each institution shall
act within the limits of the powers conferred upon it by this
Treaty"). The problems might and do arise in the areas where the
Community either shares competence with the Member States or has
been attributed competence but has not, as yet assumed it. There
is no unanimity as to the solution of these conflicts. They will
also be solved a posteriori, case by case. This discussion
centered around Community law further illustrates the point that
the law is not of necessity consistent, although it can and it is
a posteriori made consistent by means of legal reasonings in
legal interpretation (see Chapter 7).
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Closure v. Openness of the Legal System
The idea of closure is also related to the existence or non¬
existence of gaps in the law. In a closed system the fundamental
norms completely determine the content of the other norms of the
system. But in the legal system fundamental norms, e.g. those
contained in the Constitution or in the Foundational Treaties,
only partially determine the content of the other norms of the
system. The Treaty establishing the EEC lays down seme
fundamental principles - basic freedoms and standstill clauses
and prohibitions of discrimination, or the basic principle of
fair competition inspiring the totality of the Treaty - which
negatively determine the content of derived legislation in
implementation thereof. The Treaty sets material limits which no
provision of derived sources can trespass, and an effective
jurisdictional mechanism is set up to ensure that such limits are
observed i.e. judicial review by the ECJ of the acts of the
Community institutions and of the Member States namely articles
169, 170, 171 and 173 EEC. But the Treaty does not positively
determine the content of derived legislation. The principle of
legality (legal certainty) and judicial review of
"constitutionality" are elements of closure. Again, this closure
is secured a posteriori, case by case. Those principles tend to
assure the closure of the system. The EEC Treaty norms are
mainly principles. There are very few rules in the Treaty.
Explicit rules are to be found especially in derived legislation.
The content of those rules was not completely predetermined in
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the Treaty principles. It can therefore be concluded that the
legal system of the European Communities is not closed a priori,
but it is not completely open either.
Two theories may be mentioned which postulate the closure of
the Legal System (EWorkin's theory will be mentioned below).
Conte (op. cit.: passim) convincingly argues that the closure of
the legal system is guaranteed because normative gaps or lacune
critique, can always be surmounted by recourse to arguments a
contrario from the totality of the propositions of the system.
"L'ordre juridique consiste aussi en les jugements
juridictionnelles. Mais la decision juridictionnelle obtenue a
contrario n'a pas essence de norme - it only exists as a norm -
n'est pas une qualification deontique du ccmportement sur lequel
on juge. Elle est une negation faible de prepositions
prescriptives - since it is only a weak negation it does not
produce an affirmative prescription - II n'y a aucune raison de
supposer que les ccanportements inqualifies sont facultatifs
parce-que non-obligatoires ou permis parce-que non-defendus. Si
l'on argumente a contrario a partir d'une seule preposition
prescriptive notamment celle sur laquelle le demandeur a base sa
demande, il n'y a aucune contradiction ci interpreter la
conclusion comme negation forte [which would affirm the contrary
proposition]. Mais il y a contradiction si 1'argument precede de
la totalite des prepositions prescriptives" (ibid: 83-84). The
argument a contrario can be used in systemic interpretation.
This theory of closure does not contradict the view that the
system is not completely closed a priori.
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The other theory of closure which I find worth mentioning is
Luhmann's. He holds that the system is operationally closed.
The legal system is seen as autonomous and autopoietic or self-
reproducing. It produces norms with reference to itself, through
norms. The legal system feeds upon its own operations and law
becomes self-founding: law can no longer be founded on principles
outwith itself for any communication with the Environment - that
which is not the System - can be incorporated into the legal
system only by way of legally determined procedures or operations
e.g. through the process of law-making or judicial decision¬
making which are both formally regulated by the legal system
according to the binary code legal/illegal or valid/invalid. No
legally relevant event can derive its normativity from the
environment of the system, but only from the fact that it is
operationally regulated in the system. The IS is thus closed.
Luhmann can be seen as restating, in a more sophisticated way and
shifting the emphasis to the procedural aspect of law, the theory
of the legal empty space (see above); and in that sense, his
theory is also tautological and does not say anything new: law is
the law is the law is the law... (see, in general G Teubner;
1988).
As Bankcwski says (1989), Iuhmann's theory is a sociologised
version of Kelsen's, and because of that it is, in my opinion
subject to the same problem, namely hew to explain the rise of
the system. The EEC Treaty instituted the legal system of the
EEC from anew. How can it meaningfully be said that the legal
system of the EEC fed upon its own operations? For, clearly,
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before the Treaty came into being there were no such operations.
But Luhmann is also Kelsenian in the sense that he does not place
much importance on the problems of argumentation and
interpretation. Autonomy, which he sees as essential to the
legal system, is in danger once the legal coding (legal/illegal)
as such is in danger of being replaced by criteria of economic
utility and political expediency (Luhmann is especially troubled
by movements such as the Interessenjurisprudenz): the legal
quality of claims and decisions can be derived only from other
operations of the same System, it cannot be supplied from
external sources lite religion or politics or the economy. This
view mates it difficult for the analyst to study the role of
evaluative choices in the interpretation and application of the
law when the legal system is regarded as being normatively
closed.
But when attention is turned to legal argumentation, one
sees that precisely such references are at play e.g. in
reasonings from consequenes or policy decisions. Thus, in
Commission v. Council (case 45/86 [1988] 2 CMLR 131) the ECJ held
that one of the objectives of the Common Commercial Policy as
envisaged by the EEC Treaty (art. 110) is to contribute to the
harmonious development of world trade, and added: "this
presupposes that the Common Commercial Policy will be adjusted in
order to take account of any changes of outlook in international
relations" (at 154). The ECJ operates in a highly politicised
milieu, and to claim the autonomy of Community law from the
political environment is at least abjectionable. The ECJ
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addresses its decisions to a legal audience but also to a
political audience, and it must try to make those decisions
acceptable to both audiences. Many of the criticisms directed at
the Court of Justice run precisely along those lines, namely that
it has neglected the political environment in which it operates,
and from which it claims full autonomy at its own peril. But
luhmann is right in focussing on the operational autonomy of the
legal system. Of course he is not the only beneficiary to that
credit. The institutional theory of law has been focussing on
that aspect for a number of years. The other reason why
Iuhmann's theory is not followed here is his denied, of norm
hierarchies. He holds that "Autcpoietic processes are recursive
i.e. necessarily symmetrically structured ... There can therefore
be no norm hierarchies. In terms of normativity a strict
symmetry exists between the law and the judge' s decision ... In
terms of normativity the relationship between the rule and its
application is circular. Normativity as a clinging to
expectations despite disappointments is always and everywhere the
same" (1988 a: 21). Once the decision is made (and not quashed)
it does enjoy the same normative status as any other norm, but
what luhmann disregards is that if that decision is to be
justified or is appealed against, the notion of norm hierarchies
is essential. Thus a decision of the ECT will be justified by
reference to higher sources in a chain of validity that
culminates in one of the Treaties.
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The Unity of the Legal System also raises problems. Unity is
always the unity of something. In this case unity refers to the
unity of the system of sources. This is a dogma dear to state
theories, but it has to reply to three objections: (a) how does
it explain legal customary rules? The reply would be that
customary rules are recognised as a source by the laws of the
state. The statute regulates where and with what effects custom
can operate as a source; (b) hew does it explain special legal
systems of both private - such as the Scottish legal order within
the UK - and public law - such as the Basque autonomous
administration or other similar systems in Federal States -
within the state? The state dogma will still strive to explain
these "nuances" by referring to foundational norms such as the
1707 Acts of Union of the English and Scottish parliaments, or
the Spanish Constitution. The paradox in the Basque case is that
the Constitution was not approved by a majority of the Basques
whereas the Autonomy statute formally grounded on that
Constitution was approved by majority. The problems of validity
and legitimacy are inherently related; (c) the third objection
canes from legal orders of supranational organisations. The EC
constitutes a distinct legal order. This legal order is directly
applicable and effective in the Member States and thus a
harmonisation between the Community legal order on the one hand
and the legal order of the Member States on the other is
necessary. If one wants to maintain the dogma of unity of the
legal order then one must adopt Kelsen's position: the source of
unity is international law (in this case EC law), the legal
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orders of the Member States being subordinated to it. But at
this point one abandons the state dogma. It is hoped by many
(including myself) in the circles of Nations-without-a-State
(such as Alba-Scotland or Euskadi) that the great and definite
challenge to the state dogma posed by the emergence of the
European Canmunities will somehow contribute to the search for
new political and institutional arrangements whereby these
European Natians-without-a-State will be satisfactorily
represented within the European CTrnmunities thus escaping from
their present oblivion. The dynamics of sub-state and supra-
state developments can create the need to device alternative
theories of law that shift the emphasis from the state to other
institutional-political arrangements.
The legal system does not enjoy a completeness of
qualification, a priori consistency, unity or closure. Thus,
when the words "legal system" are used along this work they are
used in a large sense as synonyms to "legal order".
3. Criteria of Validity
By means of these criteria one can decide upon the validity of
any (legal) norm. Let us first examine two classical criteria. The
criterion of territorial ity has it that two norms belong to the same
system iff both norms are applied in the same territory. But this
criterion becomes circular because the concept of territory is itself
legally regulated. Another problem with this criterion is the case of
extraterritorial application of Community law (the issue was raised in
Continental Can, infra and the most recent case an the question is
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Wood Palp Producers, infra) or the application of several legal orders
within the same territory e.g. CarnmLinity law and the law of the Member
States. The criterion of the common commander holds that two norms
belong to the same system iff both have been enacted by the same
legislator, but this theory has to postulate fictions regarding the
change of legislators, delegated legislation and reception of sources
originating in different legislators: conflict of laws, public
international law, etc. In the case of Community law it would have
problems to explain the mechanism of directives which are determined
by the Conmunity as regards the results to be achieved but leaving to
the Member States the choice of forms and methods for their
implementation (art. 189 EEC Treaty).
(a) The criterion of the basic norm is built upon a necessary
presupposition of cognition (the Grundnorm is presupposed in
order to make sense of legal validity). Kelsen proposed the
criterion of the chain of validity: a norm is valid iff it has
been enacted in accordance with another (higher) valid norm of
the system i.e. if its form, its author and its operation are
founded on a hierarchically higher norm which is itself founded
on a higher norm, and so on until the ultimate norm of the system
(Constitution) is reached. Validity is content-independent, it
is a purely formal criterion: a norm is valid if it has been
adopted according to the formal conditions provided for in a
higher norm (Kelsen; 1970: ch. 5 and Kelsen; 1973: chs 1 and 3).
Since the Constitution does not receive its validity from any
higher norm - an infinite regress would result from this - its
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validity is presupposed or postulated as a hypothesis. The
Grundnorm is sometimes interpreted as starting the chain of
validity of the legal system as a whole; on this interpretation
the Grundnomt would say something like: "the Constitution is to
be regarded as valid". The Grundnorm need not be the
Constitution of a State (for Kelsen it is just a postulate)
although it is sometimes taken to be analogous to a primeval
Constitution (especially by same mid-century constitutionalists
like Carre de Malberg). A second reading of the Grundnorm sees
it as a fiction. It does not really matter when or how it
originated, it is just an epistemological starting point for the
system. One presupposes it is there because the legal system
works, but it is not a postulate or a convention. As Trcper says
(lectures given at the IUE-Firenze-1989), this view of the
Grundnorm as a fiction draws on Vaihinger's epistemology (Kelsen
elaborates on it in his posthumous work Allqemeine Theorie der
Normen).
But in which epistemological stage is this hypothesis (or
even the fiction) formulated? Once the system is identified and
one needs to secure its validity? or does the Grundnorm itself
formulate criteria of validity for the system? But in that case
where does one find such criteria? If the Grundnorm is the
constitution there is no problem, but if it is not, and it is
only presupposed, where are we to find it? Is it a rule of
recognition presupposed in the social practice of the lawyers and
officials of the system? The Grundnorm and the chain of validity
acquire their meaning in the description of the legal system.
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Otherwise this idea of "validity" performs a legitimising
function (Weinberger in Kelsen; 1973). One can use the term
"existence" instead of "validity" if one wants to stress the
descriptive aspect, the term "validity" being more directly
related to the concept of normativity and thus implying some link
with the internal point of view. The existence of a norm means
that this norm belongs to a system. The existence of the legal
system consists in its efficacy i.e. in the fact that it is in
force and generally observed (Nino; 1983: ch. 3).
(b) Hart thought this rule of recognition could be found in the
practice of judges and other officials in the form of a secondary
rule, not necessarily written dcwn, which guides the judges and
law-applying officials in their quest for the applicable law (CL:
V-3 and VI-1). Criteria of recognition thus determine when the
reasons given for judicial decisions are adequate, but they do
not determine the validity of rules and other legal standards
(MaoCormick; 1981: 115 and ch. 3). The rule of recognition tells
us where to lock for valid law but it does not itself confer any
validity an the law as the Grundnorm (on its first
interpretation) purports to do.
(c) Alf Ross favours a factual validity: legal norms are valid iff
the judges apply them. The validity of the legal system lies in
the fact that if that system is taken as a hypothesis it is
possible to explain judicial action as an institutional response
to a bunch of conditioned stimuli - the legal sources seen as
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binding by virtue of a canmon normative ideology shared by the
judges - and to a certain extent to forecast such response (OU:
passim, and Pattaro; 1980: ch. 2).
Eworkin (IE: ch. 1) attributes legal positivism the postulate
that there are shared semantic criteria about how to use the word
law; semantic theories presuppose that lawyers and judges use the
same criteria to decide whether statements about norms are true
or false, and therefore that they agree on the grounds of law
(grounds meaning sources?). Dworkin rejects the idea that unless
lawyers and judges share factual criteria about the grounds of
law there can be no significant talk about what the law is. He
holds positivists consider disagreements about the law as being
purely empirical but in reality there are theoretical
disagreements about what the law is in a particular case.
Eworkin admits that for positivists too, theoretical
disagreements are possible. But only in hard cases. He accuses
positivism of adopting a plain fact view of the grounds of law:
that the law is only a matter of what legal institutions have
decided in the past and that questions of law can always be
answered by looking into the books where the records of
institutional decisions are kept; and that when lawyers and
judges appear to be disagreeing in a theoretical way about what
the law is, they are really disagreeing about what it should be.
This view of Dworkin! s seems to pose a challenge in the view
adopted in this work. I must therefore face the semantic "sting"
of legal positivism. In my opinion shared semantic criteria on
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hew to use the word "law" are necessary for any discussion about
law to be meaningful. Otherwise one person could call "law"
something that another person would not consider law at all.
Seme of the cross-talk between legal positivists and natural
lawyers can be understood this way. There will be cases where
those shared criteria do not clearly answer the question whether
something is to be considered law (an element of indeterminacy is
endemic to law). Likewise, the decision as to whether seme
statements about norms are true or false i.e. whether those norms
exist or are valid, necessitates seme sort of agreement as to
what it is that makes a norm exist or be valid: seme criteria of
decidability. But these criteria are not about the grounds of
law, unless by grounds is meant the sources of law. One seldom
finds questions about the grounds of law at the courts.
Is Eworkin's claim that positivists conceive only of
empirical disagreements about the law empirically correct?
Disagreements as to the law in a particular case could be settled
by looking into the books where the records of institutional
decisions are kept. EXsrorkin uses the word "law" as in "the law
in a particular case" referring to the legal norm to be applied.
Disagreements as to what norm should be applied can be
theoretical when what Eworkin calls empirical disagreements do
not solve the question which norm or which sense of the norm is
to be applied. A positivist would find no trouble in conceding
this point. Moreover the norms of the legal system expect the
law-applying agents to have recourse to the plain fact view first
and foremost i.e. to search for a positive norm of the system,
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and only when the law-applying organ is satisfied that no such
norm clearly applies to the case or that there is a normative
gap, (situation of doubt or of interpretation) will such organ
have recourse to principles and standards and face theoretical
disagreements about the law in a particular way. In such problem
cases positivists would agree that there are genuine theoretical
disagreements about the law to be applied, and that an
interpretative pratice is called for. This view does not
conflict with EWorkin' s. But he thinks that this interpretative
practice is present always, even in so-called clear cases. I
would agree that in order to decide that a case is clear, seme
sort of understanding and discernment is present, and I am aware
that same authors call that heuristic phenomenon "interpretation"
but I am for restricting the use of the word to the sort of
stricto sensu interpretation involved in hard cases.
Even amongst empirical semantic criteria there is rocm for
disagreements e.g. problems of classification of facts and
interpretation of norms, problems about hew to read precedents,
etc. In order to solve these problems the law-applying organ
needs recourse to theoretical criteria about hew to operate with
the sources. These are sometimes provided by the law (IS), while
at other times they are canons of legal reasoning to be
reconstructed from judicial practice or from authoritative
judicial doctrines. Where do these criteria come from? As has
been seen, legal systems are not closed, complete, decidable
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systems. Eworkin is right in saying that they ccme from an
interpretative practice which is both constituted by and
constitutive of the law.
The approach followed in the present work closely follows
Wroblewski (1982, and Peczenik-Wrdblewski? 1985). The
identification of this or that legal system - say the legal order
of the European Communities - does not pose major problems at the
level of social practice. The problems arise at the theoretical
level. legal science, the ideology of the rational legislator
and of the rational and legal application of the law all
postulate a systemic validity: a legal norm is valid iff (a) it
has been adopted in accordance with seme norm of the system, (b)
it is coherent or at least can be made coherent with the other
norms of the system and with the principles that inspire it and
(c) it is not negated by any other norm of the system
(consistency). Factual validity adds to these conditions the
requirement that (d) the officials of the system observe the
norm. This requirement is accepted. Other theories and
ideologies of law add to these same type of axiological
requirement. If such requirement conflicts with systemic
validity it is not accepted in the legal system. But if it did
not contradict systemic validity it would be acceptable,
especially in the context of legal argumentation in hard cases
(see chapter 5). As was pointed out above, no theory of law can
ignore the role played by evaluative choices in the application
and interpretation of the law, as well as in law-making. The
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requirement (e) of axiological acceptability can thus be
incorporated into our model of operative validity (and it is then
slightly related to the requirement of coherence).
The definition of law as a system of norms can be fuzzy if
the definiens is formulated in a fuzzy language such as ordinary
language (Peczenik-Wroblewski; 1985: 5). There are five
conceptions of a IS. The IS can consist of enacted rules (ISIE),
and of inferred formal consequences of enacted rules (ISFC), and
of interpretative consequences of enacted rules (ISIC), and of
individual norms that form operative law (ISOL) and finally it
can also include principles, policies and other standards (ISPP).
For each of the conceptions of a IS there is a corresponding
conception of validity. Fuzziness of validity consists in the
undecidability whether the statement "R is a valid norm in the
IS" is true or else its negation is true. Hard rules of
recognition enable one to determine strictly and for any norm
whether or not it belongs to the system. These hold for the
ISIE, the IDFC and the ISOL. Soft rules of recognition do not
determine criteria of validity, and fuzzy rules of recognition
formulate criteria according to which, for same norms one can
decide without doubt whether they are valid in the system, but
for others the situation is doubtful (the distinction hard/soft
law is not similar to the distinction hard/clear case: if there
is a hard law or rule, the situation or case is likely to be
clear). These appear in the validity conceptions of the ISIE
(regarding the collision of norms and perhaps normative gaps as
well although Wrablewski doubts this), and especially of the ISIC
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and ISPP. The consequence of the fuzziness of validity is that
the scope of the IS is not determined in a hard manner (Peczenik




LEGAL NGFMS AND SOURCES OF LAW
PRELIMINARY POINTS
A terminological point needs to be made at this stage.
Throughout the present work I use the term "norm" meaning something
similar to a legal normative item or unit, a legal production: an
identifiable normative preposition belonging to a system and which
pragmatically operates as a legal reason for the law-addressees and
law-applying agents. In order to refer to this idea several terms
have been used by different authors: "norm",, "rule", "law4', "command",
"precept" etc. (for a review of the literature in English see ESL: ch
4). Legal norms (LNs) are the atoms of the legal system (IS). They
include legal rules and other legal standards, namely legal principles
(hard law and soft law in political science jargon). Thus we say that
the legal order or legal system consists of legal norms, of all items
that operate as legal norms.
I use the word "legal rule" in a more restrictive sense, with a
narrower extension. Legal rules are a special type of norms that have
a specific structure, a binary structure:
(1) a protasis which foresees the operative facts: authority, source,
addressees, situation, character, content and conditions of
application
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(2) an apodosis, which provides with the legal consequences of those
operative facts, with their deontic qualification (Twining-Miers;
1976: 11-2 and von Wright; 1963: ch. 1.
In simpler terms, a rule provides a solution for a case.
Sometimes rules are found in legal texts with this binary structure.
Other times they are constructed from several legal provisions
(dispositions juridiques) for the language used in legal texts is not
neatly divided into separate rules under the principle "to each
provision, one rule". In many a case rules can be formulated in spite
of there being no specific legal text e.g. customary rules or the
ratio decidendi in legal precedents. There is no such thing as the
correct formulation of rules of law drawn from judicial precedents
although one can talk about the correct norm-proposition that all norm
formulations must convey. The intensity of interpretative activity
involved in these operations ranges from a minimum in the re¬
formulation of rules from simple and straightforward provisions to a
maximum of creative activity in the operations of distinguishing
precedents or constructing vague and ambiguous statutory provisions.
Legal principles, as used throughout this work are legal norms
that lack that binary structure. They are usually general statements
contained in legal texts or inductively drawn from them. Because they
lack a binary structure, they do not enter into logical relations (of
entailment) as readily as legal rules do, where, if the condition of
subsumption contained in the protasis is fulfilled, the consequent in
the apodosis can be deduced. As will be seen belcw the rules of
recognition for principles are fuzzy.
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The literature does not agree on the use of these terms - norms,
rules, principles. One of the reasons why I have chosen this
terminology is that it is readily translateable into other Western
European languages: Norm, Regel, Prinzip; norme, regie, principe;
norma, regola (reqla), principio. Raz (1980: ch. 7) uses the term
"laws" to refer to rules or norms. The term is ambiguous enough in
English, but when translated as Gesetz, loi, legge, ley, etc. the
result is likely to be more confusion. My use of these terms does no
violence to current usage in at least German, French, Italian and
Castillan (Spanish), although there is no universally accepted use of
those terms amongst jurists. The other reason for my use of those
terms is that it can cover Eworkin's distinction between rules and
principles under a more general term, "norm", although other authors
consider principles as a kind of normative rules of so abstract a
content that subsumption cannot be realised (Weinberger; 1989: 10.).
Not all legal norms are prescriptive and not all prescriptions
are legal norms. The existence of a sanction accompanying legal norms
is not a necessary nor a sufficient condition to distinguish them from
other types of norms: social or cultural norms. Seme such norms are
accompanied by sanctions, albeit diffuse. And not all legal norms
have a sanction - most of the principles in Part One of the EEC Treaty
lack a sanction. Legal norms are the atoms of the legal system.
After having been grasped most legal norms can take any linguistic
formulation but the normative preposition must remain the same. This
is, of course, not so clear where there are problems of
interpretation. Those norms which are not readily identifable amongst
the provisions of a legal text with a fixed linguistic formulation are
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semantically almost identical and syntactially very similar to the
prepositions about norms (descriptive prepositions) as they appear in
legal dogmatics. The way to distinguish these statements is to look
at the pragmatic aspect of their utterance. If the statement is
uttered felicitously with an intention to guide behaviour
(illocutionary force) then it is a norm. The theory of speech acts is
very useful in this connection. Different language games are being
played according to different conventions when stating something about
the content of a norm and when stating a norm. The illocutionary and
especially the perlocutionary force of those two acts differs.
The typical norm formulation (for legal rules) would run:
«if facts Fx obtain, then consequence Cx ought to follcw»
Ought can be substituted by any deontic operator e.g. permission,
obligation, prohibition. To give an example, Article 171 of the EEC
Treaty says: "If the Court of Justice finds that a Member State has
failed to fufil an obligation under this Treaty, the State shall be
required to take the necessary measures to comply with the judgment of
the Court of Justice". This is a complex norm addressed to the Member
States. Its protasis refers to the "case" where the Court is of the
(pinion that a Member State was under an obligation to do something
(or to forbear doing something) and that the State has not fulfilled
its obligation (articles 169 and 170 are presupposed here). The
operative facts foreseen in this protasis are complex institutional
facts (fulfillment of obligations, requiring an institution to comply
with a judgment) the verification of which calls for evaluation and
discernment and requires a thorough knowledge of the law: what counts
as fulfillment of an obligation? The apodosis of this norm is the
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deontic factor expressed by the words "shall be required". This
deontic element falls on a certain "solution": take the necessary
measures to comply with the judgment of the Court (see the case
discussed in Chapter 6).
A preposition about that norm would run: «according to article
171 of the EEC Treaty (which is a valid norm of the legal system of
the European Communities), if the Court of Justice finds that a Member
State has failed to fulfil an obligation under the Treaty, that State
shall be required...». Validity in the metalanguage would perhaps
ressemble Tarski's conception of truth as a semantic concept
(Vernengo; 1987).
Externally, norms function as reasons for action, guiding the
behaviour of law-addressees and officials in many different ways and
influencing the expectations of individuals and groups. "The social
existence of norms is established by their becoming operative as part
of an action-guiding system for some persons or groups. Socially
existing norms function as constitutive elements of institutions, and
their being real is nothing else but the fact that they are in
functional connection with institutions and that they work as frames
for action... (Weinberger; 1989: 14.). Internally, norms are
interpretatively evaluated according to criteria of recognition and
validity endorsed in different degrees by the interpreter. The
interpreter will look at the source of the norm, and decide according
to institutionalised criteria of validity whether and to what extent
it regulates a given case. One cognises a norm as an indivisible unit
but ontologically, to use a Pcpperian language, one can reconstruct
the norm in entities existing in World-1 as physical events:
61
inscriptions in texts, or a group of utterances; in World-2 as
psychological events: intentions, endorsements, etc.; and in the
World-3 of inter-subjectively existing ideas as thought-contents or
normative meanings of the events of World 1 (Peczenik; 1984).
When the law is written down in legal texts certain consequences
obtain: there is a controllable and identifiable registry of what
counts as law and this facilitates the ordering and assessment of the
law, discretion diminishes and the formulation of the norms is fixed
(Stein; 1984: ch. 6). The law derived from other non-written sources
is in that sense less controllable, and it may be prone to suffer the
same shortcomings which Hart (CL: ch. 5, see also MacCormick; 1981:
chs. 8-9) identified in a law consisting only of primary rules i.e.
rules that impose duties and institute rights: (1) a lack of security
since there are no rules of recognition or criteria of validity, (2) a
lack of rules of change (norms that regulate legal operations), (3)
and a lack of efficacy in the application of legal norms since there
are no rules of adjudication. Secondary rules (second order norms)
are needed to make good for such defaults.
Such secondary norms are not unproblematic. Apart from the
fuzziness of rules of recognition and criteria of validity, legal
norms themselves can also be - they usually are - fuzzy because in the
last resort legal language, being an instance of ordinary language, is
a fuzzy language. Fuzziness of meaning of legal rules occurs when
their reference is not determinate enough to single out what belongs
to the classes referred to by the terms (descriptions of operative
facts) used in the norm formulations, and when the linguistic
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expression forming the rule is complex or syntactically ambiguous
(Peczenik-Wroblewski; 1985: part IV). This is a fortiori also the
case for general legal principles.
Fuzzy set logic seems capable of accommodating the penumbra areas
of many open-textured concepts used in the law, but a purely semantic
determination is insufficient in these cases and one needs to take
pragmatic aspects of the use and application of those concepts into
account (Igartua; 1988 a: 327-8). In order to operate with fuzzy
rules of recognition and fuzzy norms one can hardly resort to
deductive inferences (such inferences would only apply to clear and
determined hard legal rules). Instead, one develops a special type of
logic to deal with fuzzy concepts and fuzzy sets: a logic that
effectuates non-equivalent transformations from premises that are not
analytic to conclusions that are not deductively entailed by them.
The classical logical systems in which every well-formed-formula is
either true or false seem inapprcpiate for the assessment of informal
arguments with premises and/or conclusions which, because of their
vagueness, one hesitates to call either definitely true or definitely
false in their system (Haack; 1978: 9).
It might be better to do away with the concept of truth when
talking about legal norms and use the concept of system-validity
instead. That way, we can accommodate standard logic to the logical
treatment of norms, as long as we strive to keep the deontic element
of norms at least in two moments of norm logic: at the moment of
enacting and recognising a norm and at the moment when the judicial
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organ dictates the individual norm (the deontic element is thus
present in the scheme of performative speech acts but not in the
scheme of transformations between the contents of norms).
The term "sources of law" can be used in different ways:
(1) It is sometimes understood as referring to sources of law-making
(e.g. the higher norm on which the lower-rank norm is based
counts as its source of validity, or the delegating statute
counts as the source of validity for the developing statute, or
an article of the EEC Treaty calling for Community action in a
certain sphere counts as the source of that Community action).
(2) the term can also refer to "sources of decisions": e.g. arguments
justifying a judicial decision. In this sense ought-sources,
should-sources, may-sources and may not-sources can be sorted
out. The principle of the rule of law or Rechtstaat demands
(among other things) that legal decisions be based or grounded on
legal norms. Legal norms can be extracted from various sources
of law [sense (3) ]. The statement about the meaning of a norm is
a proposition about the way a normative act (embodied in the
source) is to be understood.
(3) one can also refer to the source of information concerning legal
norms: where do we extract legal norms frcm? One can sort out
written legal documents: the Treaties and Community legislation,
or precedents, or acquis ccmrnunautaire but one can also extract
norms from sources lacking a printed existence: custom, general
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principles, moral opinion, etc. In the first case sources have a
world-1 existence as physical spatio-temporal objects, although
the normative import given to the source is typical of world-3.
In the second sense, non written sources such as custom or
practices can be identified as events hapenning in world-1 and
world-2 (neurological processes of agents recognising and
following that custom or those practices) but they receive their
normative content from world-3. Principles or moral opinions are
specially interesting in that they do not necessarily exist in
world-1 (unless they are written down).
(4) "functional sources of law" are those aspects of social life that
lead to the creation of law: e.g. social class conflict, economic
interests and disputes, technology etc. In the European
Community context one can identify many such functional sources:
economic interests (demands for legislation from different
agents) class conflict (demands for the protection of workers'
rights) special problems created by technological development,
and demands for legislation concerning the protection of the
environment and of the consumer, etc. Many of these functional
sources can be pulling for regulation in opposite directions e.g.
short-term economic interests v. environmental protection or
social rights.
It will be clear from the context which sense of the term
"sources of law" I use throughout this work. The most common use of
the term will be either (2) or (3). (4) is very seldom used.
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LEGAL NORMS OF THE EC LEGAL ORDER
In the following a brief list of the sources the legal order of
the European Communities and their ordering is provided, along with
seme thoughts on the nature of the norms derivable from such sources.
Article 164 of the EEC Treaty can be read as saying that these sources
constitute the material frcm which the EGT draws its legal arguments
in the justification of its decisions. The two questions - sources of
EC law and methods of interpretation of the EGT - are thus inherently
related, a point well made by the former President of the Court, Judge
Kutscher (1976: I). The list draws frcm several works by: former ECJ
judge Pescatore; 1973, Louis; 1980, Fhilip; 1983, Lasok and Bridge;
1987 and Edward and Lane; 1989.
The initial legal provision that could be considered as a "rule
of recognition" is article 1(2) of the SEA, (supra).
1. Constitutional Norms or Droit Ccmmunautaire Oriqinaire: The
Treaties establishing the three European Communities and their
annexes, the Treaties of Accession of new Member States, Protocols,
conventions and Acts ancillary to the founding Treaties, subsequent
Treaties amplifying, modifying or amending the founding Treaties e.g.
the Merger Treaty 1965 arid the Single European Act 1986. Parallel to
this primary law, but not being part of it, would be those Conventions
- as e.g. the Brussels Convention - concluded by the Member States
within the context of the founding Treaties. At this point the law
created by authority of the Treaties begins: Agreements between the
Communities and third States e.g. the Icm£ Convention or the free
trade agreements, and other International Agreements to which the
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Community as such is a party, and all derived legislation. The
Treaties establishing the three Communities are at the top of the
hierarchy since other international agreements that may bind the
Communities must in principle be compatible with the Treaties (EEC:
articles 228 and 238), Community legislation cannot contradict the
Treaties (article 173) and nor can the acquis communautaire. Those
international agreements are sometimes considered derived Community
Law, but because of their special formalities they can be located in a
hierarchical position between the Treaties and derived EC law.
2. Droit Canmunautaire Derive, or the law derived from the Treaties.
(a) Acts foreseen by the Treaties: The main norms in this respect are
article 14 of the ECSC Treaty, article 189 of the EEC Treaty and
article 161 of the Euratom Treaty.
(1) A Regulation (ECSC Treaty calls it General Decision; in the
authentic French version CECA: Decision Gdndrale) "shall
have general application. It shall be binding in its
entirety and directly applicable in all Member States";
(2) A Directive (Recommendation in the ECSC) "shall be binding
as to the results to be achieved, upon each Member State to
which it is addressed, but shall leave to the national
authorities the choice of form and methods";
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(3) A Decision (ECSC: Individual Decision, CECA: Decision
Individuelle) shall be binding in its entirety upon those to
whom it is addressed";
(4) "Recommendations and opinions shall have no binding force"
(Avis CECA-ECSC). One can doubt whether to include them in
a list of "authoritative" ought-sources, but since we are
considering sources as providing the courts with reasons for
action they can be included at least as prima facie reasons,
albeit not conclusive reasons for such acts do not produce
legal effects and are not subject to jurisdictional control
(should-sources).
Innominable acts, (actes issus de la pratique). These acts have
internal effect on the functioning of the EC institutions. Seme
are organisational acts and others are preparatory functional
acts. They can be grouped as may-sources. Examples of these are
proposals for legislation, general Programmes, general statements
and other communiques, and also the acts of the European Council
although these are new mentioned and partly regulated by the SEA.
An interesting example is the joint declaration of the three
institutions on Human Rights (QJ 1977 C103/1) the status of which
is probably that of a should-source or even an ought-source.
The EKEA doctrine on jurisdictional control (case 22/70,
Commission v. Council [1971] ECR 263) is especially interesting
because by examining which acts of the EC institutions are liable
68
to jurisdictional control one can have an indication as to what
the EGJ considers as a source of EC law (an ought or should-
source as a protected reason for action). The competence of the
EC to enter into international agreements originates not only
from an explicit attribution by the Treaty (e.g. from arts. 113,
114, 238) but it can also derive from other Treaty provisions or
from acts of the institutions in implementation thereof (motifs
15 and 16). Article 173 excludes from jurisdictional control
only opinions and recommendations. It does not exclude (a
contrario argument) any other provision adopted by the EC
institutions and intended to produce legal effects (motif 39)
because a restrictive interpretation of article 173 which would
rule out jurisdictional control frcm acts not mentioned in
article 189 would be contrary to the aim of article 164
(principle of legality). The Council had adopted a deliberation
fixing its negotiating position and establishing the negotiation
procedure on a subject within Community competence (transports by
road: agreements between the EC and third States), and that
deliberation produced legal effects in the relations between
institutions and also between the Community and its Member States
(motifs 38-41, 52). Thus, those acts which produce legal
effects, whatever their object or denomination fall under the
jurisdictional control of the ECJ.
3. Jurisprudence or case law of the ECJ. The decisions of the ECJ
bind the parties concerned: they are individual norms (the conception
of the effet relatif de la chose jugee). As a precedent the decision
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of the ECU has no formal authority, it has only valeur d*orientation.
Having said that, one mast add that the ECU case law is an essential
element of the Community legal order insofar as it states or applies
principles of Community law or provides an interpretation of
legislative provisions in cases involving different parties. A
previous decision on the interpretation of a specific legislative
provision can in practice be treated as binding, as a prima facie
reason guiding the action of the courts (the jurisprudence constante
de la Cour counts usually as a should-source whereas previous
judgments that do not fall into a consistent line count as may-
sources) but it is not a conclusive reason. It could be argued that
considering such jurisprudence constante as a should-source is in line
with the principle of legal certainty and protection of legitimate
expectations: citizens can plan their actions according to the
practical information drawn frcm the knowledge that there is a series
of Court decisions in the same sense on a given point of law, and that
therefore it is very likely that future relevantly similar cases will
be treated in a like manner. But it is not an ought-source; as will
be seen when the acte clair doctrine is examined, it is always
possible to make a reference to the ECU for a preliminary ruling on a
question of Community law that had been previously raised. The ECJ
often refers to the jurisprudence constante de la Cour: a series of
decisions in the same sense on an issue of principle can be treated as
binding authority.
4. General Legal Principles are dealt with separately.
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5. Subsidiary sources: the following could be considered as
additional reasons guiding the Court (may-sources): the doctrine
(legal dogmatics), answers to parliamentary questions by
representatives of the other institutions, notices and other
statements of policy issued by the Ccanmunity institutions (e.g. the
common declaration mentioned above), especially the Commission and the
Parliament (its opinions, proposals and resolutions). In my view,
same acts of the Parliament can be included with the opinions and
recommendations by the Council and the Commission mentioned in article
189 EEC as prima facie reasons, but any act of the European Parliament
producing legal effects can be reviewed by the Court, unlike opinions
and recommendations, and could thus count as protected reasons.
Seme of the norms derivable from this list of sources correspond
to the paradigmatic case of legal norms i.e. legal rules. Most legal
rules are to be found in Regulations and Directives and Decisions.
The Treaties contain seme specific provisions which count as legal
rules, but most of its provisions appear in the form of principles to
be developed and/or applied by the Community institutions. This view
is expressed by judge Kutscher (II.6.a.2, and judge Pescatore; 1972c):
the Treaties employ a large number of undefined rules and concepts and
contain only a relatively small number of precise, substantive rules
of law. They prescribe objectives, indicate directions and establish
principles: they constitute a great plan, a programme and the
procedure for its realisation. On the other hand the mass of derived
Community law only contains, as a general rule, implementing
provisions of a technical nature. From the case law of the ECJ one
can derive legal rules or legal principles, depending on hew specific
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the norms are and hew determinately they can guide law-applying and
other officials in the Community and the Member States. From
subsidiary sources, standards can be obtained, which count as
additional considerations at work in the course of legal argumentation
and justification (this view of principles is also held by
Gianformaggio; 1984). The discussion of other possible sources (may-
sources and may-not sources) is worth pursuing.
In ICC (infra) the Commission and AG Reischl refer to the
uncertainty in academic writings as to the erga crones effect of ECJ
rulings under article 177. Academic writings are seldom explicitly
mentioned by the Court, but one could classify them as may-sources,
especially where there is doctrinal agreement. In UK v. Council
(Battery Hens, infra), the Court referred to two other possible
sources: a survey of the preparatory measures referred to by the
parties shows that the decision to harmonise the standards was made
with a view to eliminating unequal conditions in that field (a may-
source is used here to draw a dynamic argument), tut a previous
practice of the Council of adopting legislative measures in a
particular field on a dual basis cannot derogate from the rules laid
down in the Treaty and such a practice cannot create a precedent
binding on the Community institutions (the Court is here determining
the conditions under which previous practice can function as a may-
source) . Travaux pr^paratoires are dealt with in Chapter 7. The
Court may also draw reasons to justify certain normative standpoints
from comparative law.
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GENERAL FRINCIPIES OF EC LAW
1. The context for the analysis and understanding of General
Principles of Law is formed by the types of legal reasoning used in
the interpretation and application of the law, and in particular by
legal argumentation in the justification of decisions in hard cases.
Such justifications have recourse to principles of formal justice, to
arguments from consequences evaluated according to certain principles
and policies and to systemic principles such as consistency and
coherence (MacCormick; 1981: ch. 10). Notwithstanding what will be
said in chapter 7 regarding recourse to principles as a method of
interpretation by the EGT, the following lines will deal with general
legal principles in a general way.
Their study was initially appropriated by civil law, as was also
the case for the study of the sources of law. One thus finds
reference to principles in the introductory or preliminary titles of
same civil codes. Public international law came next in the analysis
of legal principles, and then came administrative law and more
recently constitutional law. Modern constitutions often contain a
number of principles. It comes to no surprise therefore that
Community law, being closely related to those branches of law, should
also refer to general legal principles. From the study of legal
principles by these subjects one can conclude that these principles
maintain seme kind of link with the explicit norms of the different
branches of positive law, that they are versatile and that they make
reference to elements of different nature and scope. The present
analysis of legal principles closely follows Igartua (1986).
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2. Igartua, following Carrio and Wrdblewski, has sorted out several
uses of the expression principles of law: a use in order:
(pi) to isolate several features or important aspects of a legal
order;
(p2) to express generalisations obtained from the rules of the legal
system;
(p3) to designate those norms of a positive legal order or system that
have a fundamental character;
(p4) to refer to the "logical" consequences of a group of norms of a
legal system;
(p5) to qualify those norms which formulate the general aims of a
positive legal order;
(p6) to identify norms of a supra-systemic nature obtained by
induction from the comparison of different legal systems;
(p7) to refer to "natural law" rules based on the binding acceptance
of criteria of justice, equity, etc. One could include here
Fuller's eight principles corresponding to the idea of the rule
of law (Rechtsstaat).
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This is not a closed list; one could add other uses of the
expression or combine same of these. Different levels of generality
are at play in the different uses here pointed out. Normally one can
say that the more general the principle is the more clearly it can be
distinguished from legal rules. Same principles of a lesser
generality are more readily confused with legal rules formulated in a
general way. In virtue of their specificity legal rules can guide the
courts in a more direct way than principles of law. As Pescatore says
(1960; 120) "lis [principles] ne sent pas de regies de droit positif:
ils sont trap generaux, trop abstraits, trap vagues pour servir de
premise a une deduction juridique". The level of generality of norms
is a first approximating criterion to identify principles and rules.
Seme principles are incorporated into legal texts next to legal rules.
This means that the location of rules or principles is not a
sufficient criterion for their distinction. Seme authors hold the
view that "principles are relatively general norms which are conceived
of as ' rationalising1 rules or sets of rules" (LRLT: 232). This view
loses the expression in the sense (p2) and (p4). The problem with it
is that it depends on a set of norms being "out there" already. In
other words, for such views principles are logically subsequent to
other norms. But what about principles that are prior to other norms,
principles that have not yet been developed by other norms? Such
principles (pi, p3, p5) are not rare in the EEC Treaty.
The legal order of the Oaranunity contains instances of many of
the uses of the expression "principles of law" as identified in (pi¬
pe) . (p7) is the most troublesome of such uses. When they are
referred to in a legal context they will be indirectly related to
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positive law. An example of the latter is furnished by fundamental
rights. Thus the aforementioned common declaration of the three
institutions states that as has been recognised by the ECT the law of
the EC comprises the norms of the Treaties and derived Community law,
as well as general principles of law, in particular those fundamental
rights, principles and rights upon which the constitutional law of the
Member States is founded, also to be found in the European Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. One
could perhaps also mention the principles of natural justice cis
developed in the UK and some of which have been incorporated by the
ECT although still related to principles of administrative law.
A special case of (p6) in combination with (p4) can be seen in
article 215 (2) of the EEC Treaty: "In the case of non-contractual
liability the Community shall, in accordance with the general
principles common to the laws of the Member States, make good any
damage caused by its institutions or by its servants in the
performance of their duties". The search for such principles has so
far been restricted to the corpus of public or administrative law, but
as Edward (1989) has pointed out, the field of non-contractual
liability can include principles of private civil law as well. This
specific reference to "general principles" is seen by some (louis;
1980: 68) as an application of a wider rule under which the EC is
bound by the general principles common to the laws of the Member
States. "The role of these principles arises frcrn the necessarily
incomplete character of the Community legal order as determined by the
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objectives and substantive rules of the Treaties and by the common
traditions of the Member States". Such view would give general legal
principles in their sense (p6) a major role in Cemnnunity law.
An instance of (pi) can be seen in the principles or doctrines of
direct effect and direct applicability and unity-autorcmy-supremacy of
Community law, as elaborated par une jurisprudence constarrte de la
Cour. The ground for such principles may in seme cases be based on
further principles of law in their sense (p2): the general theory of
obligations. Thus the doctrine of the supremacy of Ccmmunity law as
developed in Costa v. ENEL (case 6/64 [1964] ECR 585) may be based on
the contract law principles of reciprocity of (unconditional)
obligations. Rights of the individuals might arise from the
obligations entered into by the Member States; this is the ratio of
the doctrine of direct effect.
The following passage (ibid: 30) captures uses (p3-p5): "Faced
with interpreting a framework Treaty [EEC] which necessarily leaves to
the institutions considerable powers to enact rules implementing it,
the Court has isolated from the technical rules contained in the
Treaty the fundamental principles which provide the foundation for
building the Cannunity. These principles of the Community's economic
constitution (Wirtsschaftsverfassung) serve as the theme or leitmotiv
of an extensive case-law concerned both with the achievement of the
free movement of goods and persons and with implementing camion
policies" (principles of equality, freedom, solidarity, unity, and
principles of interpretation such as effet utile or effectiveness).
In a similar vein Fescatore says (1960: 120) that "les principes font
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du droit un systeme coherent" assuring its systemic unity amid a
congeries of positive rules; "ils premettent d1ordonner les regies de
droit en fonction de certaines idees directrices".
Principles as norms? The conception of legal system that one
holds largely detemines whether one considers general principles as
norms of the system or not. In the conception of the legal system put
forward above, there would be no problem to grant the status of legal
norms to positive principles i.e. those enacted in legal texts or
expressly formulated in other norms of the system: Treaties, secondary
legislation, maybe even case-law. There could even be principles not
expressly formulated in such norms but derivable from them through
their formal consequences and systemic relations. Those principles
extracted from interpretative consequences of the norms of the system
are more problematic because the process of interpretation implies
certain evaluations. It may be difficult to say that such principles
are embedded in the law when they are not mentioned or implied by the
norms of the legal system. New, certain directives of interpretation
are themselves norms of the legal system or are principles contained
in other norms of the system such as judicial decisions. These
directives only provide with general clauses and cannot solve all
problems concerning which principles can be regarded as legal. There
is always seme scope for evaluation and discretion.
A posteriori one can say that such and such a principle is a
principle of this or that legal order because it has been so
considered by the courts of that legal order: "new principles are
adopted into the law through judicial decision-making" (LRU: 235-6).
Political or ethical principles sometimes enter into the Legal system
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disguised as supra-systemic principles allegedly referred to or
implied by valid norms of the system or by formal or interpretive
consequences of these. If such principles are incorporated into the
legal system e.g. through a court decision, they might be considered
as reasons guiding further decisions, for principles are regarded as
general norms having an explanatory and justificatory force in
relation to particular decisions or to particular rules for decisions
(ibid: 260). As more principles are in that way adopted into the
legal system (referred to in the sources of law) the potential number
of principles and policies of an extra-legal nature decreases, the
body of law itself gradually changes (though the criteria of
recognition, essential to legal positivism, may remain the same at
large) and the problem then turns around the concrete determination of
their meaning and around the weight to be given to such principles
i.e. hew bindingly do they guide further decisions. But as Lyons
(1977) has pointed out, the acceptance of principles as elements of
the legal system does not necessarily lead to the rejection of
discretion, for semantic sources of indeterminancy or fuzziness are
endemic to the law.
3. According to such systemic conception, what principles of
Community Law can be identified?
(a) General principles which define the legal structure of the
Community and the scope of Community law within the Member States
(pi and p4 reading teleological-systemic instead of logical) and
which are to be found in the case law of the ECJ or implicit in
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the Treaties: principles of autonomy, direct applicability,
primacy. "Cette superlegalite est, en effet, degagee par la Cour
de Justice ... du systeme des Traites eurcpeens et de leurs
finalitds" (Megret; 1986: 1).
Fundamental principles which assure the protection of citizens
from public authorities (these correspond to p3). These are to
be found also in the case law of the ECJ: "c1est ... en se
rdferant aux principes generaux ccmmuns aux droits des Etats
membres [common traditions] que la Cour de LUXEMBOURG est appelee
a d6gager les droits fondaxrientaux des personnes qui doiverrt etre
sauvegardes par les institutions de la CEE sous peine
d* illegality" (ibid: 2). The Treaties do not contain a catalogue
of fundamental rights, unlike most modern constitutions. The
reason for this axiological gap may be that the European
Community as an international organisation did not intend to take
over the sphere of other European supranational organisations
especially designed for the issue of Human Rights. But the EEC
Treaty does contain seme provisions that concern seme fundamental
rights: articles 7, 48 et seq, articles 52 et seq, and notably
article 119, and the recent Preamble of the SEA says that the
Member States are "determined to work together to promote
democracy on the basis of the fundamental rights recognised in
the constitutions and laws of the Member States, in the
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms (ECHR) and the European Social Charter, notably freedom,
equality and social justice".
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In Nold (case 4/73 [1974] ECR 508), the Court admitted that
indications concerning the protection of human rights could be
drawn frcm international instruments adhered to by the Member
States (see also the common declaration of the three EC
institutions, above). The Court stated that it could not uphold
measures incompatible with fundamental rights recognised and
protected in the Constitutions of the Member States, and which
form an integral part of the general principles of law, the
observance of which the Ccramunity ensures.
Such instruments and in particular the ECHR thus become
sources of Community law. Examples of such fundamental
principles are: respect for private and family life, for the
residence and for correspondence, free exercise of economic
activities, respect for the procedural principles of natural
justice, legal security, equality, proportionality, confiance
legitime, and other principles of administrative law. Most
authors are agreed that the hierarchical standing of these
fundamental principles ranks higher than derived Community law,
and seme even claim they are higher to primary Community law (M
Dauses; 1985).
Principles drawn from the legal systems of the Member States.
These are the only strictly positive principles. They are
directly mentioned in the EEC Treaty, in the abovementioned
article 215(2). They are hard to classify according to the list
provided above because they are drawn from a comparison of the
legal orders of the Member States but only an a particular,
81
albeit rather wide point: non-contractual liability. They are
supra-systemic only in the sense that they are in theory common
to various systems, though in practice the ECJ may choose those
principles which best suit its purposes. Other such principles
common to the laws of the Member States are of a jurisprudential
origin; they are mainly principles of administrative law: "le
principe de bonne administration; notamment le retrait
retroactif des actes illegaux, le principe du non paiement des
jours de greve, la notion de force majeure et tout r6cemment ce
qu'il faut entendre par conjoint en droit communautaire (ibid:
3).
Principles as the special standing of certain provisions can be
seen in Defrenne and in the Insurance and Co-insurance cases (see
Chapter 5). In these cases the ECJ considers certain legal norms
as having a special status of principles because of (i) their
importance in the system (e.g. freedom to provide services) or
(ii) their axiological import (equal pay for equal work and no-
discrimination between the sexes).
In the latter case the EGJ accepted the principle of consumer
protection as a guide to the interpretation of cases of general
insurance and considered it an objectively justified mandatory
requirement in that sector of insurance.
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CHAPTER 3
JUDICIAL EECESICW-MAKING AND SOCIAL ACTION
INTRDDUCTICW
Hie present and the following chapter deal with issues such as:
what different approaches are there to the analysis of judicial
decision-making?, what approach in our opinion should be considered
most suitable to the application of European Ccmraunity Law by the
European Court of Justice? why? which aspects of the application of
the law should be given primacy for that purpose? ... These questions
are set in a wider framework: the explanation of social action.
As has been explained in Chapter 1, legal positivism can be seen
as a methodology of law, as a particular way of analysing the law, an
approach that distinguishes between a description and systematisation
of the law on the one hand, and an evaluation of the law on the other.
The two tasks are important, but they have to be kept separate.
Judicial action is seen through the application of the law by a
judge or a group of judges (a court) in order to solve a legal
problem, a case. I take judicial action to be an instance of social
action. For the moment let us assume that social action implies some
socially relevant behaviour, carried cut in accordance with seme
social rules in a specific institutional context and that it involves
same mental acts within the realm of the social agent. It can also be
assumed for present purposes that judicial action, as a form of social
action, comprises decision-making carried out according to seme legal
rules and mental acts: self-perception, intentions, inferences, etc.
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and that judicial action takes place in a given social setting or
institutional context, being conditioned by multiple factors such as
the legal characteristics of the case, its social relevance, the
interests at stake, the audiences to which decisions are addressed,
the reactions of those audiences to the decisions, etc.
In order to understand judicial action one can take into account
the level of justification of judicial decisions which can be based
upon different models - logico-deductive, inductive, argumentative -
and the level of explanation of judicial decisions following
approaches such as a heuristic description of the events taking place
in a courtroom, a phenomenological account of hew each participant
perceives the process, a functional model centred on the psychological
and sociological factors influencing the background conditions in
which decisions occur, or a mixed approach that sees judicial
decision-making as behaviour of a certain sort i.e. intentional
behaviour and draws elements frcm other approaches. As Aarnio has put
it, "understanding the decision-making behaviour as an act ...
completes the pre-understanding that is an indispensable pre-condition
of all argumentation" (OLR: 222). In order to understand decision¬
making behaviour as an act, the theory of action as elaborated by
interpretative sociology and philosophy can be of same help.
Analytical Jurisprudence has as two of its main purposes (a) the
elaboration of a general theory of legal interpretation, and (b) the
understanding of decision-making behaviour as an act. The legal
order emerges as a result of definite human behaviour, or human
action. Patterns of behaviour occur when rules are applied (it is
also the case that rules occur when patterns of behaviour are
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recurrent) and cur everyday action can be seen as behaviour in
conformity with or against certain rules. When enacting the law, new
rules are made according to certain choices, which legal theory must
make explicit. The law-applying officials too must make a choice
between various alternatives and these choices must also be made
explicit by legal theory - and analytical hermeneutics. A judge's or
a court's decision facing a choice between alternative interpretations
takes place in a social setting and has social consequences. Part of
the judge's or the court's action may thus be understood in the same
way as any other social action.
A common problem for interpretative analysis lies in the
subjective character of the object of study i.e. social action
understood as meaningful social behaviour that is often already
interpreted. Thus interpretations of interpretations are involved
(Taylor; 1971). Facts in the social sphere are seldom brute facts.
Instead they involve seme sort of interpretation by the agents. They
can be called "institutional facts" and their study calls for special
hermeneutic methods. Strictly speaking interpretative analyses
constitute meta-interpretations and can move in different levels of
generality:
(1) level-1: the understanding of social action, itself a complex
phenomenon or institutional fact, by seme theory which can be
more or less distant frcm that action;
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(2) level-2: assessment, according to criteria of validity or
correctness, of the particular interpretations of level-1, or of
the methods used by these.
In relation to the judicial decision, in level-1 we would find an
instance of social action e.g. proceedings at the EGT (European Court
of Justice) attitudes of different people involved in the proceedings,
or attitudes toward the EGT of the public at large, or of a particular
sector of the public such as persons working in the other institutions
of the EC, or in other judicial institutions of the Member States ...
Judicial application and interpretation of the law and the
justification of judicial decisions (legal argumentation, legal
discourse) would also be part of level one. At level-1 we thus find
interpretative analyses of such instances of social action;
phencmenological accounts of judicial behaviour or heuristic studies
of how decisions are actually reached, accounts of what goes on during
hearings, or a study of how the reactions or responses toward the ECT
by its surrounding institutions and countervailing powers affects the
ECJ, "quasi-descriptive" theories of interpretation and justification.
At level-2 we could assess the methods and findings of these
studies and ask how they contribute to a better understanding of the
instances of social action (level-1) they study. Does this second
level presuppose same form of privileged epistemological position on
the part of the assessor? The hermeneutic circle of understanding is
at work here. Those (internal) accounts which make sense to the
actors involved and those which render their action intelligible to
observers in the light of information available from an external
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perspective, according to seme test of narrative coherence can be
chosen. All this assessment requires is a commitment to verstehen; it
does not necessarily require an ideological approval of the social
action which is being understood and explained. But those theorists
who claim that only an internal account is meaningful will hold that
the best interpretation is that which joins the practices analysed and
struggles "with the issues of soundness and truth participants face"
(IE: 14).
The type of social action I have chosen to study is the
justification of judicial decisions. The method chosen for this study
is the rational reconstruction of authoritative doctrines of
interpretation and justification as found in the judgments of the EGT
and in other legal material, using the methods of analytical
jurisprudence. What type of statements are implied by this method?
What degree of commitment does this method imply? These questions are
addressed in the present chapter. A proper understanding of legal
interpretation and justification (argumentation) requires an
understanding of the institutional context in which legal
argumentation occurs: the legal norms the ECJ is expected to interpret
and/or apply are normally enacted by other institutions. Those norms,
as interpreted and/or applied by the ECJ or by domestic courts, became
part of the law of the Member States that constitute the European
Communities. The ECJ addresses its decisions to a number of
audiences. These will expect those decisions to be justified or well
grounded and to be rationally acceptable. My attention focuses on the
forms of justification of those decisions, but it draws insights from
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the context of explanation of judicial decision-making as an instance
of social action in the wider socio-political context (environment)
within which judicial decision-making takes place.
THE INTERH3ETATI0N OF SOCIAL ACTION
1. Understanding social action
Interpretative social sciences deal with the "understanding" of
social action, of individual as well as collective agents. An
interpretative understanding is peculiar to knowledge of social
reality. The focus is on human action rather than on human behaviour;
the term "action" referring to the fact that the behaviour is socially
meaningful i.e. the social agent intends to give it same meaning or
acts for seme reasons and other social agents perceive that behaviour
as meaningful. Max Weber defined sociology as a science which strives
toward the interpretative understanding of social action in order to
arrive at a "causal" explanation of its causes and effects (Keat and
Urry; 1982: ch. 7). Explanation and understanding are two distinctive
features of interpretative social science. Explanation is different
from justification: the reasons given in justification of an action
can exist as a matter of fact and yet not be the reasons why the
action was undertaken. Thus a justification of a judicial decision
would be an ex post presentation of the reasons that back up the
decision. But the reasons that motivated the decision may be
different. A justification will also be an explanation when the
88
reasons given in support of the action not only were available ex
post, tut also did move the agent to action, to make that particular
decision.
One can identify three types of explanation:
(1) logico-deductive or ncmological explanation, as in same physical
sciences,
(2) causal-experimental: the context of social action in this case is
restricted so as to be controllable and manipulable;
(3) action-explanation, which involves motives and reasons; the
context in which the action takes place is ncm widened and more
elements are taken into account (von Wright; 1983, Patzig; 1980).
This is the type chosen in the present work.
Partly because of similarity of experiences we can -
empathetically - understand agents' motives. A basic feature of
social action is that it is meaningful. Two senses of "meaning" can
be distinguished: (a) meaning behind an action refers to motives,
reasons, intentions of the agent in performing the action; (b) meaning
of social products e.g. of a work of art, of church rites, of the
structure and character of a city as in Calvino's Invisible Cities, of
the architectural structure of a prison, of a text, etc. In this
second sense meaning can be seen as the result of an interpretation.
We are here concerned with (a).
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"All behaviour which is meaningful is ipso facto rule-governed.
The test of whether a man's actions are the application of a rule is
not whether we can formulate it, but whether it makes sense to
distinguish between a right and a wrong way of doing things in
connection to what he does" (Winch; 1958: ch 3). An action is first
made intelligible as the outcome of motives, reasons and decisions,
and is further intelligible by those motives, reasons and decisions
being set in the context of the rules of a given form of life. Winch
elaborates on Wittgenstein's notion of following a rule as an
indicative of meaningfulness, but Winch does not specify how narrow
should that rule be, what its intention would be, and to what extent
it ought to be shared. His proposal to understand the motives,
reasons and decisions given by agents in the wider context of the rule
- a given form of life - seems too general. It also seems to imply
that one must aim to understand that action only through the reasons
given for it by the agents or, at the most, through the framing of
those reasons within the cultural context in which they are given. In
our present study this would mean that in order to understand
decision-making at the ECJ we should not go beyond what the members of
the court say they are doing nor beyond the reasons they give in
justification of their decisions. In the last resort, all we could
do is explain how the judges understand what they are doing.
(a) Social action as rule-guided behaviour
Social action conforms to certain more or less informal social
rules or norms. It implies agents following rules which may be
more or less explicit, but social action can be seen as behaviour
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according to those rules or opposed to those rules by reference
to seme alternative ones. Compliance with the rules might be a
matter of unreflective habit, of willing acceptance - considering
the rules as good reasons for action - or of acceptance for
reasons of convenience (prudential reasons). Legal rules can be
of different kinds as has been seen in the previous chapter (the
term "rule" is used here in a large sense). Seme legal rules
(Hart's "primary rules") reformulate those more or less informal
social rules and give them a special significance: they are
incorporated into the game of the law. The agents that apply
these legal rules might comply with them for reasons similar to
those stated above. In clear cases one can say that judges apply
such rules almost unreflectively whereas in hard cases there is a
need for reflection and seme scope for discretion, and this makes
judicial action more significant. This does not deny relevance
to the type of rule-follcwing involved in clear cases, which
already implies an underpinning commitment to follow those rules.
Of course, in exercising discretion judges will be following
other norms (rules and standards) of a different level, other
legal norms that regulate and institutionalise the legal game.
These institutional or organisational norms or rules are complied
with by law-making and law-applying officials because, and
insofar as these officials take part in the legal game (see
chapter 4).
The legal game acquires an autonomous development but
remains inserted in social life. There is a sort of feedback
between change of enacted or operative law and social change
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the "normal" situation of the legal system being hcmeostatic i.e.
trying to maintain an equilibrium between internal and external
stimuli. Decisions taken by law-making or by law-applying
authorities according to the rules that institute the legal game
aspire to be effective, to produce social change; and social
change itself influences the change of law, be it enacted or
operative law (some of the developments of consumer protection
and protection of the environment in the context of European
Community law can be understood in this light).
It is basically to these organisational rules that the
postulate of the internal point of view refers when an
explanation of the dynamic aspect of law is attempted. Law¬
making and law-applying officials would recognise the need for
same organisational rules (rules of adjudication) to regulate the
"game of the law". They would realise about the need for seme
criteria (1) to decide which rules are legal and therefore to be
applied by them (rule of recognition) and (2) to decide on hew to
apply those rules: standards of decision-making and (3) to
organise the process of elaboration of new legal rules or to try
to bring about a change in social practices through the creation
of new legal rules (rules of change).
Winch objects to Weber's advocacy of causal explanations in
the social sciences. According to Winch (ibid: ch.4), Weber
fails in his attempt to infer that the kind of law which the
sociologist may formulate to account for the behaviour of human
beings is logically no different from a law in natural science.
For Weber the process of checking the validity of suggested
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sociological interpretations is to establish statistical laws
based on observation of what happens. What is needed - Winch
contends - is not statistics, but a better interpretation.
Positivist philosophers of the social sciences would fall under
this criticism, as would fall any approach which sought to
express the epistemology and aims of the social sciences as
directly similar to those of the natural sciences. But again
Winch's contention is too general. To be sure, the object of
study of natural science is not social interaction, but something
different, which does not imply "meaning": events, reactions,
compounds, genes, stars ... In order to study, understand and
explain these, the different natural sciences have developed
particular tools and techniques: observation, experimentation,
induction, data recording and processing techniques, etc.
When it comes to the understanding of human action, e.g. of
judicial decisions, the picture one would get from losing only
those methods would be a misleading one; human action would be
reduced to mere behavioural responses and no attention would be
paid to the volitional elements - the intended meanings and
reasons of the agent. In order to grasp these, seme specific
methods are needed: the teleological explanation of action.
Saying this does not necessarily lead to establishing an absolute
distinction between the natural and the social sciences.
Observational statements in general are theory-laden, and the
methodological unity of science is questionable. Science is a
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social activity, itself governed by rules and conventions (Kuhn;
1969). The hermeneutic circle also applies in natural science:
any interpretation which is to contribute to an understanding
must already have understood in some way that which is to be
interpreted. Besides, any knowledge-seeking enterprise is of a
social nature.
Still, natural science attempts to achieve an explanatory
understanding, whereas the type of understanding peculiar to
social science - though not the only one - is interpretative
(Keat and Urry; op.cit.: 174), and the hermeneutic circle applies
tragically in them. For instance, a person who wants to analyse
a judgment of the ECJ, e.g. van Gend en Loos, and has no previous
knowledge of the legal order of the European Communities, would
probably pass by many fundamental issues when reading the
judgment, but (s)he would probably understand the judgment better
than a person from a different culture who is not familiar with
highly institutionalised courts as agencies for the resolution of
disputes nor with the notion of judicial decisions (judgments as
social-cultural objects having same meaning).
The interpretative approach is thus relevant in order to
understand that part of social life which can be called the
internal point of view, characterised by "subjective" states such
as motives, expectations, aims, ways of experiencing social
interaction, meanings ascribed to "reality" by the agents, and
meanings intended by them in their actions. One of the useful
ways of grasping the internal point of view of the social agents
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(the judges of the EGT for instance) is to examine what they
themselves say either when performing their job or when
reflecting upon it: in the justifications they collegiately offer
for their decisions, and in their individually or collectively
published works. Other ways to grasp their point of view could
be to carry out participant observation in their setting.
Apart from methodological difficulties within the
interpretative approach, problems arise when those who support
this approach claim that it is to be considered as the
epistemology of the social sciences. This claim leads to an
epistemological restriction: the need to stick to "experience-
near concepts" i.e. the set of concepts and terms used by the
agents themselves (Geertz; 1973, 1977). Thus one could not
analyse social conduct using words or ideas that go beyond those
of the agents situated in specific cultures or even in specific
traditions or paradigms within those cultures. This view
ultimately leads to a radical incommensurability of explanations.
Interpretative understanding is peculiar to the social sciences
but seme other complementary experience-distant methods of
understanding and explananing social action can also be useful
because they can themselves explain the internal point of view
characteristic of such action (habitus).
A methodology inextricably bound to the participants1 point
of view, using only experience-near concepts would have to give
up the pursuit of holistic explanations and probably also the
prospects of adopting a critical outlook on the practices
examined. By contrast, a realistic conception of social science
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would have recourse to concepts that imply criteria which go
beyond those available in the society or sector under scrutiny -
experience-distant concepts - thus allowing for critical
standpoints. In relation to law there could be a third
possibility such as represented by the "legal realists": paying
attention to subjective states with a view to prognosis; in other
words, examining which norms judges feel themselves bound by
(normative ideology) so as to be able to predict which norms they
will apply, or what types of argument they might have recourse to
in the interpretation of those norms.
Experience-distant concepts can be used by the observer (a)
to judge the rationality or global coherence of the arguments and
reasons invoked by the agents - judges - in support of their
actions - decisions - and (b) to study aspects of society that
are not directly concerned with the agents* meanings e.g. the use
of statistics about judicial decisions or economic analysis about
the cost of justice to litigants, or about efficiency in the
allocation of resources to the judiciary and so on; data which
are independent from judges' perceptions.
Winch is one of the most devoted defenders of the
hermeneutic method using the internal point of view. His basic
point is that any reflective understanding must necessarily
presuppose, if it is to count as genuine understanding at all,
the participants' unreflective understanding. Human facts derive
their meaning frcm their internal relation to the situation in
which they occur. Primacy must thus be given to the concepts in
terms of which the agents see their cwn experience.
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This standpoint runs into several difficulties. It cannot
account for experience-distant concepts such as alienation and
ideology, concepts which, others would contend, can be useful to
explain and understand social action especially at the level of
the unintended consequences of agents' actions. By recourse to
observers1 concepts, criteria that go beyond those concepts
available to the agents may be invoked in order to assess the
rationality of their actions (Gellner; 1970: 118 et seq).
The second problem concerns the philosophy of language.
Winch's standpoint adopts an unreflective uncritical approach
toward ordinary language; the discourse social agents use is the
object of analysis and only the rules underlying that use are
studied (semantic sting! IE: 45-6). Although such a restriction
is not a necessity for analytical philosophy, many of the
ordinary language philosophers have not gone beyond the
description of the criteria of ordinary use of certain terms and
concepts in different speech situations and the connection of
those terms. The use of the terms has not always been criticised
nor their implications made clear.
To give an example, judges see the law as a coherent and
systematic order, and this conception of the law is operative in
judicial interpretation. A scholar who wants rationally to
reconstruct judicial interpretation will need to have an insight
into how judges conceive of the legal order. But if the scholar
only has recourse to the conception of the judges, (s)he will not
be interested in questioning that very conception, or in
explaining why that conception, and not an alternative one that
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sees law sis a chaotic congeries of normative provisions, is in
practice operative, what ideological functions it serves. Social
norms are capable of different interpretations by agents and by
observers. Those interpretations will be guided by different
cognitive and practical interests: system-institutional interests
in the case of participants or explanatory-critical-emancipatory
interests in the case of social scientists and legal theorists.
The fact that the instance of social action under
consideration (e.g. judicial interpretation) could have been
different and that the group of rules or standards according to
which it was carried out could have led to a different action or
that different rules could have been followed makes a critical
analysis of the action possible. Let us new examine what types
of statements can be made regarding the law, and what agents are
likely to make them.
2. Statements about the law
(a) Internal normative statements. These are statements made by
judges and other officials involved in applying and enforcing or
interpreting the law or by those who use the law as a standard by
which to guide, evaluate or criticise behaviour. These
statements are uttered from an evaluative-internal point of view,
they are committed statements guided by a practical-normative
interest: making internal normative statements is a sign of
endorsement of the norm or standard concerned. There is a
dispute as to whether these statements also carry a moral
evaluation with them. Raz (AL: ch. 8.3.) seems to think they do
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not necessarily entail moral approval of the normative
prepositions conveyed by the statements. By contrast, Dworkin
(IE: passim and Ch. 2) affirms that judicial interpretation can
and must be based on principle, and that the aim of principled
interpretation of the complex detail of law is to mould the whole
of it as far as possible into a morally unified structure founded
on consistent (though not necessarily uncontroversial) political
and moral conceptions (Cotterrell: 1988). This issue is quite
controversial. I agree with Raz's idea that the utterance of
this or that normative statement does not entail moral approval
as a matter of analytical necessity. Still, it might be the case
that moral approval is normally implied as a matter of fact. In
order to verify this, empirical research is necessary.
But there is a sense in which making internal normative
statements by judges and officials implies an underpinning
engagement (sottinteso metodologico in Scarpelli's terms; 1980),
which can be qualified as "moral" or political: the decision to
be guided by and apply the law. In the context of the ECJ,
article 164 expresses this idea.
Detached legal statements. These are statements made from a
cognitive-internal point of view and revolve upon what legal
rights and duties people have. The utterance of such a statement
by e.g. a lawyer advising a client on a point of law does not
commit the utterer to the normative proposition expressed by the
statement. This idea was first expressed by Kelsen who gave as
an example that of an anarchist law professor describing positive
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law as a system of valid norms. The main interest in the
utterance of these statements is practical-informative. But, in
my opinion two types of detached statements can hold. A detached
statement can deal with a specific point of law in a situation
where there is a clear legal rule that tendentially applies to
the case at hand. In these situations the detached legal
statement could well be made by an expert system machine. In the
second situation, the legal question at hand might be a difficult
one calling for more sophisticated forms of legal reasoning. In
these cases recourse is had by the expert to the systemic and
dynamic features of the legal order as re-constructed from
authoritative judicial doctrines, scholarly doctrine and legal
materials, and (c)-statements will prove very useful in this
connexion. The degree of detachment involved in these situations
is still dependent on the utterance, which is still a
descriptive-informative illocution, but the statement implies an
engagement to a certain conception of the law as (a coherent)
legal order.
External statements about the internal point of view of law-
officials and lay-persons, about their beliefs and attitudes
regarding the law: the normative ideology of the legal field (of
those who operate within the law in positions of official
authority), their self role-perception, their conception of the
judicial function and of the role law and judges ought to play in
society, their views on the limits to discretion and en the
legitimacy of judicial decision-making, the degree of their
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ccnrniitment to the aims certain laws are seen to embody (e.g. the
commitment of ECT judges to European Integration) ... These
external (informative) statements deal with experience-near
concepts, but they can be re-translated into concepts typical of
social sciences. In order to make those statements, special
methods are called for: the hermeneutic method typical of
interpretative social science (verstehen), and participant
observation as used by Social Anthropology and Social Psychology.
External statements about the legal field. Such statements
concern not the internal point of view of the agents of a legal
system but rather observations about regularities, causes,
consequences and implications of actions obtaining within the law
or data about the personnel which make up a legal system or about
the social and material conditions in which it operates.
Examples of such statements are judicial statistics about
workload, about number of actions brought before a court or
average lapse of time for each action, about number of appeals,
etc., data about the socio-economic background of judges, data
about resources available to the judiciary, information about how
other institutions or countervailing powers react to the
judiciary ... The interest that guides these statements is
mainly informative-descriptive. Lawyers' and judges' realm of
experience are in these statements (which complement the previous
ones) understood in terms of professional, institutional,
political and socio-economic conditions within which legal and
judicial practice takes place and which to same extent constitute
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that practice: the power-relations and monopolies of symbolic and
decisional power inherent to the legal field (Bourdieu; 1987).
The information provided by this kind of statements will often be
transformed into elements of the internal point of view. Thus,
knowledge about the workload in a court, about the amount of
appeals or about the environment's reaction to their activity
might influence the way judges conceive of their own role.
The method of Rational Reconstruction followed in the present
work yields detached statements of the second type. It does not
provide information on particular points of law. It tries to reveal
the underlying structure of legal justification at the EGJ using
information provided by different types of statements: using internal
normative statements as the primary material (norms of European
Community law and decisions of the ECJ), expository-doctrinal detached
legal statements about the legal order of the European communities,
and external statements regarding both the internal point of view of
the ECJ judges (as drawn mainly from their academic writings) and
external-institutional features of the legal field (namely judicial
statistics and historical analyses about the institutional context in
which the ECJ operates). Rational Reconstruction does not require an
engagement or endorsement of the particular substantive values
embodied in the reconstructed practices and norms, but because it
tries to capture operative doctrines in the work of the courts it does
involve a commitment to a certain conception of law as legal order and
to an ideology of the legal and rational judicial decision. The
adopted method also has normative undertones since the model of
102
justification which is described or reconstructed is presented as a
rational model which can itself be justified from the standpoint of
procedural rationality. In so far as the method is normative, it has
a certain critical potential: actual justifications that do not
conform to the reconstructed model can be criticised as incorrect or
unacceptable justifications. The interest that guides such method is,
at least in part, an emancipatory interest.
3. Judicial interpretation as social action
Interpretation consists in the ascription of meaning to a text, a
social practice, a certain tradition, etc.
(a) Different levels of interpretation can be distinguished
(Wrdblewski; 1985 a: 2.2.-2.5.):
(1) in a very large sense interpretation refers to all sorts of
understanding of cultural objects in the light of a presumed
purpose or teleological scheme frcan the standpoint of e.g.
interpretative sociology. This can be called interpretatio
sensu largissimo. For instance, one might recognise a legal
provision as a certain socio-cultural object or
institutional fact having seme meaning or seeking to bring
about seme state-of-affairs. One can distinguish such
provision from other socio-cutural objects, say from a poem.
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(2) interpretatio sensu largo is roughly equivalent to the
understanding of a linguistic message in a given context of
communication. In highly institutionalised contexts this
understanding can be quite complex. For instance, in the
law a legal provision (norm) might be almost mechanically
understood by a person who has been legally trained although
a lay-person might not understand that same provision. The
theory of the sources of law and of the systemic features of
the legal order constitute underpinning or pre-
interpretative knowledge presupposed in the understanding of
the law in given situations of communication.
(3) interpretatio stricto sensu is the form of interpretation
involved when there are practical doubts in the
understanding of linguistic messages in a given context of
communication, or when there is a dispute as to the meaning
of such messages. In such situations the interpreter has to
make a choice (and the judge has to justify the choice)
among viable meaning alternatives. In determining the
meaning of the ambiguous message the interpreter will use
certain criteria of interpretation (see chapter 5).
Interpretation and application. Certain authors - namely the
later Kielsen, Tarello, and more recently Nerhot - have held that
in truth there is no distinction between interpretation and
application. They operate on a notion of interpretation sensu
largo, as equivalent to understanding: the ascription of meaning
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to a text in any situation. On such views, legal interpretation
becomes the process through which a legal provision, a text is
transformed into a norm by means of the ascription of meaning.
It follows that there are no norms before interpretation, only
texts or provisions which will tendentially became norms once a
given meaning is concretised for them. In my opinion it is more
convenient to restrict the concept of "legal interpretation" to
those situations where there are doubts concerning a legal text.
I believe this narrower concept is more readily amenable to the
concept of interpretation used in the Treaties establishing the
European Communities.
Gadamer claims that all interpretation presupposes
application and that there is no application without
interpretation or understanding. The second claim is related to
the large notion of interpretation. The first claim is related
to his idea of the hermeneutic circle. Gadamer's ideas have been
taken up, as regards legal interpretation, by Nerhot with
interesting results. Nerhot too holds that the assignment of
meaning to a legal text and its application to a specific case
are not two separate acts, but a unitary process (1988, and other
unpublished works). A normative content can be determined only
in application to a specific case. At the epistemological moment
when the ascription of meaning is done such application is
imaginary or hypothesised, but it is inescapable. The factual
situation will itself be re-constructed and re-translated in
terms of the provisions which tendentially regulate those facts
(hermeneutic circle in operation). The task of hermeneutics is
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thus to adapt the meaning of a text to a specific situation to
which it tendentially applies. This process implies a fusion of
horizons of tradition: the text was seeking to regulate or bring
about certain states-of-affairs, the interpreter-applier might
approach the text with different questions in mind and a dialogue
between traditions results.
I find such views interesting. It may be that as a matter
of fact (heuristics) interpretation involves seme form of
imaginary or tentative application of a given provision to a
given factual situation. It may well be that if a proposed
interpretation leads to consequences that are negatively
evaluated by the interpreter, a different, more "suitable"
interpretation will be adopted, and that therefore interpretation
of a provision is not possible without a view of the facts of
specific cases. But when one tries to apply these views to cases
such as preliminary references for interpretation from the
domestic law-applying courts to the EGT (EEC article 177) one
runs into interesting problems. Those views can contribute to
the explanation of the heuristics of decision-making (context of
discovery) but not of the justification of decisions of
interpretation in cases where interpretation and application are
tasks assigned to different courts. Article 177 operates with a
strict notion of interpretation: if a domestic court considers
that a decision on a question of interpretation (of Community
law) is necessary to enable it to give judgment it may (and if
there is no judicial remedy against its decision it shall) bring
the matter before the ECT. The matter will normally be: "(a) the
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interpretation of the Treaty; (b) the validity and interpretation
of acts of the institutions of the Community". The ECJ is not
competent to decide questions of application of Community law in
cases where such application is the job of the domestic courts.
Domestic courts are the normal Community law-applying agents in
the Member States; the job for the ECJ will normally be the
interpretation of Community law when there is a reference from a
domestic court on such interpretation. Still, in many cases the
EGJ is given the facts of the case and many of the preliminary
references are drafted by the domestic courts in a way which
makes the separation of the questions of interpretation and
application quite difficult. In such cases the ECJ will usually
make an effort to distill the problem of interpretation from the
reference; but the EGJ has rejected seme other questions put to
it by domestic courts on the grounds that those questions turned
on points of application. This can be seen in Bosch (case 13/61
[1962] ECR 45) where the EGJ said: "The request from the Court of
Appeal of The Hague is concerned with the question whether the
restriction on export imposed by the plaintiff, Robert Bosch GmbH
of Stuttgart, on and accepted by its customers, falls under
Article 85(1) of the Treaty. Ihis question cannot be considered
as a pure question of interpretation of the Treaty since the
document in which this summarily described restriction on export
appears has not been laid before this Court. This Court can
accordingly make no decision without a preliminary investigation
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of the facts, and the Court has no jurisdiction to conduct such
an investigation when proceeding under Article 177 of the Treaty"
(at 53).
Interpretation as activity and interpretation as result
Interpretation as social action refers to interpretation as an
activity or process and not to interpretation as the result of
such activity. The messages which are interpreted aire to be
found in texts. Interpretation of a text is an activity which
produces a certain result. This activity can itself be the
subject of rational reconstruction using the method of
interpretative sociology (verstehen). Thus, on the one hand we
have interpretation stricto sensu - in our case, the operative
interpretation of legal texts by the EGJ - and on the other hand
we have interpretations or re-constructions of that activity by
scholars. The result of the stricto sensu interpretation - i.e.
an operative interpretative statement - is an internal normative
statement whereas Rational Reconstruction of practices of
interpretation and justification formulates detached legal
statements. As Ricoeur (1976) and van de Kerchove (1986) have
explained, interpretation applies mainly to written texts and not
to oral discourse. Two relevant features of interpretation are
absent in oral dialogue: the distance "du locuteur a ce qu'il
dit" and the distance "du locuteur a son interlocuteur". It is
spatio-temporal and cultural distance between a statement and its
utterer and/or between the utterer and the addressee that makes
interpretation necessary. This idea of distance is closely
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related to Gadamer's idea of the fusion of horizons which obtains
in all interpretation. In the next section I endeavour to
explain how this fusion of horizons (the horizon of the Treaties
as they were drafted and the horizon of the ECJ in interpreting
and applying them) has occurred in the ECJ.
JUDICIAL DECISION-MAKING
AT THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE
As has been said above, the ECJ can be considered a social agent;
its decisions are socially relevant. They imply a commitment to
European Community law, an engagement in the project of European
integration. Even when same norms of Community law may be difficult
to adhere to on their own merits (e.g. same provisions of the Common
Agricultural Policy) still the Court will try to make the best
possible interpretation of such norms and understand them in a wider
context in terms of coherence. Using contextual and systemic criteria
of interpretation can thus be seen as a form of social action whereby
the Court seeks to obtain legitimacy and adherence to a body of norms.
In the case of the CAP this contextual justification frcm coherence is
combined with a dynamic interpretation which seeks to explain and
justify why there is a need for an agricultural policy as a whole and
seeks to interpret such a policy in the best possible light. In this
sense the ECJ is very Dworkinian. The social relevance of its
decisions can be clearly perceived in hard case situations where the
Court exercises discretion (see chapter 7).
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Most of the questions discussed in the present work in relation
to the justification of ECJ decisions can be also studied from the
standpoint of interpretative sociology: the acte clair doctrine as an
attempt by the ECT to establish its own authority and to set criteria
for its cooperation with domestic courts; the systemic and dynamic
criteria of interpretation as the attempt by the court to give order
and structure (coherence) to the corpus of Community law and to pursue
the objectives proclaimed by the Treaties. The relevance of the
Court's justification of its own decisions lies in the attempt to
achieve legitimation amongst the audiences to which such
justifications are addressed. The legitimation of the European
Community project of an ever closer union is internal.
1. The ECJ has "une certaine idee de 1'Europe"
Hew do the ECJ judges see their decision-making activity? Hew do
they conceive of their role? The ECJ has been accused of activism, of
going beyond the letter in its interpretation of Community law, of
engaging in policy-making. But many ECJ judges agree that Community
law calls for systemic and dynamic criteria of interpretation and
that, in losing such criteria, the Court has not overstepped its task
as defined by articles 4 and 164 (Pescatore; 1968, 1972a and b,
Monaco; 1972, Kutscher; 1976, Lecourt; 1976, Mackenzie Stuart; 1977
and Slynn; 1987). This activist role of the ECJ has been favoured by
several factors: (a) a wide definition of its task as "guardian of the
law", (b) the existence of ample and varied judicial remedies which
bind the Member States and are accessible to individuals, arid (c) the
existence of a substantive law which, at all levels - common
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objectives, institutional structure, distribution and attribution of
powers, general clauses and principles - allows for the use of
creative systemic and dynamic criteria of interpretation. One can add
a further factor (d) the fact that for a large period in the existence
of the European Community there has been a crisis or standstill on the
part of the political (law and policy-making) institutions of the
Community, especially of the Council of Ministers in spite of
Commission proposals. As Kutscher has explained, the inactivity of
the legislature compels the courts to decide questions and to solve
problems the settlement of which properly belongs to the legislature.
The ECT has recourse to the aims of the Community and to general
principles of law (as defined by the Preamble and opening Principles
of the EEC Treaty) and the Community judge on occasion finds himself
compelled to consider the interpretation of Community law frcm the
standpoint of the existential necessities of the Communities: the
maintenance of their capacity to function (1976: II-6-a-2).
The idea underlying Kutscher's remarks seems to be that if there
is a renewal of the steering role of the political institutions then
the EGT will not step over into tasks that properly belong to those
institutions. This idea is taken up by Judge Koopmans (1986) who
argues that courts cannot by themselves achieve European integration.
Kbcpmans has explained that in the past the Commission often thought
it could rely on the Court's help when its case was likely to
strengthen European integration (instrumentalist role of the EGT). In
the future perhaps it will only be able to do so when it can show a
solid legal basis, as the Court's willingness to construct such a
basis on its own initiative may diminish (minimalist conception of
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law). These ideas are expressed precisely at a time when there seems
to be a new momentum towards European integration (at least in certain
sectors) on the part of the political institutions, a momentum
channelled by the Single European Act of 1986.
In this new period of moderation or minimalism (the first period
of moderation took place immediately after the establishment of the
ECSC Court) the ECJ tries to consolidate what has been achieved and to
identify areas in which a judicial approach may be helpful. In those
areas the Court will tend to apply strict minimum standards e.g. in
matters like discrimination on the grounds of nationality or of sex,
the treatment of aliens or technical requirements for commodities.
The previous, instrumentalist period was characterised by an attempt
to define the fundamental principles of the legal order of the
European Communities (see chapter 1) and by an extension and expansion
of the attributed powers of the Communities. That period, which
coincided with a standstill at the Council, witnessed the major
constitutional rulings of the 1960s and early 1970s (especially those
dealing with fundamental rights), bold rulings which had an element of
experimentation and testing-out of reactions frctn the environment of
the Court. It is difficult to say whether to these periods or stages
in the history of the EGJ there would correspond characteristic
methods of interpretation. In general one can say that a minimalist
court will stick to textual and literal criteria and an
instrumentalist court will resort to dynamic methods of
interpretation. Things are not so crystal clear. Still, it can be
said that the Court developed its systerruc-cum-dynamnic approach to
interpretation during its instrumentalist stage. The approach to
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interpretation has not changed in this new stage of moderation; what
has changed is the willingness to carry it very far in politically
sensitive areas where there is not a clear legal basis (teleological
or not, this does not matter) and where countervailing powers are
likely to react harshly to adventurous EGT decisions.
2. The institutional context in which the ECJ operates
"The eventual content of the judicial tasks is determined by the
political and social environment within which the tasks have to be
performed" (Bell; 1988: 51). In relation to the ECJ, the analysis of
that environment has been carried cut by Rasmussen (1986). Rasmussen
argues that the major cost of too much political jurisprudence is the
predictable loss of judicial authority and legitimacy: judicial
policy-making must remain within socially acceptable boundaries. But
the problem lies in hew to fix those boundaries, hew to model a test
for judicial activism. He thinks that they can be fixed by examining
the negative policy-inputs i.e. reaction of the Court's countervailing
powers, namely, the Member State courts and legislatures and executive
branches of government and the Council of Ministers. Pescatore's
argument is that activism may be legitimate if it develops in order to
compensate society for the social consequences of legislative deficit,
but Rasmussen replies that the judiciary cannot expand its activities
beyond same point where it stops enjoying the tolerance of the
countervailing powers and that the ECJ cannot function as a Community
political branch because it has not developed techniques and methods
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of functioning fully adequate to that role: it is isolated from socio¬
economic fact and has failed to develop docket-control mechanisms in
line with its policy involvement.
Same authors have pointed out that democracy is also served (and
consequently legitimacy can be obtained) by courts who can stand up to
the powerful political establishment and that the ECT has a huge
responsibility in not allowing that the vision and ideal incorporated
into the Treaties be destroyed by contingent political and social
negative inputs or environmental pressures (Mackenzie-Stuart; 1979:
79, Cappelletti's [1987] and Weiler's [1987] reviews of Rasmussen's
book). As Slynn (1987) has pointed out, even if it is said that the
EGT has regard to the realities of Community life and that changed
economic circumstances may affect the interpretation of the Treaty,
its function is to ensure that the law is observed (article 164) and
that the Treaty, not the practice or reactions of Member States,
predominates. Rasmussen has been courageous in dealing with a
delicate issue, and his work can serve as a warning to the ECT not to
overstep its function in the line of Judge Kbqpmans' views, but he has
downplayed scame important positive policy inputs such as the welcoming
reception of the ECJ jurisprudence by the legal and professional
audiences to which the Court's justifications are addressed, and he
has not taken into account the fact that there is not very much
attention from public opinion to the work of the ECJ.
Rasmussen has also underemphasised the fact that there is a
democratic deficit in the European Communities at the present
institutional development, where laws are not adopted by the European
Parliament and the legislative bodies are not subjected to effective
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control by the Parliament. In view of this democratic deficit
judicial control and interpretative fidelity to the dynamic character
of the Treaties by the ECT has been a contributing factor to achieve
legitimacy of the Community project by the furthering of principles
such as legal certainty and the rule of law. The confidence which
litigants need to repose in the independence and impartiality of the
decision-maker may cause judicial institutions to develop in ways
which make them ill-suited to many tasks, particularly of a dynamic
nature (attempts to change society incrementally and by experiment).
The respect (legitimacy) accorded to judges will depend on the way
they meet the expectations of fairness, justice and so on which
individuals have of them and on the substantive (including procedural-
discursive) values which their decisions and procedures promote,
especially where judgment and discretion are involved (Bell; 1988).
The approach chosen in the present work focuses precisely on the
justification of decisions by the ECJ - which is a duty imposed on the
EGJ by article 33 of its own Statute - and tries to provide same
guidelines along which the work of the Court can be assessed. This
approach can be complemented with more politological approaches such
as Rasmussen's. I believe it is very interesting to study the
reaction of the political environment to the Court's policy-making,
but I focus on the theory of legal justification of judicial decision.
It is very important that courts state the policy arguments that guide
their decision-making so that public debate on (and possibility of
control of) judicial decision-making becomes a reality.
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3. The Parliament cases and the "Chain Novel"
The idea that the Court operates within a certain political
environment can be exemplified with the Parliament cases. R. Dworkin
(LE: 228-238) uses the felicitous analogy of a "Chain Novel" to
illustrate his conception of law as integrity and his idea of
interpretation: each chain-novelist continues a novel which has been
previously started and built on by other chain-novelists trying to
make it the best possible novel. Likewise, judges interpret a
tradition into which they will fit their interpretations of the law
and upon which they build to make it the best it could be given the
constraints imposed by that tradition itself and by the requirements
of interpretation. In cur case, each new Court of the European
Communities will build on the project started up by the Treaties and
continued by previous Courts as best it can. In continuing the Chain-
Novel of European Integration each new Court will be constrained by
several factors such as the institutional context in which it operates
and the particular conception of its own role that it has and by the
interpretation it makes of the Chain-Novel as it stands. The cases
where the ECJ has dealt with the powers and competences of the
European Parliament exemplify this idea.
At the time when the Treaties were enacted the European
Parliament (then called Assembly) played a minor role in the
institutional set-up of the European Communities, although Treaty
amendments, inter-institutional agreements and unilateral undertakings
by the Council and the Commission have improved its institutional
position, especially as regards its budgetary powers. The EGT has
built on the novel of Parliament basing itself on the notions of
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institutional balance and completeness of the system for the
protection of legal rights intended by the Treaty (as interpreted by
the Court).
In the Isoglucose cases (Roquette Freres, case 138/79 [1980] ECR
3333 and Maizena, case 139/79 ibid 3396) the Court dealt with
Parliament's right of intervention in proceedings before the Court and
held that "it is not possible to restrict the exercise of that right"
by one of the Community institutions "without adversely affecting its
institutional position as intended by the Treaty, and in particular
Article 4(1)".
In lord Bruce of Doninqton (case 208/80 [1981] ECR 2205) the
Court decided that it has jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings
under article 177 on the validity and interpretation of acts of
Parliament.
Deciding on Parliament's right to initiate legal proceedings
under article 175 (against the Council or the Commission for failure
to act) the Court extended its previous ruling and said that the fact
that Parliament's role as a Community institution is essentially
political does not preclude its relying upon the legal process for
resolution of disputes with other institutions, nor prevent the Court
from deciding such disputes (Parliament v. Council, case 13/83 [1986]
1 CMLR 138) .
As regards the Court's control over acts of Parliament (article
173), the Court decided on its own motion to examine the issue in Les
Verts (case 294/83 [1986] ECR 1339) although it had not been
questioned by the parties. The Court added to the Chain Novel of
Parliament: "The European Parliament is not expressly mentioned among
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the institutions whose measures may be contested because, in its
original version, the EEC Treaty merely granted it powers of
consultation and political control rather than the power to adopt
measures intended to have legal effects vis-a-vis third parties [at
1365] ... An interpretation of Article 173 of the Treaty which
excluded measures adopted by the European Parliament from those which
could be contested would lead to a result contrary both to the spirit
of the Treaty as expressed in Article 164 and to its system" (apagogic
systemic argument at 1366). Parliament had argued, and AG Mancini had
supported this line of arguing, that it did not intend to exclude its
own acts from jurisdictional control and it considered that an
extensive interpretation of article 173 which would allow for the
possibility of judicially reviewing its own acts should lead to a
recognition of its active competence to take annulment proceedings
against acts of the Council or the Commission: the system of judicial
review of measures adopted by the institutions would not otherwise be
complete (systemic-dynamic argument with an apagogic form, see chapter
7).
This issue arose in Parliament v. Council (Ccmmitology, judgment
of 27-9-87 in case 302/87, not yet reported) where the Court rejected
(for the first time) Parliament's claim. This time the Court relied
on linguistic criteria of interpretation and stuck to the text of
article 173 which does not consider the possibility of Parliament
taking procedures for annulment, and distinguished this type of
procedure from the other types where Parliament's competence has been
recognised by the Court. The Court further argues that the SEA has
not modified article 173 when it could have done so, and that
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Parliament can still make use of article 175 (proceedings for failure
to act) and that its interests can be defended by the Commission
especially but also by Member States under article 173 and by
individuals under articles 184 or 177. This argument of the Court
reveals a paternalistic attitude toward Parliament. This decision can
be seen as an attempt by the Court to avoid writing the Parliament
Chain-Novel in a too adventurous way and as a decision to stick to a
minimalist role so as not to overstep into the terrain of the
political institutions of the Ccanmunity. But perhaps, if the question
is brought once again before the Court (in more favourable
circumstances where Parliament can prove that it has a real interest
in intervening) Parliament's competence to bring annulment proceedings
against acts of the Council or the Commission could be recognised
under an extensive (systemic-dynamic) interpretation of article 173.
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CHAPTER 4
APPROACHES TO JUDICIAL IgjCTSIOf-MAKING
EXPLANATION AND JUSTIFICATION
OF JUDICIAL DECISION-MAKING
In this Part, I introduce a distinction between two levels of
analysis of judicial decision-making: the level of explanation and the
level of justification. The distinction is also describable in
different terms: motivation v. justification; process or context of
discovery v. process or context of validity; psychological process v.
logical process. Each of these terms refers to a slightly different
aspect of decision-making, but they all form a family of resemblance.
I shall not go into the details of hew the distinction was first
introduced in the philosophy of science by Reichenbach at the
beginning of the century and how it was subsequently elaborated on by
the Vienna Circle. It is also necessary to make the warning from the
beginning that the distinction is not always as clear or even as
useful as the members of that Circle would have us believe. It is not
an absolute distinction as regards the analysis of judicial decision¬
making, and same recent philosophers of science have doubted whether
it is workable, especially in the domain of the history of science
(Kuhn, Feyerabend, Lakatos, Hacking, etc).
As far as our present study is concerned it can be said that
there is a set of problems and questions which have characteristically
been grouped as problems of justification, and another rather fuzzy
set of problems which have been raised in contrast to the former. In
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fact many of the questions raised separately in one of the contexts
can find interesting answers when tackled from both contexts (e.g. the
acte clair doctrine or the study of consequentialist decisions in
law). In order to explain judicial decision-making the requirements
of justification of judicial decisions have to be taken into account,
and the process of justification can be better understood when certain
factors of the context of explanation are taken into account. The
(methodological) problem is that many factors of the context of
explanation are difficult to control or analyse. "Assessing the role
of personal values and experiences in judicial decisions is
particularly difficult because of norms which prevent judges from
openly casting their decisions in such terms" (Grossman; 1966).
Hie last chapter dealt with some "aspects of explanation" of
judicial action necessary for its understanding as meaningful social
behaviour. The discussion can now focus on the "aspects of
justification" of judicial decisions. Justification makes judicial
action controllable at the level of Rational Discourse (see next
chapter) and is an institutional requirement of the law. Every legal
culture expects the courts to apply the correct rule(s) to the case in
question and thus expects that at least in clear and simple cases the
knowledge of the rules to be applied can be fairly unproblematic. One
finds provisions in different legal orders requiring that judicial
decisions be justified or motivated or reasoned, and that in solving
cases courts must apply the law (e.g. art. 164 of the EEC Treaty and
art. 33 of the Court Statute). And in some legal orders one even
finds provisions that aim at guiding the courts when faced with
problem-cases: provisions on statutory interpretation and closure
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norms for gaps in the law. Moreover, non liquet is not an available
solution to the courts (these matters are dealt with in chapters 1, 6
and 7). "logically it may be possible to assume that the judge
actually refers to the normative material by which he feels bound and
which he thinks that others will also accept as a sufficient
justification of his decision, even if it is not his real motive. The
objective element in the application of the law lies in that it is the
law and not the judge which makes the decision. This is the basic
principle of the Constitutional State" (S. J^rgensen; 1987).
In order to understand the court's decision, the motives, beliefs
and goals of its members must be carefully analysed, even if a formal
and institutional justification of the decision be expected to
withdraw attention from those factors pertaining to the context of
explanation: volitional and epistemic factors and other social factors
that condition the outcome of judicial decisions: perception of its
own role by the court, expectations from the court at a larger
societal level, relevance of the question decided for public opinion,
resources of the court and time available to make a decision, social
relevance and acceptability of the alternative choices available to
the court.
Sane of these factors are relevant also at the level of formal
justification proper, particularly when they are incorporated into
consequentialist models of justification i.e. where the foreseeable
outcomes of a decision among different alternatives are taken into
account. Same data relating to the psychology of judicial decision¬
making and to sociological analysis thus are helpful to a deep
explanation of difficult cases - below we see what seme of those data
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may be - even though the level of explanation does not necessarily
coincide with that of justification, of the formal presentation of the
decision as being in accordance with the law at large. The rational
acceptability of the decision becomes the paradigm of justification in
hard cases (see next chapter). The term "acceptability" recalls the
importance of same of the elements of the context of explanation.
Still, even in hard cases the decision will be cast out in its
subjective meaning as being coherent with the legal order (Wroblewski;
1971 and Dworkin [1977] 1984: 115, 119).
1. Context of Discovery and Context of Justification
This distinction has became a commonplace in works on judicial
decision-making. The context of discovery would refer to the factors
that, put together, actually led to the decision as it was reached at
a given point in space and time; to the real process whereby the
decision was reached. (I do not hereby imply that the context of
justification is somehow unreal.) These factors can be of a
psychological (hence the expression "psychological process") or of a
sociological nature (factors relevant to the explanation of social
action) or they can be idiosyncratic factors: related to the situation
and context, or special characteristics of the institution such as
resources, time, working conditions etc. The use of the term
"psychological process" stresses the strictly individual-mental and
causal-behavioural factors concerning the outcome, while ignoring the
very important social context within which decision-making is carried
out.
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The term "context of explanation", used throughout this work is
considered more suitable for a legal setting: judicial decisions are
not "discovered". The motivation of judicial decisions is related to
the psychological process and includes the set of factors that
motivate a judge or a court to take a particular decision. When
speaking of collegiate courts such as the ECU, collective agents are
implied and it is more problematic to apply to these as a whole terms
relating to the psychological level. The problem with the term
"motivation" is that it does not cover factors of a more sociological
nature, whereas the "explanation" of a judicial decision would have
resort to the factors motivating the judges individually and
collectively as well as to other factors conditioning in one way or
other the outcome of the decision:
(a) motivation: immediate factors: physiological (mood), or
responses; mediate factors: personality or character of the
judge, social background, ideological views, hew the judges
perceive their own role, cultural background, gender, ...
(b) social factors: roles the decision-making organs are expected to
play as social institutions, social backgrounds (see belcw)
(c) idiosyncratic factors: setting of decision-making: hew the
courtrocams are built (acoustics, light, space, symbols,
decoration, etc), resources the court has available, other
characteristics of the administration of justice: number of cases
that have to be decided and time available for each case, staff
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preparation and availability, social pressure and inportance of
the issue decided, policy statements on the issue available from
other social institutions, economics of justice, social need for
deterrents,
(d) factors of wide explanation: institutional setting: organisation
of the courts, conventions and rules whereby certain conflicts
are brought before courts and others are decided at an extra¬
judicial level - e.g. political arrangements -, prohibition of
non liquet, the requirement that judicial decisions be motivated
according to the law.
This arbitrary classification of the different factors
relevant to the explanation of judicial decision-making exemplifies
how numerous and heterogeneous these factors can be. Other
classifications would group (b) and (d) together. Same of them are
usually not taken into account because they are considered irrelevant
and others are difficult to take into account although their relevance
is generally recognised. The social background of the judges is
particularly relevant concerning the ECT: it is interesting to knew
for instance whether its members have had prior experience in judicial
activities or have had prior knowledge of European Community law,
whether they have held posts of political responsibility before, and
so on (for these and other questions concerning relevant factors of
the level of explanation concerning the EGT I address the reader to
Rasmussen; 1986). There is a wide range of factors relevant to both
contexts of explanation and justification (institutional factors):
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what role the ideology of the legal ccmnraunity assigns to the courts,
the level of consensus towards certain sources of law, the normative
ideology behind judges' references to the rules of law that constitute
grounds for the decision and which the judges accept from a
volitionally internal point of view, etc.
The context of justification refers to the logical process
whereby a decision can be tested or justified according to certain
criteria as to what constitutes a proper justification. The focus
here lies on a rational reconstruction of the steps that are necessary
to arrive at a certain conclusion. The rules of justificatory
reasoning move from axiological and epistemic premises to a certain
conclusion (decision). The deep logic of justification would thus be
based upon a deductive model. It is not time-place bound as the
context of discovery or explanation is, it is not even discoverer-
bound: any member of the legal community could arrive at the same
conclusion any time if the steps of the logical reconstruction of the
decision are carefully followed. This is so at least for clear,
unprcfolematised cases, perhaps not for problem-cases, but the
ideologies of the application of the law have it that the model of
justification of easy cases is the paradigm of justification in the
legal community.
In the legal sphere there is a latent, and sometimes explicit,
presupposition of the form, structure and contents of the
justification of judicial decisions, and any decision the
justification of which is formulated or presented in a way that does
not basically conform to that standard, is or at least can be rejected
or repealed by a hierarchically higher court. This amounts to saying
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that even if the context of discovery were more important than the
context of validity in the explanation of a decision, the court is
legally expected by the juridical community and sometimes is required
by the legal order to make its decision public in a certain formal
way. This canonical presentation of the decision relates the facts of
the case to the factual provision of a given norm or group of norms
considered as being legally valid, and derives by means of this
subsumption a legal consequence provided for in those norms or in
other norms of the system. How tight or hew loose the subsumption can
be is a very important question for legal theory, but leaving aside
this and other problems concerning the structure of norms and the
resolution of hard cases, this basic subsumptory scheme broadly holds
as regards the legal model of justification of judicial decisions (see
chapter 6).
What the judge cannot do is to justify the decision in a way that
ignores valid law or openly contradicts it, because in such cases that
decision would not be formally adjusted to law and could be repealed.
The judge or the court might think the decision to be substantively
just according to same axiological system they may adhere to, but if
the decision does not adjust to the valid existing positive law in a
general way at least (in the sense that certain epistemic rules of
justificatory reasoning have been follcwed), then the decision will
not be legally valid or correct (richtig) or acceptable. The
different varieties of hard cases make it quite clear that the degree
of adjustment to the law that is required cannot be so strict as to
rule out adjustments that do not fit into the syllogistic model
typical of clear cases. The broad or loose adjustment of a decision
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to the legal order is the frame in which the relevance of the games of
explanation augments, the frame in which those games can profitably be
taken into account. But in any case, even if the impact of the games
of explanation is greatest in the understanding of hew a particular
decision was arrived at, one does not expect to came across elements
pertaining to the process of discovery - motivating factors - within
the justification of a legal decision, and the requirement that
judicial decisions be well-grounded is an important element in any
explanation of the heuristics of judicial decision-making. Those
elements will usually constitute a sub-text to be read along with a
thorough analysis of judicial action. That subtext is seldom explicit
in the written justification of judicial decisions.
Legal theory has elaborated a discourse on legal decisions and
their justification, a discourse that tends to sort cut and select a
paradigmatic model of justification. A paradigm case is explained by
same legal theorists in which the activity of same Herculean judge is
presupposed, a judge that has the time, the means, and the patience to
go over clear cases and find problems in them and to go over hard
cases and thoroughly examine all their possible sides constructing a
careful justification of his/her decision as being adjusted to valid
law and to a legal tradition, as being the best possible justification
(EWorkin; TRS, IE).
The reason why such supra-human fictitious judges are postulated
by legal theorists is probably explicable in terms of the emphasis
laid on the context of justification when explaining judicial
decision-making. The psychological motives of these judges are often
explained away by depriving the context of discovery of any
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significance and by ignoring other sociological and institutional
aspects of explanation. Other theorists often explain away the
motives for the decision by recourse to the internal aspect of the
rule of recognition: the possible other motives conditioning the judge
are overcome by the fact that the judge observes and accepts a rule of
recognition which tells her/him which rules to apply to the case, and
the judge feels bound by this secondary rule. Similarly, by
postulating the existence of a normative ideology which is shared by
the judges at an interpersonal level, one can downplay the relevance
of factors motivating the decision. This is a paradox affecting Ross,
whose emphasis on validity-cum-effectiveness usually secured him a
place among the anti-formalists, who used to give explanatory primacy
to the factors motivating the decision (see chapter 1).
Same partisans of the context of justification seem hurried to
close off attention from the context of discovery by reducing it to
e.g. the postulation of a hunch or an antipathy or sympathy on the
part of the judge to one of the parties. This is an unfair
reduction ism. There may be another meaning of "hunch" i.e. a type of
gestalt switch comprehension of the case and the legal solution that
it ought to be given. This insight or "intuitive faculty" may be an
important element in the context of discovery of the decision and thus
also in the explanation of decision-making, but it is difficult to
control and analyse because it is a necessarily postulated element.
The decision is and is expected to be presented in a reasoned form,
and the arguments and reasonings offered in its justification usually
do not and are not expected to make reference to such an intuitive
faculty. Of course the insight takes place within the framework of a
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congeries of norms about which the decision-maker has seme knewledge.
This idea of insight is related to the concept of "discretion" in its
positive sense, as a faculty of discernment; and it is very
interesting as far as the explanation of judicial decision-making is
concerned. But the explanation and the justification of the decision
are not always one and the same thing. It may be that in same cases,
this insight or wise discretion or special know-hew of the judge
(based on his/her expertise and discernment) is explicitly referred to
in the justification of a judicial decision; this might be so in those
cases where the law explicitly provides for discretion. But in the
cases where there is de facto discretion in the presence of apparently
clear norms, the justification of the decision will not usually refer
to such discretionary faculties (see chapter 6 on acte clair).
Historically those who stressed the mechanical side of the
judicial application of the law as expressed in Montesquieu's motto
"le juge est la bouche de la loi" have tended to ignore the problems
surrounding the explanation of judicial decisions. Such "formalists"
paid little attention to the problems of legal interpretation. This
might explain their lack of interest in the problems of explanation.
As was noted in the previous chapter, not all positivists need be
formalists. Gdny is one of the classical positivists who plunged into
problems of method and interpretation. The reaction to formalism,
especially by same representatives of American Legal Realism tended to
ignore the problem of justification and sometimes reduced judicial
decision-making to what has sometimes been called judicial
"gastronomies" - "the decision is a question of what the judge had for
breakfast". Other American "skeptics" such as the late
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K. W. Llewellyn and also the Scandinavian Realists (Ross, for
instance) analysed different aspects of the context of explanation
within the justificatory framework.
The result of these postulates is often a distortion of what
really goes on in the courts. The picture described by empirical
researchers of judicial behaviour often presents a different story:
the vast number of cases a judge or a court must decide allows them
little time carefully to justify their decisions and most of the cases
are treated as routine (e.g. staff cases at the ECJ) and imply an
almost mechanical application of the law whence a large part of the
theory jurists elaborate to analyse hard cases plays only a minor role
in the larger picture although it is still important since it provides
a framework for interpreting what is presupposed in clear cases. In
these cases, taking into account such factors of the level of
explanation as those cited above can lead to a better understanding of
judicial decision-making. The areas of the law where such routine
cases are legion vary from one legal order to the other but in general
(apart from the staff cases mentioned for the ECJ), traffic law and
other parts of administrative law such as licences, minor offences and
minor assaults, simple cases in commercial law and the law of
property, tax cases, etc. often present such routine aspects even
though in theory all such cases can be problematised.
This does not imply that such areas of the law are inherently
easy and that cases relating to them will always be clear (they can be
complicated). It only means that in these and other areas of the law
many cases are de facto decided in a routinised way and are treated as
routine. Of course litigants could always raise doubts or
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prbblematise the cases if the facts of the case were prone to be read
in different ways or the norms to apply could be twisted in such a way
as to present problems of interpretation (not to speak about the
decisions of evidence). The cases would be prbblematised in this
manner and the theories of legal interpretation elaborated having hard
cases in mind are the framework wherein such prctolematisations are
understood. But again in these cases, factors pertaining to the level
of explanation would be particularly relevant at this stage: why are
cases prbblematised? hew much does it cost to problematise a case?
when do judges consider that a prcblematisation of a case is genuine
and when do they tend to disregard or rule out other attempts to
prbblematise a case as artificial? The pragmatic aspect of the
distinction between routine and problematised cases stresses the need
to combine games of explanation with games of justification of
judicial decision-making (see chapter 6).
There is little doubt that the context of justification plays a
major role in the explanation of legal decisions. If any doubt arises
concerning the application of the law, the justification of the
judicial decision must be resorted to in the revision of the case.
But if judicial activity is to be adequately comprehended such aspects
as the sociological and psychological contexts must also be analysed.
After all the distinction between discovery and validity must not be
carried too far. Much of the philosophy of science, especially since
Kuhn, minimises the importance of the distinction, and in the sphere
of law, as has already been noted, the justification of hard or
problematised cases in an acceptable way requires, for its
understanding, paying attention to both contexts. Furthermore, the
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very fact that the justification of routine cases can be so mechanical
is itself explained by sociological factors as is also so explained
the problematisation of seemingly clear cases; and sociological
features of the judicial structure can determine the finding of the
facts of a case in a very important way, especially if it is borne in
mind that questions of fact are usually not an admissible object of
appeal to higher courts.
Thus a comprehensive analysis of judicial activity by the
observer combining both contexts will tend to minimise the importance
of the distinction, although the distinction still holds analytically.
A judge-centered explanation of judicial activity will stress the
ideology that lies behind justification and will minimise the
relevance of the individual judge's biases. The general features of
the administration of science, constituting the framework within which
justification operates, and the ideology of the application of the law
current or dominant in the legal community largely influence the
judges' self-perception of their role. In my opinion the significance
of these factors must be analysed within the context of justification
of hard and problematised cases. The application of the law is seldom
mechanical in such cases, it is interpretative rather. Even deciding
whether the case is to be considered clear, or whether to accept as
genuine proposed problematisations implies on many occasions same sort
of evaluations which are not normally made explicit and which can be
analysed by recourse to the context of explanation (see chapter 6 on
acte clair). If the focus of this work is on justification, that is
basically for two reasons: the difficulty for any single scholar of
carrying out a research into the elements that constitute the level of
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explanation, and the fact that justification dominates (is at the
centre of) the structure of judicial activity in the application of
the law. The level of justification is more readily available to the
observer in the form of reported judgments. The relevance of the
other "aspects", those of explanation, is taken into consideration
within the margins outlined by the requirements of justification under
the standard of acceptability to the legal audience. As far as
possible I have tried throughout this work to point out seme of the
features at the level of explanation that may help better to
understand the problems of justification of judicial decisions.
2. Heuristics of decision-making at the ECJ
Notwithstanding the other parts of this work where the relevance
of the distinction between the heuristic process (discovery) and the
process of justification is recapitulated (chapters 5 and 6), in the
present section I wish to discuss seme aspects of the distinction as
regards the ECU. The main methodological problem concerning the
heuristic process has been framed by Hamson (1976): the form of the
trial and the formal agreed text of the judgment preclude us from
observing the process whereby the ECU has reached its conclusions; we
have a recital ex post facto of the reasons which in the opinion of
the Court justify the conclusion which has been reached: the Court
delivers a judgment which is dogmatic. Thus the problem is how to get
to know the way the Court arrives at its decisions. Not even
participant observation will help because the Court's deliberations
are secret (art. 2 of the Statute of the Court). We will not know
what are the "real" motives which guide the Court. Does this pre-empt
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the interest of our methodological emphasis on justification? I think
not. If we want to analyse the heuristics of decision-making at the
ECT, and we are not judges of the Court: we can still look at what the
judges themselves say about the way decisions are reached. Thus,
former president Kutscher said that the comparative law method of
interpretation plays a prominent part in the deliberations of the
Court but it does not usually show in the motifs (grounds) of the
judgment. This fact is quite significant. Concepts of Community law
are presented - i.e. the interpretation of those concepts is justified
- by the Court as having a specific Community meaning not directly
connected to the meaning those concepts might have in domestic or in
international law. Of course judges of the ECJ are trained in
domestic law traditions and they will approach the interpretation of
Community law concepts with certain pre-conceptions of the domestic
law in which they are trained. But when it comes to the presentation
of the interpretative decision there might be certain considerations,
which call for a minimisation of the factors which featured in the
deliberation: the Court might have an interest in presenting European
Community law as an autonomous body of law and thus in enhancing its
cwn internal authority as the guardian of Community law; tying
Community law concepts to domestic law concepts might lead to
undesirable consequences (which domestic law is chosen? hew far will
such domestic law feature in further interpretations of other
Community law concepts? how far can those highest courts of the
domestic law, to which concepts of Community law are linked, correct
the interpretation offered by the EGJ? etc.).
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Does this make the offered justification flawed or "unreal" or a
faqade justification? Does this mean that the reasons the Court gives
are not sincerely meant or that the Court is not persuaded by its cwn
justification? In same cases this might be the case (see chapter 6 on
acte clair) and in general it can be said that if the justification of
the decision is transparent, if it re-presents in a different language
the questions which featured in the course of deliberating upon the
decision, then it is possible for the audiences to control the
decision-making process. This control I take to be one of the values
which enhances legitimation and rational acceptability of judicial
decisions. Control of decision-making is twofold: it refers (1) to
the correctness, relevance and acceptability of the grounds offered in
justification of a decision (external justification and axiological
premises) and (2) to the correctness of the forms of reasoning applied
to those grounds (internal justification and epistemic premises). In
my submission, there could be a further type of control (3) of the
transparency of the grounds relevant in the deliberation process but
this control would move on a different level. If deliberations are
secret, hew can control-3 be carried out? Hew can we find out which
arguments actually persuaded the Court? Sometimes one can find same
clues in the pleadings of the main and intervening parties to the
case, in their written and oral submissions. Consequentialist
arguments and substantive reasons are often resorted to in the
parties' argumentation.
Sometimes the Court does not echo those justifying grounds
although one could postulate that they figured prominently in its
deliberations. For instance comparative law arguments or, as in
136
Polydor (case 270/80 [1982] ECR 329), arguments frcm economic
consequences: the Commission argued that if the Court's interpretation
of articles 30 and 36 of the EEC Treaty were extended to the similar
provisions (arts. 14 and 23) contained in the Cammuriity's Free Trade
Agreement with Portugal, that would lead to a situation where non-
Member States might obtain all the rights of Community membership (in
the present case, the doctrine of the exhaustion of industrial
property rights: no trade restrictions justified on the ground of the
protection of industrial and commercial property when the holder of
those rights has already consented to their marketing) without having
to assume the corresponding obligations.
But other times the Court does refer to such substantive and
consequentialist arguments in its justification. Examples can be
found in Defrenne (see chapter 7), and other like cases where the
Court has made use of socio-economic fact briefs. Presumably, in such
cases justification parallels deliberation.
ECJ judges are agreed as to the importance and social
significance of the process of justification as furthering certain
values, namely legal certainty and the rule of law. If the ECJ states
the reasons for its decisions then these can guide citizens' actions
and also the application of Community law by domestic courts and the
interpretation and application of Community law by the CFI. Pescatore
(1973) and Mackenzie-Stuart (1977: 118) coincide in stating that the
principle must be maintained that all decisions must be adequately
reasoned so that, if necessary, they may be subjected to scrutiny or
137
control, whether at national or community level, by the executive and
judicial branches, by the citizen body to which decisions are
addressed and by the wider audiences including la doctrine juridique.
DECISION-MAKING IN THE APPLICATION OF THE LAW
Judicial decision-making is an instance of social action
performed by certain agents - in our case the ECJ judges - in the
process of interpretation and application of the law. In making
decisions the judges usually perform an adjudicative function but
there is also decision-making activity in the mere interpretation of
the law as is the case with preliminary rulings by the ECJ under
article 177 of the EEC Treaty. Judges take decisions, make choices at
different stages of their application of the law to the case before
them. Wrdblewski (1967) has elaborated a theoretical model of the
application of the law which is very illuminating in order to
understand and locate the different stages where judges are faced with
the task of taking a decision in the application of (statutory) law.
The background assumptions of this model are that the application of
the law is considered different from the creation of the law, that the
legal order is complete (at least ex post, see chapter 1), that valid,
general and abstract norms are applied and that the norms provide for
consequences to folic*/ upon the conditioning provisions they refer to
(see chapters 1 and 6). I have made several adaptations to his model
in order to account for the application of Community Law by the ECJ,
which I shall take to be the process by which this institution by
means of a (group of) decision(s), determines, on the basis of the
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legal norms (sources) that make up the Community Legal Order, the
binding legal consequences of certain facts or the meaning of certain
norms.
The theoretical model of application of Ommunity Law comprises
four stages: (1) the individuation of the applicable norm, (2)
ascertaining a fact as having been proven for legal purposes and with
a view to the applicable norm and (3) formulating this fact in the
language of the applicable norm, in the language of universals which
makes subsumption of the particular fact of the given case under the
universalised formulation of the applicable norm possible, and (4) the
binding determination of the legal consequences of the proven facts on
the basis of the applicable norm.
For preliminary rulings under article 177 EEC Treaty the model
centers on stage (1) but this does not imply that the other stages are
not taken into account. They are, and are therefore relevant to an
explanation of the heuristic process of decision-making, but they are
not usually mentioned in the justification of the judgment. It must
be remarked that this model does not intend to provide a correct
description or explanation of judicial decision-making but it allows
for a better understanding of justifications of judicial decisions.
It assumes that the deep justificatory scheme is an inferential scheme
of the modus ponendo ponens type (see chapter 6) in other words, that
the overall justification is deductive. Subsumption always takes
place with a mechanical character that makes "transformations"
possible whenever the meaning of the factual provision in the
applicable norm and the actual facts of the case are unproblematic.
In such cases, subsumption does not offer a considerable scope for
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decisional leeway . In other cases subsumption is more problematic:
in preliminary rulings the scheme is more similar to balancing and
weighing than to inferential transformation. This also applies for
norms that do not provide a description of facts of class x, e.g.
principles.
The model we are operating with here is not a normative model,
nor does it purport to be a descriptive model; it is rather an
analytical tool that allows one to concentrate on the different
choices that are made in the process of the application of the law.
It is thus a model suitable for an analysis of justification. Seme
theorists would claim that a correct description of what actually
happens in decision-making would start off from the consequences that
judges attach to the case as they first ccme to face it and only later
would they dress up their choice of consequences with the language of
the applicable norms (see section 2). If the norms lead to
consequences that the judges think would not be acceptable to the
legal community, they would choose different norms the consequences of
which would be mora readily acceptable - e.g. in our context those
consequences that would lead to "an ever closer union among the
peoples of Europe" or to the removal of obstacles hindering the
accomplishment of the internal market. I do not reject this
hypothesis. Still, a decision that did not comply with the formal
requirements of presentation-justification would not be acceptable to
the institutions around the ECT, to the countervailing powers and to
the legal community. This hypothesis fits in with the model we have
described. The presentation of the argument will make the conclusion
follow from the premises (norms and facts) and the overall
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justification takes a deductive form at least in clear cases (and
arguably in all cases, given the formal characteristics of any
subsumption and given the requirement of first order justification,
i.e. universalisability), giving way to a weighing of different
justificatory reasons and arguments in problem cases.
A plausible description of the application of the law would
probably start off from the determination and proof of facts (the
weight of institutional and legal facts in most cases before the ECJ
especially in preliminary rulings is very considerable; brute facts,
if there indeed are any such facts, are seldcm involved, and questions
of fact are seldcm disputed although the situation is likely to change
with the establishment of the CFI) and then the discussion would focus
on the choice of legal norms that should apply to those - usually
legal - facts or the choice of legal norms and other standards of
interpretation that will determine the meaning of certain legal norms
of the Community legal order the meaning of which is precisely under
dispute. A subsumption of the facts under the factual provision of
the chosen norms would follow - in the case of preliminary rulings it
is the domestic courts who would perform this subsumption - and
finally the decision would determine the consequences - again it is
the domestic courts who would determine the consequences of the facts
after the ECJ has clarified the meaning of the provisions of community
law in respect of which it was initially referred to; but in many
cases references to the ECJ for preliminary rulings are framed in such
a way that the EGJ is really asked to decide on the compatibility of a
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national legal provision with Community Law, although the ECT
skilfully approaches those questions from the standpoint of the
interpretation of Community Law (see section 2).
1. Determination of the applicable norm
(a) The individuation of the valid norm depends on the given legal
order (see chapter 1 on validity). The determination of the
applicable norm can be a mechanical or an evaluative operation
(in preliminary rulings the norm to be interpreted is fixed for
the ECT by the domestic referring court, but the choice of other
norms in order to clarify the meaning of the norm in question
invariably implies evaluations).
(b) The norm has to be understood as having a sufficiently clear and
precise meaning. Either there is a situation of isamorphy (lex
clara est): correspondence between the Norm and the Case, or else
there is a situation of doubt which calls for interpretatio
stricto sensu: in this case directives of interpretation are
needed, and the choice among them implies further evaluations.
The preliminary rulings of the ECJ per definitio bear on issues
of interpretation but this does not mean that all cases are
equally hard. The degree of precision of meaning required for
each case cannot be determined in abstract. The standard formula
for this stage (1) is: "Legal norm N is valid according to the
criteria of validity Ci.. .Cn and evaluations vi.. .Tn implied by
their use. Norm N has meaning M in language L according to the
142
interpretative directives Dli.. .Din and evaluations of
interpretation Vi.. .Vn necessary for the choice and use of
Dli. ■ .Din" (WTdblewski; 1982, and 1985 a).
Determination of evidence
Ascertaining a fact as proved according to material elements. At
this stage evaluations are operative in the choice of rules of
evidence, in a use of these directives if they require
evaluations and in the assessment of facts determined
evaluatively. The main remedy for the negative factors hindering
the truthful determination of facts would be the use of modern
techniques from contemporary science. A major limiting factor
are the practical conditions of the administration of justice
(time, means, resources). There is a special problem about what
type of facts are to be considered acceptable by the Court and in
what depth and with what technicality can facts be briefed.
Formulation of the fact(s) assumed as proven in the language of
the applicable norm. The law-applying organ must translate all
the languages in which the proof material is formulated into the
legal language. In this translation syntactic, semantic and
pragmatic elements are involved as well as evaluative elements:
choice of words and expressions with a view to making subsumption
possible (problems relating to subsumption are briefly dealt with
in chapter 6).
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3. Determination of consequences: different situations obtain:
(a) The norm establishes a straightforward consequence for the fact:
a mechanical inference is possible.
(b) The norm fixes a maximum and/or a minimum limit for the legal
consequence and provides criteria for choosing the adequate
consequence among the permitted scope. If those criteria are
rigid the situation is similar to (a); in other cases,
evaluations of the situation - in the large sense - by the Court
enter the field and the scope for leeway increases.
(c) No criteria are provided for the choice of consequences so that
the choice is free among the possible legal consequences provided
by the norm.
(d) The determination of consequences is left to the state organ
appealing to e.g. rules of justice, equity etc. Predictability
is minimal here.
The justification of the final decision requires a justification
of the choices made at the different stages of application where there
is scope for lee-way . The decision of validity implies choices that
have been dealt with in Chapter 1 and will be dealt with partly in
Chapter 6. The choice of evidence is not considered in full detail
for several reasons: so-called brute facts are seldom disputed before
the EGJ, disputes about facts frequently concern decisions of
classification - which are closely related to problems of
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interpretation dealt with in Chapter 7 e.g. whether a certain
agreement or practice between undertakings which may affect trade
between Member States has as its object or effect the prevention,
restriction or distortion of competition within the Common Market
(article 85 EEC ) - of validity or of consequences; and finally
because in preliminary rulings under Article 177 the decision of
evidence is left to the domestic courts as is the final decision and
subsumption.
Still, the model of application of Community Law in cases that
fall under article 177 is not too different from the one described.
The justification of the preliminary ruling will comprise the
justification of decisions of validity and of interpretative decisions
concerning provisions of Community Law. The ECJ has considerable
leeway to decide on these questions because Community Law does not
provide strict, fixed directives of interpretation and because the
problem of systemic validity of principles in Community Law is not
uncontroversial - I am referring to criteria of hierarchy and to the
doctrine of direct effect, dealt with in chapter 1. Recourse to the
prior practice of the Court (precedents), to the Court's doctrine of
interpretative standards and to factors determined by the ideology of
judicial decision-making and by the elementary legal culture of the
legal audience, will - albeit only slightly - limit the scope of
discretion.
This is the point where same of the questions discussed in
chapter 3 become more revealing. The ideology of the legal and
rational judicial decision at least determines the legal and socio¬
political values judges should use in their decision-making. An
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acceptance of a concrete ideology depends at least in part on the
values the judge accepts as a basis for her/his activity - whether and
to what extent the judge adopts the internal point of view. The
elementary legal culture into which judges (and legal dogmaticians)
are socialised determines commonly accepted directives of legal
interpretation and postulates an application of same logical standards
of correctness demanding consistency in justification of legal
decisions, and assumes the postulate of the rationality of the law¬
maker. The elementary legal culture is so deeply rooted that, as a
rule, it is mentioned neither in legal texts nor in the ideology of
the judicial application of law, but appears implicitly in any legal
culture (Wroblewski; 1979, see also chapter 5 on forms of life).
Legal culture constitutes a sort of Vorverstandnis which makes the
hermeneutic circle possible and is constituted by legal tradition.
The extent of legal culture at the European communities is very hard
to determine. One would need to take into account so-called general
principles of law common to the Member States insofar as these
principles are compatible with the foundational norms of the European
Communities, and possibly also practices developed in the context of
the application of Community Law. Application is seen as a fusion of
horizons, one is constituted by previous practices internally
considered as acceptable, the other constitutes and settles practices
that may became part of tradition.
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Even in those cases falling under article 177, the domestic
courts will- provide the ECJ with a brief of the facts of the case
which will usually be very helpful to the EGJ in its interpretative
task. Socio-economic fact briefing is also very helpful in
justification through consequences.
This model of the application of the law centered around the
context of justification allows for the possibility of control of
judicial decisions. Legal-institutional control of judicial decisions
can have consequences for the case involved - upholding, changing or
rejecting a decision, or its transfer to another court for a tricil de
novo - or for the decision-makers. Factual consequences may concern
the independence of the judge especially when - as is the case in the
ECJ - judicial appointment is not for life. Judges that make
decisions which do not seem acceptable to the countervailing
institutions or even to the legal community at large might not be re¬
appointed. The results of the control make the decision-maker
dependent on the controller. But in the European Community context
one might ask who the controller is. The powers mentioned above are
not institutional controllers of the Court, which is autonomous, but
they may be de facto controllers (Rasmussen; op. cit.). Legal
consequences would concern responsibility or liability, but presumably
only where a clear and precise norm that directly applies to a case -
in the absence of any possible implied conditions of its application -
had been blatantly ignored. In problem cases, it would be extremely
difficult for a judge to incur any responsibility because the
institutional control of the process of balancing and weighing
justificatory arguments is extremely hard to carry out.
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The ideology of a legal and rational decision gives an
axiological basis for an evaluation of areas of control, and for an
appraisal of the degree of toleration of a legal system for the
deviant behaviour of the judge and of the conditions of judicial
responsibility. When talking about responsibility in the ECT context
I do not refer to liability but rather to a type of political
responsibility for making bold judgments and for using decisional lee¬
way to a point beyond that acceptable to the political countervailing
powers and to the legal audience and addressees of its judgments.
Norms belonging to a legal system do not pre-determine all judicial
decisions and there are several types of lee-ways which are more or
less restricted by several factors. The principle of judicial
independence together with the principle that judicial decisions are
bound by law do not exclude control of judicial decision-making and
judicial responsibility as one of the possible results of such
control. Control of judicial decisions is necessary at least where
these decisions are determined by law.
The problem however, remains: how far is judicial decision-making
pre-determined by law and hew to draw a line between the area of
determination and the area of leeways, either protected or unprotected
by law. These leeways do exist not only as a result of the law¬
maker's design; they appear also as consequences of the semantics and
pragmatics of the legal language (problems of interpretation) and of
the features of the process of judicial decision-making itself (judges
are not bureaucrats unreflectively applying the rule-book; judges
engage interstitially in law and policy making, Bell; 1983 and 1988).
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The practical problem is that of making control and
responsibility compatible with independence in such a way as to assure
the conformity of decisions with the law, to ensure a way for stating
an optimal decision, and to preserve judicial independence in spite of





AND TOE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE
CHAPTER 5
ON LEGAL JUSTll'lCATICN
THE SPECIAL CASE THESIS
The present chapter deals with general metatheoretical questions
regarding justification in the law or legal justification and in
particular with the question whether legal justification can be seen
as a sub-class of moral justification. The views of several authors
concerning this topic are analysed and the thesis of the specificity
of legal justification is put forward. In the previous chapter the
context of justification has been considered essential to the analysis
of judicial decision-making and the following chapters examine how the
decisions of the ECJ can be (legally) justified in so-called clear
cases and hard cases.
The method I shall follow in my discussion consists in the
consideration one by one of the terms of the question: is legal
justification a sub-class of moral justification? I shall consider
those terms in the following order: "sub-class", "moral justification"
and "legal justification". The argument offers! in this chapter can
be presented in a syllogistic form with the following structure:
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- major premise: any type of justification with features or
characteristics of moral justification CI, C2, C3,...Cn is a sub¬
class of moral justification,
- minor premise: legal justification is (or is not) characterised by
features CI, C2, C3,...Cn
- conclusion: legal justification is (or is not) a sub-class of moral
justification.
Two points need to be clarified at this stage. Firstly, the
concept sub-class is taken for granted in the major premise.
Nevertheless it is not unproblematic, it requires clarification. The
analysis of that concept is carried out in the present Introduction.
Secondly, a syllogism does not provide with any new information, one
can only obtain from a syllogism that information which has been
previously put into it in the premises. That is why the formulation
of the premises is so important. All the syllogism does is to order
that information in a certain way. The second part of this chapter
tries to elaborate on the major premise and thus to establish which
are the essential features of moral justification without which the
use of the expression "moral justification" would be regarded as
incorrect or at least as deviating from its ordinary use. In Part
Three I shall try to establish the minor premise which presupposes two
intermediate or enthymematic steps: (a) which are the essential
features of legal justification? and (b) are those features among the
essential features of moral justification as fixed in the major
premise? Depending on how these enthymematic premises are stated the
conclusion will follow mechanically: "yes, legal justification is a
sub-class of moral justification since both forms of justification
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share the same essential features" or "no, legal justification is not
a sub-class of moral justification since same essential features of
legal justification are not essential to moral justification and legal
justification is found wanting in same basic features of moral
justification".
The discussion largely depends on hew the concept "sub-class" is
to be understood and defined. "Sub-class" is a relational term: it
implies scare type of relationship with the term "class". A sub-class
would be included in a class which would itself comprise other sub¬
classes. Thus, in our case if we state that the class "moral
justification" has the reference and intension CI, C2,...Ck and that
therefore whatever form of justification would be a moral
justification if and only if it had that very reference-intension, and
if we also state that legal justification has reference-intension CI,
C2,...Ck,...Cn then we can say that lato sensu legal justification is
a sub-class (or a special case) of moral justification (Stricto sensu
the extension of a class is wider than that of a sub-class). If both
forms of justification shared the same intension-reference then they
would be identical. If legal justification shared with moral
justification characteristics CI, C2,.. .Cg but not Ch,.. .Ck then we
could say that the relationship between them would be one of
similarity or family of resemblance. These concepts can be
illustrated with the help of a diagram:
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MJ = (moral justification)
U = (legal justification)
## = (essential features of MJ)
(1) Sub-class stricto sensu:
'
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(5) The present chapter argues for a fifth
possibility which would cover case (4): legal
justification and moral justification as
K P D
instances of justification in rational /j-^ _ M J
practical discourse (RPD): if it:nmztt
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These explanations are not irrelevant because the way in which
the term "sub-class" is defined largely determines the answer to our
initial question. If the term "sub-class" is understood in a strict
sense one can answer that question in the negative: there are features
of legal justification which are lacking in moral justification. In
the present discussion the broader concept of sub-class is assumed.
"Sub-class" can be taken as a synonym of "type". Thus cur initial
question can be reformulated in this way: is legal justification a
type of moral justification? This question is often posed in works on
legal reasoning. It is usually held that legal reasoning is a special
type or (as is also often held) a special case of practical reasoning.
Robert Alexy ([1978] 1989; intro. and ch.9) sorts out three versions
of the thesis of the special case (Sonderfall):
(a) the subordination thesis according to which legal discourse would
be a general practical discourse behind a legal fagade,
(b) the integration thesis: there is a combination at all levels
between legal discourse and general practical discourse, and
(c) the supplementation thesis: recourse is had to practical
argumentation when and where one could not resort to specifically
legal arguments.
The present chapter closely follows R. Alexy (1978), who
subscribes to the integration thesis. Other authors do not specify to
which version they subscribe but generally seem to accept the special
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case thesis. Thus for Perelman (1972) legal reasoning is seen as a
very elaborate particular case of practical reasoning. But what is it
that characterises the reasonings of legal agents (des juristes)? It
is not their social position or institutional role but rather the
norms concerning the establishing of facts, the validity of legal
norms and the legal qualification of behaviour (Ziembinski; 1972), or
as Kalincwski put it "la juridicite des raisonnements juridiques
constitue precisement leur specificite" (1972). Such views are not
exclusive to the literature in French. Thus in MacCormick's opinion
"legal reasoning is a special, highly institutionalised and
formalised, type of moral reasoning. Of course the very features of
institutionalisation and formality create important disanalogies
between legal reasoning and moral reasoning in the deliberations of
individuals, or the discourses and discussions of friends and
colleagues or whatever" (LRLT: 272). This view can be taken as a
representative of the special case thesis. Aarnio also considers
legal discourse as a form of general practical discourse (RAR: 120).
As can be clearly seen from these references there is no uniformity in
the use of the terms we are discussing. The different terms used can
















Ihis multiplicity of terms can lead to same confusion if their
conditions of use are not clarified in advance. But such
clarification is not an easy task. I shall attempt a provisional
clarification along the following lines. Discourse is a very general
term which implies, on the one hand, the existence of dialogue or
communication and, on the other hand, the prablematisation of the
speech-acts and statements that appear in such communication.
Discourse would represent the context where argumentation takes place,
both its semiotic and institutional context, and it is characterised
by rules and standards of participation in such argumentation.
Justification occurs within a given discourse and it covers
argumentation, for in order to justify e.g. a decision or an opinion
one has recourse to argumentation. What would be the difference
between argumentation and reasoning? In works on legal theory these
terms are used as synonyms. The two concepts are closely related.
Legal reasoning is used in both legal argumentation and legal
justification. My use of these expressions can be represented thus:
argumentation^ W reason^
legal reasonings are used in:v in
\. . . .
justification' judges' reasonings
A similar classification could perhaps be attempted in the moral
sphere. However I am aware that my proposed classification does not
necessarily reflect the ordinary use of those expressions, and that it
cannot be carried too far: lawyers' reasonings can also be seen as
justifications for a proposed interpretation of a given norm (norm
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contention), but I would still prefer to talk about argumentation in
such cases and to reserve the term "justification" for the cases where
a decision has been made and has to be justified. Lawyers (legal
counsel) argue in a way such that their parties' interests will be
safeguarded. Judges do not in that sense argue for a particular norm
contention; they hear the arguments of counsel, they take their own
decision and they offer (legal) reasonings in its justification.
The interests at stake before a court - the ECJ for instance -
can be those of the aggrieved party (applicant), the defendant Member
State affected, other Member States who present written or oral
submissions, the Commission, and if need be, the Council and the
European Parliament and other intervening parties. The reasonings
used in legal argumentation aim at persuading, and ideally at
convincing, the judge of the weight of the arguments put forward with
a view to furthering the interests of the parties involved. Rhetoric
and forensic skills are most relevant at this point, especially in
those legal systems where oral proceedings are important (arguably not
so much at the ECJ). After hearing the arguments of all intervening
parties and upon consideration of those arguments and of the
presentation made of those arguments (sometimes along with new
reasonings) submitted by the Advocate General, the ECJ judges reach a
decision which they will then have to justify in a reasoned way (see
ch.4).
Justificatory reasonings seek legitimation and acceptance by the
parties to the dispute and ultimately bv the legal audience (ideally
by the universal audience). Legal reasoning used in legal
argumentation and in legal justification characteristically deals with
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the interpretation of legal norms and with the choice of norms that
will apply to the case at hand. The reasoning offered in
justification of the decision taken by the ECJ will be drawn, at least
in part, from the reasoning presented by the parties in the course of
their argumentation.
The question whether legal justification is or is not a sub-class
or a special type of moral justification is related to the larger and
ever present question of the relationship between Ethics and law.
Legal judgements have a moral relevance since they concern (vital)
interests of different persons and to ask whether an action that
affects the interests of an individual is or is not justifiable is
always to ask a moral question (TJA: introduction). The statement
that law is morally relevant is compatible with the statement that
legal justification is not a sub-class of moral justification. I am
willing to go as far as holding that even though legal justification
as an institutional practice can and ought to be morally justified,
that does not necessarily make legal justification a sub-class of
moral justification.
Since the late 1950s there has been a growing interest and
concern for problems of practical philosophy and for the idea of a
global, general or extended rationality. Aarnio, Alexy and Peczenik
(1981) talk about a "rehabilitation of practical philosophy".
Interesting works and studies have appeared that deal with legal
reasoning, with a special type of modal non-classical logic specially
applicable to practical questions and with a special type of syllogism
the conclusion of which leads to action. The problem of Rationality
has also received considerable attention. Rationality is usually
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regarded as a method through which to arrive at rational beliefs and
rational action. The notion of intrinsic rationality would consider
the adequacy of certain means towards same postulated end or the
adequacy of certain intermediate (enthymeraatic) propositions and of
certain paralogical transformations towards a given conclusion
(Peczenik; 1983: passim). This type of rationality can also be called
technical, teleological or means-ends rationality (G.Patzig; 1986:
173) .
The idea of Rationality as Method or attitude could be extended
to include within it an extrinsic rationality, a rationality which
would imply a continuous questioning of the initial premises or the
ends one postulates as desirable, as well as a questioning of the
inferences that could be drawn from those premises or that would lead
to those ends.
One of the main differences between legal and moral justification
lies in the fact that whereas a rational justification in the law does
not require one to transcend or go beyond valid law - once the sources
have been established and the inferences to be drawn from them have
been accepted - a rational justification in ethics has to question and
prablematise the ultimate options. The ultimate options in the law
are institutionalised: they are the legal sources recognised as valid
according to a practice of recognition, a practice which can itself be
legally regulated. A justification in the law is regarded as correct
or sufficient if the legal decision to be justified is based on
sources of law and/or on certain canons of legal reasoning (e.g.
criteria of interpretation). There can be same discussion concerning
the choice of such and such norms which will apply to the case or
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concerning the correct interpretation of such norms, but legal
justification is not expected to question the very system of law nor
the ideology of adjudication embodied therein: the postulate that
legal decisions have to be grounded on legally relevant sources (this
postulate embodies the rule of law ideal). Indeed it can even be
argued that such a deep justification would need to step outwith the
law, even where the postulate can be found as positive law. Legal
justification is more controllable than moral justification because in
the latter the very system of values has to be justified whereas in
the former one need not justify the system of norms.
The situations in which argumentation is called for in practical
life are various. Diversity is so great that the very structure of
argumentation varies according to each situation (OIH: 86). One such
situation would be the justification of legal decisions; another the
justification of moral opinions and beliefs, and yet another the
justification of a choice of policies. In all of these specific
situations general practical argumentation would be called for, the
paradigm of which is the Theory of Rational Discourse. This view is
also held, among others, by Alexy (1981) for wham legal argumentation
would be a special case of general practical argumentation; by
MacCormick-Weinberger (ITL:203) in whose opinion legal discourse is a
mode of rational discourse; and by Twining-Miers (1976: 7.) who add
that even specialised kinds of legal reasoning share many features of
practical reasoning in non-legal contexts. Thus my provisional reply
to the question addressed in this chapter would be that both legal and
moral justification (and perhaps also other forms of justification
e.g. political justification insofar as it can be distinguished from
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moral justification i.e. at the level of policies) are special cases
of justification in rational practical discourse. "There must be a
unity in practical reason as well as a diversity in its particular
operation in special contexts" (LRU: 274).
In my opinion these special contexts would be not only legal
discourse and ethical discourse but also other types of practical
discourse: political, social engineering, practical problem-solving
and even same forms of aesthetic discourse. The links between legal,
ethical and political justification aire many and we ignore them at our
peril, but the contexts or domains in which these justifications take
place determine their specificity. Not even the fact that law and
morals are often intertwined in the legal justification of hard cases
will count as an overriding argument to consider legal justification
as a sub-class of moral justification for such justification, although
having recourse to principles and making evaluative choices, is still
a legal justification. Aesthetics is a very special case of rational
practical discourse quite unrelated to law but not without connections
to ethics. Thus the fundamental moral question which Maclntyre (1985:
passim) formulates thus: how do I want to live my life? what type of
person do I want to be? is not alien to many aesthetic theories which
deal with the "good life" or life styles. But even the link between




In order first to understand and then to explain an action or a
belief the theoretical observer has at least two choices: (a) to try
to grasp the meaning that the action or the belief has for its agent
or holder, or (b) to try to explain the action or the belief by the
use of concepts independent from its agent or holder, of experience-
distant concepts (see chapter 3). In order to prove or demonstrate a
statement or preposition there are again at least two options: (a) to
show that the proposition enunciates an analytical truth or (b) to
prove that the proposition constitutes an accurate or correct
description of the world, a description not yet falsified by
experience. Actions or beliefs are not susceptible of demonstration
in the sense in which prepositions are. Actions and beliefs can be
explained or they can be justified. A true statement does not require
justification, it is enough to demonstrate its validity (verification)
by reference to its truth-conditions although seme methodologists
still talk about justification (sensu largo) as equivalent to
demonstration or verification of propositions stated within natural
sciences (Wrdblewski; 1979 b).
Justification requires something other than mere explanation; it
implies giving reasons for an action or a belief or a decision. But
not just any reason. Justification consists in giving good reasons,
sufficient reasons for a belief, decision or action (Peczenik; 1983:
intro.). Moral justification consists in giving good and sufficient
reasons to support a morally relevant action, belief or decision. The
difficulty lies in deciding which reasons are to count as "good" and
why.
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1. What is being justified?
What is the object of moral justification? In the personal level
one can justify moral opinions and moral beliefs as well as morally
relevant decisions for action and moral maxims in the Kantian sense
i.e. as subjective principles that guide action; and finally one can
justify morally relevant actions and conducts. That these actions and
beliefs should be justified at a personal level does not imply that
morality has to be possible in a private world. Intersubjectivity (an
interpersonal world) is inherent to morality. On the social,
interpersonal level, the object of moral justification consists of
social (and legal) norms, conventions, principles, policies etc. The
specifically moral justification occurs at the purely personal level.
It is the individual who decides. The problem at this stage is to
decide what are morally relevant actions, beliefs, opinions, decisions
etc. What are the criteria of moral relevance? These are as
difficult to fix as the criteria for "good" moral reasons. That will
depend on the meta-ethical conceptions of the justifying agent i.e. on
what ethical theory he or she holds. Here lies one possible
difference between legal and moral justification: it is slightly
easier to establish what is to count as legally relevant, and the role
played by the legal theory of the justifying agent in determining what
is to count as legal is more constrained. Moral justification at the
social level directly bears on questions of legal and political
philosophy multifariously related to ethics.
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2. To whom is moral justification addressed?
Hew to characterise the audience or auditorium of moral
justification? From the point of view of the individual justifying
agent the audience is not pre-determined nor limited in any way, it is
an imaginary universal audience. Moral justification is addressed to
everyone and to anyone. This feature is related to the requirement of
universalisation in moral justification. From the point of view of
the addressees of moral justification the audience is ideally an
impartial spectator, but at this stage one enters into the domain of
discourse: the audience is made up of any person willing to adopt the
moral point of view or to participate in the moral "language game"
i.e. of all those willing to take part in moral discourse. But in
practice, the moral audience will be an audience that to same extent
shares a form of life (a culturally bound society or even a fragment
of society in e.g. a debate on deontology) and not the theoretically
universal audience constituted by Humanity. The pragmatic aspects of
moral argument are specially relevant here. Moral justification
normally proceeds with an interlocutor who demands justification.
Rather than addressing the justification to a universal audience, one
may more meaningfully talk of moral justification as appealing to an
impartial spectator. But in a sense the moral interlocutor is
considered regardless of personal factors, in other words, in adopting
the moral point of view certain personal features (not all) are
considered irrelevant.
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3. From where is moral justification addressed?
Kant's reply would undoubtedly have been: from the autonomous and
sovereign individual. The principle of autonomy is susceptible of
different readings. Kant's moral agent is an "artificial" individual
who is not socially conditioned and whose possibilities of choice are
almost unconstrained. Kant's attention was directed to a purely
formal sense of moral deliberation without taking problems of action
into account (a fundamental point about moral deliberation is that
one's decisions cannot be universalised, only the principles according
to which the decision was made can). Objections to the Kantian
version of moral autonomy raise the point that the moral agent is not
in reality that abstract individual Kant somehow presupposes (the
noumenal person), but rather a phenomenal person in a given spatio-
temporal dimension, belonging to a given culture and living a given
form of life, being socially determined, genders-specific and falling
under an age-group. Kant's idea of the noumenal person as the ethical
agent leads to the idea of Humanity, but it also dilutes
individuality: there is only Humanity (Agnes Heller; 1984: ch.2,
especially at p.33).
The young Lukacs of History and Class Consciousness went as far
as holding that the only impartial and universal moral agent would be
represented, if at all, by the working class because albeit socially
determined or class-bound, the proletariat aspires to the elimination
of class differences (ibid: 266). The principle of generalisability-
universaiisability is ever present in Lukacs (ibid: ch.8). I would
personally agree with Sartre in that the individual is "condemned" to
being free and cannot thus escape moral responsibility even though his
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or her social condition is socially determined. This stress on
freedom or liberty does imply that the individual's social
determinations can somehow be transcended, but it does not postulate a
noumenal individual. Practical moral deliberation always takes place
in the first person, and although the capacity of humans to effect
changes in the social world is somewhat limited, humans will still be
responsible for their actions upon the world and for their
deliberations regarding the moral ought, and as Heller (following
Luckcics in this point) says, "that which can be done also must be
done: to acquire a moral personality, to build up one's own life as if
the community of free humans already existed: such is our duty" (ibid:
256). Moral justification is addressed by the agent who adopts the
moral point of view and who accepts that it is not only possible, but
also desirable to give good, valid or sufficient reasons in moral
matters; not necessarily reasons possessing a truth-value - in order
to establish the truth of a moral belief demonstration is called for,
but demonstration is not an available option in morals - but neither
"reasons" based exclusively on self-interest, on emotions or on
sentiments. The moral agent adopts the role and takes the place of an
imaginary universal legislator or at least of a "rational chooser" or
"rational preferrer" (sic). And the rational justification of such
choices is always retrospective.
4. How can we justify our moral judgments?
A sceptic would reply that such an enterprise is doomed to
failure. But moral sceptics, if they want to remain faithful to their
scepticism, have to refrain from asking questions such as: why should
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we be rational? What do we need justifications for? etc. because
from the very moment they ask those questions they are asking for
reasons, and this asking for reasons constitutes the very practice to
which their scepticism is directed. Besides, as Maclntyre (1985:
ch.l) points out, many moral critics do not succeed in ridding
themselves of the assertive use of moral rhetoric. Sceptics ask: why
should we demand justifications of moral and practical opinions? but,
in so asking, they themselves engage in a form of discourse which
presupposes, at least, the principle of universalisability (a point
made by Apel; 1986: passim and by Habermas; 1989: passim). But if by
scepticism same form of ethical non-cognitivism is understood as in
e.g. Mackie (1977: 1,12.), in that case I would regard it as a
defensible position. Emotivists might also deny that one can allege
relevant reasons for or against a moral judgment: one can only resort
to persuasion by means of rhetorical "arguments", one can only hope to
win the argument by gaining emotive adherences. Is then justification
incompatible with persuasion? Can justification ever resort to
persuasive reasons? These are open questions.
We can try to back our moral judgments by reference to facts
(factual reaons), but being extremely careful not to derive an "ought"
from an "is". Still we can try to obtain the maximum possible
information available about relevant facts and try to reach same
agreement on hcm to read those facts. Both of these preliminary
activities are useful toward justification. It would be equally
useful to reach some agreement on the use of the terms in our
arguments. This way the risk of falling into linguistic disagreements
can be minimised (we construct our values from our knowledge of hew
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the world is constituted, and it is quite easy to forget to carry out
a continuous reflection on the terms that we "naturally" use). A
further step could be taken by having recourse to arguments that imply
functional or instrumental concepts - or technical norms - for such
arguments make relativised value judgments possible. This way moral
judgments can be treated as statements of fact and can therefore be
tested. For instance "if equality is to be achieved in the
opportunities of access to public posts, discriminations based on
gender, race, political beliefs, nationality, etc. are to be
abolished". In a sense this is a technical norm which can be tested:
do such discriminations in fact restrict opportunities of access to
the public service? The gap between facts and values is not so
overwhelming after all. What we agree to call "fact" is usually
determined by a given theory and what we agree to call "value"
frequently consists in seme future state of facts or in a set of ends
(aims) that we consider to be desirable and foreseeable. All these
observations are relevant to consequentialist or teleoloqical
conceptions of morals (as opposed to deontoloqical conceptions). A
teleological conception makes use of finalistic or end-oriented
judgments i.e. arguments that predict future facts and place same kind
of evaluation on those facts according to criteria which are
ultimately moral or ideological (Maclntyre; cp.cit.: chs.4 and 5,
Muguerza; 1977: 111, and on deontological and teleological conceptions
see von Wright; 1983: ch. 6 and Aarnio; 1977: 2-5, and regarding those
conceptions in legal reasoning see Wrdblewski; 1987)
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Deductive argumentation cannot guide us to the very end of the
chain of justifications. It only operates on an intermediate or
inferential level (see chapter 6): normative reasons are connected or
hooked on to one another back to the stage where it becomes necessary
to justify - to give reasons in support of - the initial premises from
which justification proceeds. If the principle of individual autonomy
is considered to be essential in ethics or morals, then the reasons
supporting the premises must originate in the very individual
justifying agent. Those reasons cannot originate from seme instance
external to the individual for that would imply heterorony. Our moral
judgments are value judgments. We would be wasting our time if we
tried to rely on deductive logic in order to justify them, for any
argument we could adduce in support of those judgments would itself be
founded upon a value-judgment, and so on ad infinitum (infinite
regress). logic cannot help in the choice of primary premises. But
the absence of pure logic or strict rationality does not imply an
impossibility of reasonable justification.
A transcendental step must thus be taken beyond logic, and a
point is reached where deductivism is no longer of any service to cur
justification. Once we have climbed to the initial premises the
deductive ladder can be dropped and an engagement is necessary, a
personal and autonomous commitment to a certain value-system
postulated by no one but ourselves and to a deeper value: to
participate in discourse. This is the gist of the principle of moral
autonomy: we do not accept a value-system ccrnimanded to us by an
external real or imaginary agent be it a prophet, a leader or a so-
called god. There are no moral authorities. We must always accept
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the risk and the responsibility of having erred in the choice of our
ultimate premises, but the recognition of the error has to originate
in ourselves. We must equally always be willing to alter our basic
choices in the light of "better" reasons for different choices or upon
consideration of objections raised to our reasons by others and by
ourselves at a later time (this leads to a rejection of dogmatism). I
would be foolish to hold that such choices are made in a vacuum.
Absolute autonomy is an illusion. Our choices are always conditioned
by the culture and the form of life into which we have been
socialised, and in closed, extremely static societies (for the concept
of static justice see Heller; 1987) social pressure is so overwhelming
that a genuine possibility of choice - and the moral autonomy that
goes with it - is seriously undermined. In view of such circumstances
one might feel tempted to embrace an absolute determinism which would
rule out the very possibility of ethics. In spite of it, I would
still maintain that even in such circumstances a choice is possible
which departs from that form of life: such a choice is the task of a
hero (or of a revolutionary) ...
Our moral evaluations can therefore be justified by reference to,
among others, factual reasons. Does this inevitably lead us to
committing a naturalistic fallacy? Not necessarily.
Is it then possible to make a rational choice? As J. Muguerza
(op. cit.: passim) points out, the hypothesis of the rational election
is an ideal limit which plays a regulative role in moral codes,
similar to the regulative role played by the limit-idea of "truth" in
natural sciences. A step toward rational choice is to encourage the
proposal of alternative choices so that a constant critical appraisal
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of ultimate choices can be possible. As H. Albert says, any component
of a problem-situation - including so-called ultimate presuppositions
- can, in principle, be revised (1988). Rationality is an open-ended,
unfettered activity. Many moral codes or moral forms of life appear
to be internally rational, that is, rational for those who partake in
those forms of life. In such cases only questions referring to the
interpretation of this or that aspect of the form of life arise, but
the very forms of life are not questioned.
If one holds the viability of an extrinsic or external
rationality then it is possible to give reasons, even better reasons
for the adoption of different codes or forms of life. My use of the
words "better reasons" might raise a suspicion of cognitivism, which I
wish to avoid. It can be shown that a certain moral code or a certain
moral form of life does not match up to the very principles and
ultimate choices on which they are said to be based i.e. that there
are same inconsistencies or at least incoherences inherent in such a
code; and this can be held independently of the question whether those
who hold that code or lead that form of life are aware of their
shortcoming. This view implies that one can meaningfully talk about a
certain form of life from an observer's point of view (see chapter 3).
It can even be held from outwith the code in question that its
postulated ends are mutually contradictory, but I would very much
doubt that one could terminate the dispute by alleging "better"
substantive arguments from a material point of view against those
postulated ends and in support of alternative ones (see chapter 3 on
incommensurability of cultures). At that point one would hold same
cognitivist theory of values.
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Perhaps the exceptions that could overrule that substantive veto
would be the values of liberty and life. These substantive values
would thus function as a precondition of argumentation, and they would
samehcw check the consensus reached after argumentation. This view is
forcibly held by Agnes Heller (1987) who goes a bit further than
Habermas and Apel adding those two substantive values to the
transcendental-pragmatic foundation of (Discourse) Ethics: based on
the need to presuppose the principles of formal logic and the
universal-pragmatic principles of universalisability and of
argumentation as human communication.
The fact that our ultimate normative premisses are not the
product of a chain of logical reasonings (circular arguments being
ruled out as well) does not imply that no reasons whatever can be
adduced in support of such premises. It only means that those reasons
which can "be given are not in their nature conclusive, nor equally
convincing to everyone. Honest and reasonable people can and do
differ even upon ultimate matters of principle, each having reasons
which seem to him or her good for the view to which he or she adheres"
(MacCormick; 1978: 5). The only claims to Rationality one can make on
the basis of these non-cognitivist postulates are formal claims:
rationality would then require consistency and systematicity of the
postulated ends, system-coherence of the consequences of the actions
followed or proposed with a view to those ends (these do not
necessarily include the requirement of the acceptability of the
consequences for that would amount to a quasi-material claim to
reasonableness rather than to rationality).
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Rationality thus consists in method: critique and revisability of
the postulated ends. The fact that these cannot be logically
demonstrated does not mean they cannot be rationally justified, that
no reasons whatever can be given in their support. Whereas an
internal-intrinsic rationality would only require us to adopt means
that are instrumentally adequate to those ends, an extrinsic-external
or open rationality would require from us a critical assessment of the
ends by recourse to formal criteria, and arguably also to the material
values of life and liberty. Rationality will always leave open the
possibility that there is a plurality of equally rational systems of
practical reasoning, differing in their practical materialisation but
equal in their rational form (ITL: 199).
The same requirements of formal rationality can be observed from
two or more diverse forms of life based on different ultimate choices
leading to different normative codes or sets of beliefs. Can we
rationally prefer one of these forms of life? Can we rationally adept
a substantive engagement with a given form of life? Such an
engagement would go beyond the rules of practiced, discourse. It is
not problematic to give a tangential answer with a negative form: an
absence of rationality does not lie in the fact that a given moral
code have this or that content, it lies rather in a dogmatic method or
attitude, unable to rid itself of prejudices and unwilling to tolerate
criticism of its cwn basic premisses. We can thus rationally prefer a
form of life that enhances the opportunities to critically re-assess
its own ultimate choices and potulates, a form of life inspired by
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rational practical discourse and allowing its partakers to engage in
rational discussion about that form of life even when those partakers
are not agreed on the ultimate choices.
As regards the substantive engagement, it can also be pointed out
that there exist certain pro-attitudes or predispositions towards
certain ultimate choices. These predispositions are not entirely
rational since they presuppose an engagement, but they are not
irrational either: they can be called non-rational. As has been
suggested above, it is not irrational to have a pro-attitude in favor
of a form of life that does not tolerate violations of personal
liberty nor qualitative economic differences between persons and which
secures a genuine equality of opportunities. In other words, it is
not irrational to make a choice for life and liberty.
5. Formal requirements of moral justification
The requirements of method of a rational preference and of its
rational justification are also essential features of moral
justification. The requirement of universalisability in moral
justification implies three inter-related characteristics: (a) the
preference has to be impartial, (b) it has to be objective with
respect to certain standards by which evaluations are assessed - ends,
aims, desires, aspirations and intentions pursued (Mackie; 1977: 1.5.)
- and (c) the choice must not be based exclusively on self-interest.
As a rational preference-maker I shall make my choice not because of
any specific interest in the outcome of my choice as far as it will
concern me, but rather I shall postulate that anyone in my position
would have to mate the same choice even in those cases where the
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outcome of the choice does not benefit me. The choice I make
regarding a given situation will remain the same whenever I find
myself in the same situation again. Of course criteria of relevance
are needed in order to decide which are to count as equal situations.
Unless you have decided to adopt the moral and impartial point of
view you would not regard as reasonable the proposal that the way to
decide what to do consists in asking to yourself what rules you would
establish if you did not enjoy your present benefits and privileges or
if you did not knew what these were. The rational agent takes his or
her interests and desires into account from the standpoint of
impartiality: the agent sees him/herself as dictating rules which
harmonise the interests of all other rational agents (Bernard •
Williams; 1985: ch.4). The preference-maker would have to decide as
if he/she were blinded by a veil of ignorance (the term is used by
J. Rawls; 1972) regarding his or her own assets and capabilities and
would try to make a rational decision taking all interests into
account. The problem is that we always approximately knew what are
the opportunities the social order in which we live makes available to
us, and if we tried to disregard such knowledge, our moral decisions
would cease to be rational (G. Patzig; 1986: 107). The veil of
ignorance is still meaningful insofar as it demands from me that I
disregard my stake in the outcome of my decision, and in this sense it
is closely related to Kant's golden rule or moral imperative, but the
veil of ignorance cannot possibly demand the impossible: the interests
of the members of society are always a relevant factor of my decision
(and Rawls' proposals were concerned to maximise the interests of
those worst-off in society).
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In After Virtue, Alasdair Maclntyre has made an interesting
criticism of the conception of morals based on rules, and has proposed
instead a re-appraisal of the Aristotelian tradition with a view to
restoring the intelligibility and rationality of our attitudes and
moral and social commitments (1985: ch.9 and 1988), a tradition that
turns around the idea of moral virtues. Although I would not hold
that all moral judgments are to be the outcome of the categorical
imperative a la Kant, I still find it very difficult to conceive of an
ethical theory not based upon universalisable normative principles
(normative in the moral sense, not in the legal sense). Such
principles might clash with one another and solutions to such
conflicts will have to be attempted through new principles. An ethics
based on principles is compatible with attention being paid to moral
dispositions, virtues or sentiments (pro-attitudes).
Universalisability will further require taking into account
alternative interests, preferences and ideals and empathically
considering other persons' conditions (placing oneself in another
person's shoes, as Mackie remarks) and thus it can hardly be denied
that the very practice of universalising counts as a virtue.
Willingness to enter into ideal rational discourse can be seen as a
virtue.
When it comes to making a decision it is important to have
sufficient information available about the possible forms of life and
moral codes or sets of moral beliefs, about value patterns and norms
of behaviour implied by those forme of life, and about value judgments
and prescriptions derivable from them. It is equally important to
possess sufficient knowledge about the practical possibilities to
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bring one decision into effect and to bring about the outcome the
decision pursues, as well as knowledge about alternative decisions,
their viability and possible outcomes. Any moral justification of a
moral decision has to take into account people's needs, interests and
desires as far as these might be affected by the decision. "That is
why the data obtained by social sciences i.e. anthropology, psychology
and psychoanalysis [what about sociology?], are indispensable for the
theorist of norm justification" (Patzig; op. cit.: 109).
The rational agent is condemned to be free. A sufficient freedom
of choice of the form of life one wants to live is also essential.
Same philosophers of the form of life, most notably Wittgenstein,
assumed that it could not possibly be the object of individual choice,
that the person was irremediably bound by his or her form of life. I
do not share that view, especially not with regard to open or dynamic
societies characteristic of Modernity (see Agnes Heller's Beyond
Justice for the concept of modernity). Freedom of choice inherently
assumes autonomy of choice: I choose this form of life because I
regard it as the best, the most just(ified), the most virtuous and the
most interesting (herein lies the link between ethics and aesthetics),
but not because same external authority or Institutional requirement
have moved me or driven me so to choose. This way absolute
determinism is denied: the moral agent acts according to reasons and
this fact transcends his or her acting in the light of same law or
regularity (Williams; 1985: 65). As I have said above, for other
authors this talk of the choice of a form of life does not make sense:
one is born to a form of life, one cannot choose it, it is a given. I
do not hold that the agent is absolutely unbound, or that his or her
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decision is in no way culturally or socially conditioned. But the
rejection of blind determinism makes it possible to assert the
connexion between liberty, responsibility and autonomy regarding the
choice. And this stance is compatible with the moderate denial that
there are objective moral values which ought to, and do in fact,
dictate the agent's wishes and inclinations (Mackie; 1977: 1.6.). The
courage needed to choose for oneself is a primary virtue.
Sincerity of choice is another essential feature of moral
justification and is related to impartiality. Sincerity must be
accompanied by a critical attitude and by the acceptance of the need
to constantly revise our moral decisions in the light of new
information regarding the state of affairs before and after our
choice, and in the light of new considerations about the viability and
acceptability of alternative choices. These new information and new
considerations (ideally) will have been acquired in the course of
rational practical discourse a la Habermas. The need for constant
revisability of one's ultimate choices implies that these cannot be
absolute or definite and that one must always remain open to
alternatives and tolerant of conflicting choices made under the same
ideal conditions. Such openness and toleration can be considered as
primary virtues.
LEGAL JUSTIFICATION
Legal justification also consists in giving good reasons in
support of a decision, a contention or an action bearing on a legally
relevant question. But in the case of legal justification we have at
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our reach indications as to which reasons are to be considered "good"
adequate or correct (richtig) legal reasons. Good legal reasons are
not "good reasons in all possible worlds" as reasons in Ethics ideally
are, but rather reasons that fit into a legal system. Thus reasons in
legal justification are more relative, more context-dependent than
reasons in moral justification. One might even encounter the law
stating which reasons are to be considered as adequate within that
law: the law (norms of the legal system) determines the situations in
which the decisions ought to be justified and determines seme of their
elements (this constitutes a minimum legal justification), and
judicial practice shapes same accepted ways of justifying the
decision, ways which can go beyond the requirements of law (thus
shaping a concrete legal justification, Wroblewski; 1984).
Also in contrast with the essential univocity of moral
justification there is a diversity in legal justification. We can
thus talk about different forms of justification in the law:
justification in the creation of the law in the form of general norm
creation by the legislator or the executive, and in the form of
individual or particular norms "created" by the law-applying organs.
Justification is different depending on who the norm-creating
authority is. There is also a justification of norm-contentions: the
opinions of legal counsel offered in legal argumentation on a given
point of law. The justification of these contentions will be based on
the minimum legal justification required by the law and also partly on
the concrete justification shaped by judicial practices of
justification. There is also a justification of the prepositions
about norms issued by legal dogmatics: in this case justification will
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be less "institutionalised" but more systematic. Finally there is a
legal justification of the application of the law by the courts and
other law-officials. This last form of justification would comprise
the form of justification of the "creation" of particular norms by the
courts, for this form of norm-creation is not recognised by the law.
Each of these forms of legal justification uses legal reasonings,
but the paradigm case of legal justification is constituted by the
justification of the judicial application of the law because, as
Perelman points out, legal reasoning manifests itself most clearly in
the decisions and judgments of the courts, which have to prove that
their decisions conform with the law (the system of norms) they have a
duty to apply (art. cit). There is thus an institutional requirement
of justification which amounts to coherence with or fit in the law.
This highly institutionalised context contrasts with the wider,
more open context - the universal audience - in which morel
justification ideally takes place. Legal justification is addressed
to a particular audience: the legal audience made up of jurists and
law-officials, and it is addressed in a particular style with a
specific jargon, legal jargon. In order adequately to understand the
offered justification it is necessary to be acquainted with the
institutional formalities of the legal process and with the specific
legal terminology. The particularity of the legal context would
perhaps compare to the narrow audience of moral justification as
represented by a given moral tradition or a moral form of life (static
society). Legal discourse occurs between the judicial organ - in cur
case the EGJ - and legal counsel - in our case the lawyers
representing the parties, the Commission (and in seme cases the
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Council and the European Parliament) and the intervening Member
States, if any - but the parties whose interests are at stake
participate in legal discourse only in a very limited way (the
situation is slightly different when the parties concerned are legal
persons or institutions, and especially when they are Member States).
They participate indirectly through the mediation of their lawyers (I
am using here a neutral term in view of the different names the
profession has) and they will usually have problems in following what
is happening in the court (what is being said and argued).
This fact is in clear contrast with the openness of moral
discourse - everyone can participate in moral discourse without
mediation - and with the principle of autonomy in moral justification.
In certain legal contexts, namely the penal process, the initiation of
the discourse does not depend on the will of the affected individuals:
initiation occurs ex officio. In European Community law the same
thing can be held about the initiation of enforcement proceedings by
the Commission (against persons in cases of supposed infringement of
the Treaty rules on competition, or against Member States in cases of
breaches of their obligations under the Treaties (EEC: articles 169
and 170): the participation of the involved parties is not voluntary.
The roles and functions of the discourse agents are unevenly
distributed in the legal process or legal discourse. Even though the
judicial organ is neutral and impartial regarding the parties and is
also independent regarding the other institutions of the legal order
(EEC: art. 167), it stands in a position of authority as the conductor
of the process. The Court is elevated to this authoritative position
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by the law itself (EEC: arts. 4 and 164), and the way it has to
conduct the legal proceedings is also legally determined (in our case
by the Statute of the ECT and its Rules of Procedure).
The requirement of sincerity is somewhat limited in the law. Hew
far are counsel expected to raise claims they sincerely hold? I do
not think sincerety is an essential feature of legal justification.
The "game of the law" does not assume sincerity of argumentation in
the sense that the "moral game" (sic) does. The lawyer for the
applicant will advance a legal claim and argue for it by referring to
same legal ground trying to enhance the interests of the client. The
lawyer for the defendant will try to resist that claim by referring to
same legal grounds: denying allegations of fact, denying the legal
relevance of the facts alleged, raising claims about legal norms that
contradict the legal claims advanced by the applicant's counsel, etc.
Sincerity is not at stake. At least not at first sight. The versions
of the facts and the interpretation of the applicable norms or the
contention about the relevance of this or that norm in the given case
will all vary according to the interests of the parties. Moral
sincerity is different to legal sincerity. There exists a requirement
of legal sincerity, which may be different for lawyers and judges.
The legal audience does not expect that the justifications
offered by the parties in support for their claims be sincere or even
impartial. The Basic Rule (1.2.) of General Practical Discourse, as
formulated by Alexy (op.cit.), seems to be too stringent: "Every
speaker may only state as true something which he or she actually
believes...". At the most, this rule will be translated into the law
in the form: "Every advocate must raise legal claims that he or she
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believes to be statable in law". The requirement of sincerity will be
more readily adapted to the law if it is taken to mean that no one
should put forward a statement with the intention to deceive or mock
the interlocutor. The justification offered for the judicial decision
has to be impartial, but how far does it have to be sincere? This is
a very controversial point; does legal justification require the
judges sincerely to hold their decisions? This question is related to
the problem of the internal point of view of judges and other legal
officials (see chapters 1 and 3) and also to the wider issue of the
relationships between law and morality. I would claim that the
requirements of sincerity are different in the law and in morals, but
many authors would severely criticise my point of view as allowing for
double standards; the judge would make a decision which (s)he
sincerely believes to be legally correct, although (s)he might have
given a different opinion frcra the moral point of view. The two
spheres, legal and moral judgment, can be analytically distinguished.
But I would agree with R.M. Hare and claim that moral judgments are
overriding (1981: passim), and this view would at least minimise the
"double standards" abjection. According to Hart the proper
functioning of the law requires the judges willingly to accept the
law. It is not necessary for the law to operate that it be recognised
by all the law-addressees, but at least it has to be accepted by the
judges (the willing acceptance of the rules of recognition can be
predicated on the basis of the observance of the law: the practices of
recognition).
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The position of the lawyers regarding the legal process (and it
most be remembered that lawyers are legal discourse participants) is
an uncompramised position: lawyers are not before an "engagement":
they simply play their role in the legal game. They do not occupy the
same position regarding the particular case as the clients they are
representing. Thus the position of the participants in legal
discourse is not parallel to the position occupied by the participants
in moral discourse. But there may be a kind of requirement of legal
sincerity for lawyers as well. This requirement may be incorporated
into positive law (e.g. guides for professional conduct of the
different Bars) or it may be deduced from existing practices. Thus
rule 4.3.9. of the Faculty of Advocates' (Scotland) Guide to
professional conduct says: "An advocate may not accept instructions to
act in circumstances where, in his opinion the case is unstatable in
law or where the case is only statable if facts known to him are
misrepresented to, or concealed from the court... There may, however,
be exceptional circumstances in which it is proper for an advocate, in
order to assist the court, to present a case which he believes to be
unstatable in law. In such circumstances, the advocate must explain
to the client that he cannot do more than explain the client's
position to the court, and that he will be bound to draw the court's
attention to such statutory provisions or binding precedents as have
led him to the conclusion that the case is unstatable".
The requirements differ in each legal system of the Member States
of the EC, and the attempt at a minimum common denominator constituted
by the Declaration of Perugia on the Principles of Professional
Conduct of the Bars and Law Societies of the European Community
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(16 September 1977) steps short of such a requirement. It only states
that the lawyer "must serve the interests of justice as well as of
those who seek it, and it is his duty, not only to plead his client's
cause, but to be his adviser" (II) ... "The disinterestedness is as
necessary to trust in the process of justice as the impartiality of
the judge. A lawyer must therefore shew himself to be as independent
of his client as of the court and be careful not to curry favour with
the one or the other" (V-l).
Legal justification does not occur in the first person, not even
the justification of the judicial organ. The judicial decision does
not count as the decision of this or that particular court, but rather
as the decision of the legal order. According to the traditional
ideology of the judicial role (legal formalism), the court is merely
applying the law to the given case or interpreting the law on a given
point (not creating it). The decision-maker is under the legal
obligation to justify the decision taken for the given case by
referring to valid legal grounds: the ought-, should- or may-sources
of law. Whereas ordinary practical decisions always aspire to be
rationally justifiable, legal decisions can only make claims to
rational justifiability within a valid legal order (Aarnio, Alexy and
Peczenik; 1981). Legal decisions are arrived at following a common
style of argumentation that uses normative canons and are presented in
accordance with formal criteria of presentation, criteria which are
ideally acceptable to the legal cammuriity. Those normative (and
interpretative) canons can be explicit or implicit in the law, and
more or less precise (LRLT: 12).
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A formal, institutionalised presentation of the result of legal
justification i.e. of the legal decision makes it possible for the
theorists of law to concentrate on the context of justification,
leaving aside the context of discovery or psychological context by
which the decision is arrived at - the social and psychic genesis of
the decision - which is always of relevance for an understanding of
the decision (see previous chapter). This methodological stance is
backed by the ideology of rational legal justification, and in
particular by the principle of legal certainty (the rule of law) in
its two versions: (1) the requirement that the justification be
legally adequate or in conformity with the law, and (2) the need to
avoid arbitrariness in adjudication (RAR: ch.1-1.2. and 1.3.,
Peczenik? 1983: 3.3.4., and Wrdblewski; 1985 a).
In my opinion, the audience of a moral justification can expect
to find a greater overlapping between the context of discovery and the
context of validity, precisely by virtue of the strong requirement of
sincerity of moral justification and because the moral context is less
institutionalised than the legal context. Further limitations of the
context of validity are the need to reach a decision in a given time
limit, and namely the fact that in legal justification there is a
point of no return, that is, a point at which the judicial decision
becomes final and definite either because domestic or international
remedies have been exhausted and there is no higher court which is
competent to hear the case (there is no remedy against the decisions
of the EGI) or because the time limits whithin which appeals to higher
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courts can be made have already expired. This amounts to saying that
revisability of judicial decisions is only limited in law, it is not
even ideally or tendentially absolute as in morals.
These ideas can be illustrated by Cammission v. France ("aid to
fishing undertakings" case 93/84 ECR [1985] 829) where the EGJ held
that the French Government did not challenge Decision 83/313 in due
time and it was thus barred from challenging the factual and legal
findings on which the Commission based its decision. On those
procedural grounds, the Court did not need to consider the arguments
put forward by the defendant. But revisability of decisions given by
the Court to previous cases is possible when new similar cases arise:
a domestic court may make a reference for a fresh preliminary ruling
on a question of interpretation which the Court has settled in a
previous case (see the discussion of CILFTT in the next chapter).
A further limitation is constituted by the fact that non-liquet
is not an acceptable solution in law: legal disputes have to be
solved, and they must be solved ex autoritate. The judicial organ
cannot reply (in cases that fall within its competence) that it does
not knew what decision to make before the present case because it is a
specially hard case. It cannot say that it will however adopt a
provisional, temporary solution in this or that sense. Still, a court
can say, in various reference proceedings (not in article 177
proceedings), that a problem is political and non-justiciable and that
therefore the court will not answer the questions put to it. The EGJ
does not do so, pace Foqlla v. Novello (case 104/79 [1980] ECR 745 and
case 244/80 [1981] ECR 3045). Legal decisions are always presented as
final and certain (except perhaps in same person-oriented cases such
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as child custody and related cases). But in moral justification there
are no such structural or institutional limitations. This is not to
say that non-1iquet is possible in moral thinking. It is a matter of
dispute hew far can a moral agent say that (s)he does not know what
course of action to take when facing a moral dilemma. In my opinion
this is a genuine position. And there will be situations in morals
where not only does one not know which is the right answer to a moral
conflict, but one can seriously doubt that there is only one right
answer (e.g. abortion or charity or violence in certain situations).
The situation is somewhat similar in the law, but with the caveat that
revisability of legal decisions is limited (in positive law) and the
functioning of law, according to many ideologies of law, "requires"
strong limitations on the availability of non-1iquet. These
limitations are crucial to the law because they make legal
justification more readily predictable and controllable and they thus
contribute to the value of legal certainty and the rule of law. Also
contributing to the value of the rule of law is the fact that in the
legal sphere it is possible to know what will count as "good" reasons:
the process of legal argumentation and legal justification
"presupposes same objectively and commonly acknowledged way of
identifying same normative propositions as having specially legal
status; and it presupposes an institutional character to this process
of identifying or asserting the special character of these
propositions as bases of argumentation" (MacCormick; 1988).
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1. How is Legal Justification possible?
As was indicated above, there is a diversity in the forms of
legal justification depending on who the justifying agents are and
what institutional role they play: justification in the creation, in
the application and in the systematisation or expounding of the law.
In the sensu largo application of the law - including the activities
of legal counsel in argumentation and of Advocates General in the
presentation of the case - different decisions are involved (see
previous chapter). Among these one finds decisions on the
interpretation of legal norms: interpretative standpoints (Aarnio;
1987 and Peczenik; 1983: passim). The study of interpretative
standpoints is the subject of chapter 7. In the remaining parts of
the present chapter I shall refer to the glebed, forms of justification
in the law: the justification of judicial decisions in clear or
routine cases and in hard cases - although "in truth there is no clear
dividing line between clear cases and hard cases" (MacCormick? 1978:
197) - and the distinction between internal and external justification
in the law in connexion to the larger question of Rationality.
Notwithstanding what will be said below on clear and hard cases
(see chapter 6), one can, for present purposes, say that clear or
routine cases are those in which there are no problems regarding the
meaning or the validity of the legal norms to apply nor regarding the
choice of those legal norms as covering the case at hand (situation of
isamorphy). In other words, clear cases are cases where no stricto
sensu interpretation is required: interpretatio cessat in Claris
(Wrdblewski; 1985 a: 2.4.). Of course same interpretation is needed
for the understanding of the norm - in Cworkin's terms this represents
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the pre-interpretive stage (LE: ch.2) - and same background theory of
the sources of law is presupposed in the pre-interpretive stage. Nor
can it be denied that problems may arise concerning the classification
of the material facts of the case. But, in general, clear cases are
fairly routine. It is a matter of dispute how frequent clear cases
are although the term "routine" is indicative of their frequency.
2. Justification in clear and in hard cases
Clear cases can be distinguished from hard cases. Hard cases
call for interpretation in the strict sense because of semantic or
pragmatic features of the case at hand:
(a) the meaning of the applicable norm may not be clear owing to e.g.
polysemy, vagueness, generality and ambiguity of the terms used
in the norm, or due to the open texture of legal language as a
species of ordinary language (CL: VII-1),
(b) there may be a conflict of norms - for the types of antinomies
see chapter 1,
(c) it may be that the case at hand cannot, at first sight, be
subsumed under any of the existing valid norms and yet it seems
to be a legally relevant case (see also chapter 1 on the problem
of gaps)
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(d) it may be that the decision adcptable, upon first consideration,
does not seem to fit with existing law, or contradicts same
previous norm, and yet this solution appears to be "just" or
acceptable to the legal community. This is the problem of equity
and ideological antinomy (see Perelman; art.cit. and RAR: III-
4.2.).
Legal counsel will try to elaborate on such apparent antinomies
whenever their interpretative standpoints seem to clash with the
existing body of law; they will stress the interpretation of the
contested norm(s) to cover their contention and to make it thus
acceptable to the legal audience on the grounds that, as interpreted,
the norm can be made coherent with existing law and/or that it
enhances substantive values (principles) embodied in the law
(coherence and integrity).
A judicial decision will be legally justified when it follows
from certain premises (internally justified) and when those premises
have been correctly selected and the rules of justificatory reasoning
or "transformations" or canones for reasoning with such premises are
accepted as correct (externally justified). In hard cases, a purely
analytic, "deductive reasoning will prove to be insufficient, and it
will be advisable to have recourse to what Aristotle, who was quite
inspired by the law, called dialectical reasoning and which I would
personally call argumentation" (Perelman; 1972, my translation). In
my opinion the decision given in clear cases can be (internally)
justified deductively by means of ex post syllogistic reasoning. This
deductive justification would be sufficient and valid in the law. A
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justification based on deductive reasoning going back to a major
premise (or to a group of major premises) derived from the body of
existing law counts as a valid justification in the law. Premises
based on legal norms (see chapter 2 for a list of the sources of such
norms in Community law) count as legally "good" reasons. In clear
cases the establishment of the premises (external justification) will
not be problematic. A legal justification will be valid if it, at
least, contains a reference to a material legal source (authority
reason). The accepted sources of law are typical of legal
justification, as opposed to moral reasoning. This is so also in the
case of the rules of interpretation. In moral reasoning there are no
such relatively homogeneous sets of inference rules as in legal
reasoning (Aarnio-Peczenik; 1984).
In clear cases legal justification is not as directly related to
moral justification as in hard cases since an internal justification
will be regarded as sufficient or acceptable in the law: there is no
need to go beyond the premises for these are not a matter of dispute.
In hard cases the relationships between legal and moral justification
are more salient: there are formal similarities as far as the method
of justification is concerned, and there are substantive connexions
because moral considerations and evaluations will often step in legal
justification. But it can be held that these connexions do not
prejudge the question of the special case thesis since a reason will
be a moral reason in a moral context, but it will acquire a legal
character in a legal context (this can clearly be seen with principles
that became part of the law either through legislation or through
judicial decision-making), it will form part of the reasoning which,
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along with other types of reasons, leads to the legal justification
(ibid). Still, there is a sense in which the justification of a
decision in a clear case is related to Morals: the underpinning
decision to apply the law and to use as a standard according to which
to judge the acts of others is a moral-political decision.
In problem cases resort to an operative interpretative decision
is indispensable. Internal justification will proceed along
"transformations" rather than entailments, although the basic internal
justificatory scheme can remain deductive (because of the requirement
of universalisability in the formulation of the Major Premise,
subsumption will be made possible). The main difference for hard
cases lies in the (external) justification of the premises: they are a
matter of dispute and interpretative techniques are called for
(notwithstanding the problems of evidence).
The decision in hard cases can be justified by reference to a
more complicated scheme (at this point the works of Jerzy Wrdblewski
are followed) which takes the very premises into account:
Norm N has meaning M in language L according to
interpretative directives DI1, DI2...,DIn and to
evaluations VII, VI2... ,VIn necessary for the
choice and use of those interpretative directives.
In such cases, special argumentation techniques are called for
which differ from formal (and deontic) logic. Deductive reasoning has
proved sufficient for the justification of decisions made in clear
cases (a first-order justification based on the requirement of
universalisability: a particular instantiation of the norm is subsumed
into the universal norm), but it will not do in the justification of
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decisions made in hand cases. These call for a second-order
justification the method of which roughly resembles the method used in
moral justification (the contexts remain different). This second-
order justification must involve three elements (MacCormick? 1988,
with slight modifications):
(a) consistency of the decision (or contention) with pre-established
and binding law: non-contradiction of any established and binding
rule of law,
(b) coherence with established law: shewing that the ruling (or
contention) in hand instantiates same general legal principle or
same legal value in a way which exhibits acceptable balance or
fit with other relevant principles and values, in this way
reasoning at the level of grand generalisations differs from
reasoning at the level of lower-order universals, and
(c) consequentialist reasonings shewing that the ruling is, in the
light of its logical and perhaps also its material consequences,
preferable to any alternative.
Second-order justification also cavers first-order justification
(universal isability and subsumption) which can be regarded as a
minimum legal justification. Thus the law-applying decision needs to
be justified in both clear cases and hard cases. A plausible
justification can be reached following Wrdblewski's formula:
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According to norm N, as applied with its meaning M
(at this stage the abovementioned formula for hard
cases is added), fact F of the present case which
has occurred in space c and time t, and which has
been established according to the empirical rules
of evidence EKE1, ERE2...,EREn and/or the legal
rules of evidence IRE1, U?E2..., LREn, and/or
evaluations of evidence VE1, VE2... ,VEn, has as
its legal consequences CI, C2...,Cn. These
consequences have been established according to
directives for the choice of consequences DC1,
DC2... DCn and evaluations of consequences VC1,
VC2..., VCn (the proper alterations need be made
for purely interpretative decisions as in the case
of article 177 preliminary references to the EGT,
for which the first formula is sufficient).
As the analysis of this formula shews, the question is not that
legal justification requires moral justification (the formula remains
in the legal sphere) but rather that moral criteria which do appear in
legal justification operate in a highly institutionalised and specific
context. This context is so essential to legal justification that it
determines its specificity. The justification of the decisions given
to hard cases may call for a reference to moral principles or moral
values, but the limits to that reference lie in the requirement that
the justification be coherent with the established law: a moral
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principle or moral value that boldly contradicts the principles and
values embodied in the law will not stand a chance as an acceptable
legal justification.
3. Internal and external legal justification
When the legal decision is deductively or argumentatively
inferred from the premises accepted by the judicial organ, the
decision is internally justified and it is intrinsically rational: the
different kinds of transformation (as the term is used by Peczenik;
1983) occurring in the process of justification are regarded as
legally valid by the legal community to which the justification is
ultimately addressed. These transformations roughly follow the modus
ponens scheme of logical inference. External legal justification on
the other hand implies an assessment of the very premises from which
these transformations start. But external justification does not
necessarily imply extrinsic or external rationality. External
rationality is related to the justification tout court of legal
justification and it implies going beyond the law in order to justify
the institutionalised practice of justification of legal decisions
within the law. But I am anticipating my own conclusions. Let me
return to external legal justification.
The major premise has to be justified if it is disputed (this
will typically happen in hard cases). It can be justified by proving
that it is consistent and coherent with established binding law or
that it leads to acceptable consequences (second-order justification),
and by formulating it in a universalised way (first-order
justification). Of course, the requirement of coherence-consistency
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presupposes a preliminary systematisation of the existing law - which
will thus operate as a legal system. But a complete systematisation
of the law is theoretically impossible, although it may be a practical
ideal (see chapter 1). Since total systematisation is not possible,
the claim that a proposed legal decision or norm contention is
coherent-consistent with the law cannot run along logical lines only,
it will always be made from a tentative interpretative standpoint and
it will have to be argued for (rather than proven). Apart from this
previous ordering of the law inherent to the requirement of coherence,
a selection of the norms to be applied to the case at hand is
necessary which implies a choice of one (or one set of) among various
possible norms that tentatively apply to the case. The choice of that
norm also has to be justified (not only the proposed interpretation of
that norm). Again, certain presuppositions about the relationships
between norms are made at this stage.
The ideology of the rational legal justification also requires
that the minor premise be justified in all cases, hard and clear. The
present study does not deal with the question of the proof of facts
(and most of the ECU cases analysed in the preparation of this thesis
are cases of preliminary references for interpretation to the ECT,
cases in which questions of fact do not fall within the competence of
the Court), but Wrablewski' s formula gives seme indication as to how
facts can be established. Suffice it here to add the general
requirement of narrative coherence in the presentation of those facts,
a problem related to the question of the levels of relevance of the
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facts, and the necessary formulation of the relevant facts in a legal
language in order to facilitate the subsumption of the minor premise
into the major premise.
The difficulty then lies in the external justification of the
premises used in hard cases: the justification of the interpretations
argued for by counsel and chosen by the ECJ. The way to proceed would
now be to analyse in detail the different rhetoric or persuasive
arguments used in the motivation (justification) of the chosen
interpretation. Such an analysis has been carried out by Tarello
(1980: 345-346), and successfully tested on the interpretative
practices of the Spanish Constitutional Court by Ezquiaga (1987).
These schemi di arqumentazione (seme of which are referred to in
chapter 7, below with references to the ECJ) are the arguments or
reasonings:
a contrario, a simili ad simile, a fortiori, a
campletudine, a ccherentia, psychological
argument, historical argument, apagogic argument
or reductio ad absurdum, teleological argument,
economic argument (e.g. 1'economie du Traite), ex
autoritate, systematic argument, naturalistic
argument, argument from equity, and finally the
argument from general principles.
Other, more global classifications distinguish between
deontological arguments (arguments from principles) and teleological-
utilitarian arguments (arguments from consequences) (Wrdblewski; 1987
and MacCormick; 1978). These holistic classifications recall the
forms of justification used in moral discourse, and provide further
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evidence for the thesis of the similarity between legal and moral
justification as subclasses of sensu larqissimo justification in the
sphere of rational practical discourse, a thesis to which I now turn.
JUSTIFICATION OF LEGAL JUSTIFICATION
When the premises are considered valid or legally "true" then the
decision based on them can be externally justified for legal purposes.
Legal rationality ends at this point. The judicial organ does not
need to go beyond this point in order to justify its decision. But
the philosopher of law, the judge as a rational agent (not as a
judge), and all other persons interested in practical philosophy can,
and should, take a further step toward a deeper justification, toward
a foundation of the justificatory activity. Such deep justification
will ask the question: Why justification? or Why is justification
desirable? and not only How is justification possible? (Peczenik;
1983: passim). When one attempts to answer questions of deep
justification one leaves the legal sphere to enter the realm of
practical reasoning. From the standpoint of a broad practical
rationality one can question not only the context of legal discourse
but also the ultimate choices on which the legal order is based and
the practices that constitute it. Apart from questioning those
choices one can also critically assess them in relation to their
rational acceptability (Aarnio; 1983: 2.). Rational acceptability
operates as an idea-limit, as an evaluative parametre of all
justification.
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This notion of rational acceptability has two elements:
(1) the justificatory discourse must fulfil certain formal or
procedural requirements: consistency, universalisability,
efficacy or relevance, sincerity and coherence or support of the
arguments (allowing perhaps for certain presumptions on the
burden of proof in practical discourse), and
(2) the underpinning problems of deep justification: justification is
rooted in a form of life, and legal justification is regarded as
an acceptable practice within that form of life.
A first justification would be provided by the law itself and by
the type of political philosophy on which that law is inspired, for
there is a requirement that judicial (and other institutional)
decisions be justified or grounded. Judges "use reasoning to link
their decisions, their fact-situations, their problems to something of
higher [institutional] authority - a code provision, or same pre¬
existing legal doctrine" (Friedman; 1988: 255) or same precedent.
Judges only have secondary authority, an authority that must link
itself to primary authority (e.g. that of the legislature).
"Reasoning and interpretation constitute the process through which
secondary authority links its decision and acts to authority of
unquestioned or primary legitimacy ... to duly enacted law" or to
precedents (ibid).
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The problem lies in the foundation of legal justification, of the
type of justification explained in the following chapters (internal
and especially external justification in clear and hard cases).
Internal justification is not distinct in the law, as compared to
other spheres of practical reason (reasoning by analogy and example,
syllogistic reasoning and non-equivalent transformations).
External justification of the premises is the real problem: a
decision is justified in the law when it is shewn to be based on
sources of law (authority reasons) and subsidiarily - if the
connection with legal norms is not straightforward - when, by means
of interpretation and other accepted transformations, certain formal
and substantive reasons are adduced in support of the chosen premises
with a view to their rational acceptability. In these hard cases the
role of axiology is paramount. But how to justify this highly
institutionalised Legal Justification? It can be explained by
identifying its underpinning social, cultural (ideological) and
philosophical features, but can it be justified?
(1) One could try to give reasons why legal justification is (and
ought to be) contextually sufficient. This would be an
institutional legalistic justification based on the principle of
legal certainty and the rule of law,
(2) One could try to show why it is (if indeed it is) a necessary
condition for any society to function (functionalist-utilitarian
justification) or show that having such institutionalised form of
justification for the law leads to better results;
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(3) It could be argued that legal justification is a morally
justified practice, although it is not the same and does not
yield exactly the same conclusions as pure moral
argumentation on the same matters (MacCormick; 1988: III);
(4) One could further argue that legal justification contributes to
certain substantive values and is thus politically justified (the
values of formal or procedural justice), that it enhances
legitimacy in society especially when it is loyal to the
principle of the separation of powers, or when the practices of
justification in a given legal order are widely accepted by the
audiences to which such justifications are addressed or by the
public at large, or at least there is no negative reaction to
those practices from the institutional environment;
(5) It could also be argued that the highly institutionalised form of
legal justification we explain in the following chapters fits in
and makes sense within a moral and political tradition of
justification without being fettered by it (this foundation of
legal justification would run along the lines of narrative
coherence a la Eworkin)
(6) I would join Alexy and Habermas in arguing that in taking part in
the process of legal justification (which takes place in the
context of legal discourse) one is, implicitly at least, raising
claims to correctness (a notion related to consensus in an ideal
speech situation, and thus also to legitimacy. It implies more
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than just legal correctness). Claims to correctness presuppose
the acceptance of the principle of universalisability. Legal
discourse is subject to specific procedures which one could try
to justify (and criticise) according to ideal procedural rules of
discourse (presupposed in a free communicative community: anyone
who can speak and act can participate in disccurse, anyone can
prciblematise or introduce any claim or express his/her cwn
desires and pro-attitudes, and no speaker can be coercively
deprived of these rights). Legal argumentation can also be
justified according to discourse rationality (principle of
universalisability over cases and over agents, rules of non¬
contradiction and consistent use of language) and the requirement
of grounding judicial decisions on positive law (authority
reasons) can be based on the principle of formal justice and
legal certainty (the rule of law).
These forms of (deep) justification of legal justification
combine elements of moral justification, political justification and
ratioral practical justification. The discourse wherein this deep
justification proceeds is rational practical discourse as theorised by
Habermas and Alexy. As Ota Weinberger (1987) says, practical
rationality and legal theory use the term rationality in a much
broader sense than "correctness of logical form, consistency or valid
inference" (this is a necessary but not sufficient requisite). The
broad concept of rationality (external justification of the canones of
reasoning or transformations) extends to methods of reasoning or of
action, effectiveness of procedures used in argumentation, search for
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true and useful information, search for justified practiced,
convictions... But the use of the term "rationality" by legal theory
is not reflexive: legal theory does not always question itself about
its own practices and its own working principles, whereas the use of
the term in practical philosophy will always be reflexive or
foundational: the very practical activities of reasoning are
questioned. Practical philosophy (and Ethics) will always have that
ideal-transcendental feature.
We have seen how the essential features of legal justification
differ from those of moral justification. We have also seen hew moral
justification and other forms of justification may support legal
justification, and hew this support operates in the context of
rational practical discourse. This will be more clearly seen in
chapter 7. These views tend to confirm the thesis that legal
justification, among other forms of justification (e.g. moral
justification), is a very specific, highly institutionalised type of
Rational Practical Discourse. The aim of Rational Practical Discourse
is to achieve rational acceptability of justificatory arguments within
a given audience, to achieve, that is, the impossible: an ideal speech
situation. The ideal feature of Rational Practical Discourse
contrasts with the more institutional features of legal discourse, but
inherent to both Rational Practical Discourse and legal discourse is
the idea of Rationality as Method.
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(what is being justified)
Moral beliefs and morally
relevant actions.
Legal decisions and legal
contentions.
The practice and features
of legal justification.
Legal Justification: 1. sensu largo justification: first-order
justification. The decision is shown to
be based on the premises (sources)
2. sensu stricto justification (hard cases)
Second-order justification needed to
justify the premises
Deep Justification: 3. sensu largissimo justification: rules and
principles - Rational Practical Discourse
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CHAPTER 6
JUbT'JLb'lCATICW IN CLEAR CASES
INTRODUCTION
Hie last part of chapter 5 has offered possible formulae of
justification of judicial decisions for clear cases and for hard
cases. It has been stated that there is an institutional requirement
that judicial decisions be justified. This justification that is
required and expected by the legal community is a special type of
justification: legal justification, which is different from other
types of justification, e.g. moral or political justification. In the
present chapter I shall argue that judicial decisions can be justified
deductively once the premises leading to the conclusion are accepted
and considered valid for legal purposes and once the underpinning
reasons behind judicial decisions are made explicit.
Such deductive justification can be regarded as an ex post legal
decisory syllogism - a deductive scheme of inference of predicate
logic used for practical legal purposes. The legal syllogism
guarantees the internal rationality or formal correctness of the
reasoning leading to the judicial decision. In chapter 5 the idea has
been put forward that external rationality of the decision is also
necessary in legal justification: the premises used in such legal
syllogisms have to be considered valid, correct or acceptable at least
by the decision-maker and the legal audience, and ideally by society
at large. This further reqirement is especially relevant in hard
cases i.e. cases where there is same dispute as to what is the law to
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be applied. In clear cases there is general agreement as to the
applicable legal rules and as to their meaning, so that the formal
correctness of the decisory syllogism is sufficient for legal
justificatory purposes.
A justification of the judicial decision in a clear case can be
tested by deductivism whereas same additional tests would be required
for the rightness and lawfulness of the decision in a hard case. Both
types of test are rational, but the justification of the decision
given to a hard case requires something other than simply
demonstrating the correct application of a legal syllogism. As will
be emphasised in chapter 7, deductive justification is not sufficient
in hard cases, where legal reasoning and legal argumentation focus on
the establishing of the premises. "Arguments to justify the premises
can be interpretative, analogical, evaluative and consequentialist.
Even if they include deductive elements or steps, they are
fundamentally non-deductive in character. They are forms of practical
reasoning par excellence" (MacCormick; unpublished).
As can be seen, my argument about legal justification places
considerable weight on the distinction between clear cases and hard
cases. Part II of the present chapter tries to sort out possible ways
to distinguish clear cases from hard cases and indicates different
levels at which such a distinction could be workable. But I must
emphasise that the distinction is not workable in all the cases that
came before a court (in our case, the EGJ). There is an area of
penumbra where the distinction loses explanatory weight. One also has
to keep in mind that not all cases that came before the EGJ are to be
given a final legal decision establishing the legal consequences
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applicable to the established facts. References for preliminary
rulings only request from the EGJ an interpretative decision on
Community Law or a decision as to the validity of Community
legislation. Deductive justification characteristically does not
operate in the case of decisions on same points of interpretation.
The other decisions taken by the ECU can be justified in a (roughly)
deductive way, notwithstanding the fact that deductive justification
in many such cases - hard cases - is not a sufficient justification in
itself (see part III, in which a case decided by the ECU is
discussed).
What is the theoretical basis for deductive justification? In my
submission, it is modern logic as applied to law. This issue takes us
to the question of the relationships between logics and law, a
question which has been very much discussed in legal theory. The
relationships between the different logics and law in general are not
dealt with in the present work although they are presupposed in
different chapters: chapter 1 deals with metalogic and system theory
in the law, chapter 2 with the concept of norms and the possibility of
logical relations holding between norms, chapter 4 deals with the
"logic" of research and justification, chapter 5 with the limits of
logic in practical affairs and chapter 7 deals with what Perelman and
the Brussels school have called non-formal logic. The present chapter
on deductive justification briefly deals with the issue of the legal
syllogism.
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CLEAR CASES AND HARD CASES
1. The distinction between clear cases and hard cases has been
established by legal doctrine, although, as will be seen belcw (point
3), same versions of the distinction are implicit in legal texts, in
sources of Cammunity law. The distinction is useful to explain the
type of work with which the ECT deals. I shall try to substantiate
this claim by bringing in seme data on the number of cases decided by
the ECJ, and by commenting upon same recent proposals on procedural
aspects at the ECJ, and recent changes in its structure.
To what does the word "case" - as in clear case or hard case -
refer? It does not refer to a legal norm or a group of legal norms,
it does not refer to the source material, but rather to a situation or
a state of affairs: the applicability of the sources to a certain
situation in a given context (the emphasis lies basically on the
pragmatic aspects of the distinction). In the case of any particular
legal rule, it would be extremely difficult to keep a tally of the
number of occasions on which it clearly applied and to compare this
with the number of occasions on which it raised questions of purposive
interpretation (J.Harris; 1979: 1-1.).
The term "clear case" refers to a situation of isamorphy in which
the applicability of a legal rule or a set of legal rules to certain
facts is clear and unproblematic (these would roughly correspond to
Raz's regulated cases). "Hard case" refers to those situations where
it is not clear what legal sources are to apply to the case at hand or
what they mean (in Raz's terms unregulated cases). The distinction
between clear and hard cases is not absolute; in truth there is no
"clear case/hard case" dichotomy. Same cases contain both clear and
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hard issues. These are overall hard cases. The distinction itself is
not always easy to establish: clear cases can be prbblematised (a
point rightly observed by Cworkin; IE: 354), and what, at first
glance, might appear as hard cases may be considered clear and
unprcblematic by the decision-maker. "The situation of doubt
(interpretation) and that of claritas (isamorphy) depend on concrete
acts of communication and cannot be dealt with in abstracto ...
clarity is a pragmatic notion which is linked with seme semantical
features of the interpreted legal language" Wrablewski; 1985: 2.5.).
Pragmatically, there can be different degrees of clarity and of
hardness.
2. One can sort out different levels at which the distinction
between clear cases and hard cases is relevant and useful:
(a) At a sociological level the distinction becomes one between
routine cases and problem cases. In many areas of the law -
perhaps especially in what Fuller called (1972) thing or object-
oriented cases - as in EC law staff cases, and in domestic
jurisdictions fines and administrative sanction cases, minor
offences and mass crimes, licence grantings, simple debt recovery
cases, evictions, same parts of property law and labour law - a
large number of cases, perhaps the majority, are decided in a
routine way. Several institutional and court organisational
reasons can be put forward to account for this fact: the vast
number of cases that came before the courts, the scant resources
that courts have, and the limits of time, the expense of
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litigation, and so forth. Thus, while in 1980, 279 cases were
lodged with the ECJ, in 1985 the number rose to 433 and 376 cases
were still pending before the plenary Court and 434 before its
Chambers. In that year the average length of proceedings was
twenty months for direct actions and fourteen months for
preliminary rulings. At the moment the average length is 22 and
18 months respectively. By contrast a relatively snail number of
cases are prcblematised. Appeal cases will be, by definition,
problematised but this does not make them automatically hard
(with the establishment of the CFI the ECJ will deal with
appeals).
It would be interesting to study the reasons why certain
cases are prcblematised i.e. why doubts are raised concerning the
application of the law by a lower-instance court or judge, hew
costly it is to appeal, under what conditions can
problematisations be successful, when will judges consider a
prcblematisation as being genuine, why a guilty plea is entered
in so many criminal cases thus limiting the task of the decision¬
maker to that of passing sentence (Bankcwski et al.; 1987). But
prcblematisation does usually involve an attempt to make a
seemingly clear case hard. This is the job and the purpose of the
parties1 legal argumentation. But cases can also be
prcblematised ex officio by the courts, as in Les Verts where
neither party had problematised article 173, but the Court raised
the question whether it was competent to review the legality of
an act of the European Parliament since the article only mentions
as subject to review the acts of the Council or the Commission.
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It can be argued that problem or doubt raising is more likely to
happen when the appellant has the means to appeal, where
something of substantial value from the appellant's point of view
is at stake and where the norm(s) applied is/are not clear in a
semantic sense, or where they seem to lead to negative
consequences as in Les Verts (the negative implication being that
acts of the European Parliament would not be subject to review on
a prima facie (same would say on an acte clair) reading of
article 173).
Semantic and pragmatic difficulties can be adduced to help
problematisation, which implies rival readings of the legal
sources. "Each of the parties to a dispute has to show same legal
ground for the legal case argued: produce a suitable formulation
or interpretation of authoritative materials. ... The judge
necessarily rejects one or another of the rival interpretations
of the law as an unsound one which is not authorised by the
sources" (MacCormick; linpybt Lshe-d).
Routine decisions - or mass decisions - are those where the
cases come up repeatedly and the decision-maker is aware of the
details of both the applicable legal rule(s) and the facts of the
case. They are part of everyday life. They are mechanical and
their quantitative preponderance (e.g., in the ECT, staff cases
amount to more than one third of the Court's list: from 1953 to
1985, 2,155 out of a total 5,171 cases were actions raised by
Community servants against the institution for which they worked)
may lead to the false notion that all cases of the application of
the law are the same as the observance of the letter of the law.
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But there are also many decisions of discretion in which the
judge may be uncertain as to how the case must be decided
(Aarnio; EAR: 1,1.1).
The distinction between hard and clear cases is also relevant at
the level of the explanation of judicial action. As has been
seen in chapter 3, judicial action as expressed in decision¬
making can be regarded as an instance of meaningful social
behaviour. Two dimensions of meaningfulness are relevant here:
rule-guided behaviour (following a rule) and reflective
intentional action (teleological explanation). The explanation
of judicial behaviour as a rule-guided action is important in
both clear and hard cases, but in clear cases following a rule is
probably a sufficient explanation of that behaviour. In clear
cases, lee-way - though existing as a matter of fact - is not
expressly provided for by the applicable legal norm(s); in
deciding a clear case the judge can be seen as following the
rules that institute and regulate the application of the law. In
these cases of isamorphy - where the facts of the case clearly
fit into the operative facts of the legal rule, which attaches a
legal consequence to those facts - judicial action can be
accounted for by pointing to the fact that a rule is being almost
unreflectively applied. Further questions underlying judicial
decision-making such as the judge's internal attitude towards the
legal order can, but do not characteristically, arise. The
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judge's following the rule is not questioned by those who are
involved with the legal system i.e. those who take an internal
viewpoint towards it.
The dimension of following a rule is not sufficient in order
to explain judicial action in hard cases. The rules that
constitute and regulate the legal game do not determine the
outcome of the case in a straightforward way and choices have to
be made concerning decisional lee-way. The teleological
explanation of social action is particularly relevant to the
explanation of such choices: what state of affairs does the judge
intend to bring about with her/his decision? Hew has the judge
applied the rule of recognition to choose applicable norms and to
solve possible norm conflicts or gaps? Why does the judge think
that the rules of the legal order do not clearly provide the
solution to the case? These questions are typically raised by
those who share the judge's internal point of view, by internal
sceptics.
These and other questions can always be raised from the
external point of view both in hard and in clear cases. When one
adepts a critical reflective attitude towards the legal order one
asks: why ought judges to apply the norms of a legal order? Why
do they accept and put into practice a certain rule of
recognition? These questions take us to a deeper level of
explanation of judicial behaviour which requires the use of
experience-distant concepts.
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At the level of legal dogmatics, or legal epistemology, the clear
v. hard distinction is related to the notions of "legal sources",
"legal norms" and "legal order". The distinction would turn out
to be one between cases that can and cases that cannot be
decided on the basis of existing legal rules. Legal systems in
clear cases would be systems of currently valid legal rules -
what Harris calls momentary legal systems - whereas the system
used to solve hard cases is a non-momentary legal system: "a
historical congeries of rules, principles, policies, doctrines
and maxims forming part of an official tradition employed by a
community's officials" (Harris; 1979: 1-2).
Legal dogmatics regroup norms with a view to their
application to possible cases. It might well be that the
ordering and working of legal sources in clear cases is different
from that in hard cases. In clear cases we see legal norms -
legal rules - with a typical binary structure at work: a case is
foreseen and a solution provided for that case (and there is
isamorpohy between the antecedent of the legal rule and the facts
of the case at hand). In these clear cases individual rules or a
coherent set of rules are applied whereas in hard cases the legal
order as a fuzzy set is resorted to: apart from same such
conditional norms one also finds other legal sources at work
which constitute guidelines to be taken into consideration by the
legal community and characteristically by the judges. Principles
do not provide solutions to possible cases, but rather indicate
what criteria should be taken into consideration in deciding
cases.
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The theory of the sources of the law - as reordered by legal
dogmatics - is thus present at the background of any
justification theory and any practice of adjudication or
decision-making. Pragmatic interpretation is always required,
even in the case of transparency, but not all applied texts are
strictly interpreted. Still, whereas in clear cases
I
interpretation tends to be literal and to operate at a pre-
interpretive stage'(the interpreter simply follows the literal
interpretation that is involved in all linguistic understanding,
but does not choose literal interpretation after being puzzled),
in hard cases interpretation proper tends to be systemic and
teleological rather than literal, especially when dealing with
principles and other similar standards. Non-legal standards and
evaluations also came into play in hard cases. Thus the systemic
aspect of the law is more clearly at work in hard cases, and the
analysis of the sources carried out by legal dogmatics can be
very helpful in these cases.
Related to this level are the logical aspects of the distinction.
An axiamatisation of the legal order could work only with norms
conceived as rules or precepts, and the practical implications of
this - the use of Expert Systems in law - are for the moment
limited to the resolution of clear cases. Expert Systems in law
with knowledge bases containing only law-statements can solve
what might be called semanticaiiy clear cases: conclusions can be
drawn on the basis of the user's responses to questions asked of
her/him. Machines are not necessarily going to substitute for
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judges in the application of the law. They are to assist judges
and lawyers in the task of finding out which norms are applicable
to given factual situations and what logical relationships those
norms can enter into.
Expert Systems1 assitance is enhanced when iscmorphy is
present and when the norms in question do not provide lee-way to
the judges, or at least provide fixed criteria for the exercise
of limited discretion. When the norms in question, or the facts
of the case call for a weighing and balancing of reasons,
computers are of little assitance; but in cases of norms that are
extremely complicated and detailed or that have a very complex
structure, or when the relationships between a large group of
norms came into play - and assuming they are norms of a binary
structure - computers or inference engines based on algorithmic
operations can be very helpful to Community law: in dealing with
certain tax law provisions, or with provisions implementing the
Common Agricultural Policy, or social security schemes, or
criteria for obtaining aids and subsidies, or even in dealing
with certain staff cases, which are not always simple. Susskind
calls these cases clear cases of the expert domain: their
resolution depends not on intricate legal reasoning but on a
thorough knowledge of the domain and on expertise in dealing with
the application of that domain-specific knowledge to different
novel situations (ESL: 6.6) using first order predicate logic
(Martino; 1988: 131). There can be clear cases of the expert
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domain also where the facts of the case are extremely
complicated, but the expert is able to select the legally
relevant information out of those facts.
At the level of justification of judicial decisions the
distinction between clear and hard cases is especially relevant.
The types of reasons given in support of the decision vary in
each case. Justification in clear cases does not extend to
evaluations. In hard cases one has to justify certain
intermediate decisions leading to the different premises of the
final subsumptory decision. The final decision in hard oas^^s and
the overall decision in clear cases have a more or less deductive
structure (internal rationality of the decision, or first-order
justification). The scheme of inference is characteristically
that of a modus ponendo ponens: A(x) Fx. —> OCX + Fa —> OCa.
This can also be expressed in a syllogistic form.
A(x) Fx —> OCX
Fa
OCa
The justification of intermediate steps is necessary in hard
cases: the choice of the applicable norm when other norms could
have also applied to the case, the determination of the meaning
of the norm when that meaning is not clear and the choice of
directives of interpretation used to determine that meaning, the
choice of consequences and the evaluation of those consequences.
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Further problems of justification common to both clear and hard
cases are related to the establishment and formulation of the
facts (decision of evidence which is itself an interpretative
activity) but these problems are not dealt with in the present
work.
The level of justification is related to the level of
explanation. Clear cases are justified by reference to the
applicable norms when the internal rationality of the inference
leading to application is assured - when one cannot negate the
conclusion without negating at least one of the premises. But in
hard cases the outer rationality is at play: doubts are raised
about the validity of the premises. In clear cases the premises
are not disputed, they are clear. In order to justify the
validity of the premises in hard cases one cannot always resort
to further norms of the system although there can be additional
criteria to be taken into account. Furthermore, evaluative
choices cannot be justified by reference to legal rules of the
system. Principles, policies and other standards can be adduced
in support of same choices; but again, in order to choose certain
principles instead of certain others, further evaluative choices
are necessary, and these choices are made according to ideologies
of the application of the law and to ethical and political
beliefs of the judges.
The relevance of the distinction at the ideological level.
(Wrcblewski; 1985). Same ideologies of the application of the
law present justification in clear cases as the paradigm of
219
justification. For these ideologies the application of the law
is fairly unproblematic. The requirement that legal decisions be
justified is then exhausted when a norm or a group of norms is
given as ground for the decision. Montesquieu can be regarded as
the propounder of such ideologies based on the doctrine of the
separation of the branches of the state, and incorporated into
constitutionalism in "liberal" and "popular" democracies. The
official versions of these ideologies have it that judges do not
create new law but find or discover previously existing law when
they decide a case.
An argument from democratic principles is often given in
support of this view: judges are appointed to apply the law
enacted by Parliament (or by other institutions), and not to
create new law. Thus article 164 of the EEC Treaty says: "The
Court of Justice shall ensure that in the interpretation and
application of this Treaty the law is observed". The
institutions of democratic control of the legislature and law-
creating agencies do not extend to the law-applying agencies.
Judges should accordingly refrain from activities they were not
appointed to pursue. This view is connected to same problematic
postulates about the legal "system": that the law is complete and
has no real gaps, that apparent gaps can be filled by existing
norms, that the law is decidable and provides the means for
deciding all cases, that the law is consistent and conflicts of
norms can always be resolved according to the law, that the
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meaning of the legal norms is either clear or can be rendered
clear according to directives of interpretation extracted from
legal norms, etc. These postulates are all problematic.
The ideology of the mechanical application of the lav has it
that in these boundary cases judicial activity is creative not in
the sense that judges create new law, tut in the sense that it is
an art, a craft: the knowledge of the law allows the judge to
discover within that law the appropiate solution to a case. This
view can be called the "consensus" model of application (J. Bell;
1983) or "Conventionalism" (R. Eworkin; 1986). The values
stressed by this ideology are those of stability, security and
judicial restraint. The model of norms it is based upon is that
of legal rules, and the tool of justification they propound is
the legal syllogism.
Other ideologies usually not embraced by the official
versions on the application of the law are those of the free and
unbound judicial decision. Judges do and ought to create new law
when deciding cases. These ideologies (e.g. pragmatism,
Interessenjurisprudenz, ecole libre du droit, rule-scepticism,
Freirechtsfindung ...) are based on hard cases, which they take
to be the paradigm cases in the application of the law. They
stress the limited scope of deductive justification and work with
a model of norms that is also restricted to rules and precepts of
a binary structure. Since such norms can determine the outcome
of a case only in very few cases, all other cases are free from
the fetters of legal norms and the judicial decision necessarily
has to create new law. These ideologies of the free judicial
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decision stress the value of adaptability of the law to changing
circumstances - the dynamic aspect of judicial application - and
the value of deciding each case on its cwn merits - individual
justice.
According to these ideologies the degree of judicial
discretion is maximal and justification does not need to go
beyond the individual merits of the case. However if cases of
interpretation do arise, a teleological interpretation is
preferred: norms were enacted having certain purposes in mind,
but the situation has changed and the new problems require new
purposes of the legislation. The bound judicial decision
ideology would instead favour the literal and restrictive
interpretation: one cannot trespass upon the intention of the
legislature.
Between these extremes there are a number of ideologies of
the judicial application of the law, and their proponents would
contend that they are embodied in the legal orders of
contemporary advanced societies. Each of these ideologies offers
a different relationship between three important constants:
sources of law/clear cases/discretion. On the one extreme of the
spectrum we find e.g. the exegetical school of exposition of
civil law as discussed by Perelman in his Loqique Juridique
(1976) and Prott (1978): legal rules; clear cases are the
paradigm; little or no discretion. Interpretation is recognised
as being necessary in same cases but it is regarded as almost
equal to application. The legal rule would have a clear meaning
for the law-applying organ. That subjective meaning would became
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the objective meaning of the norm through the process of
application (RRL). Only same degree of arbitrariness would be
recognised; the general norm would work as a frame of which the
individual norm would be a specification. The legal system
provides norms to solve doubts (criteria of hierarchy, of
generality and of temporality). Judges create new law only in
the sense that they dictate an individual norm: the judgment.
A second position would be Hart's: legal rules? mostly clear
cases; strong discretion in hard cases. But hard cases would be
pathological. A mechanical application of the law (formalism)
would not always be possible. Hart would identify hard cases
through semantic criteria: the judge has to determine the core
reference of same word which, because of the open texture of
language, is vague or ambiguous. But there are other features of
law which may give rise to hard cases. Discretion is then
possible not only for those semantic reasons but also because
there can be antinomies or inconsistencies and gaps, as A. Ross
points out (OLT: IV). In these situations too the judge must
exercise discretion in order to eliminate doubts.
There is a third position, which is basically the one this
thesis follows, based on Wrdblewski, MacCormick, Aarnio, Alexy,
and Bell among others: legal rules and legal principles;
pragmatic approach to clear v. hard cases; discretion is endemic
to hard cases, but criteria of acceptability and canons of
procedural rationality constitute an important limit to
discretion. One cannot determine beforehand what degree of
discretion judges have. That will depend on the area of the law
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in question: hew much, to what extent and with what degree of
precision that area of the law or the particular question before
the judges has been regulated by clear and precise legal rules,
and in the absence of rules whether there are other sources that
tendentially apply to the case, or whether there is any consensus
within the legal audience as to how certain gaps should be
filled. Justification in clear cases is rather straightforward
and follows roughly a deductive scheme. Justification in hard
cases follows deductive schemes only as a general outline: the
final decision is presented deductively, but the intermediate,
enthymematic steps cannot be deductively justified, though they
can be rationally justified in the law.
A final position would be Dworkin's: rules and principles?
mostly hard cases; only weak discretion. Eworkin's position (in
TRS) is based on the one right answer thesis and on the rights'
thesis. Ihe law is made up not only of rules but also of
principles and policies. In hard cases where no rule is clearly
applicable principles and policies step in and, through the
weighing process they imply, guide the judges in their decision¬
making activity. According to the "Rights' thesis" citizens
would hold prima facie rights to have their interests defended
and these rights would override reasons based on policies. The
right answer consists in recognising the rights of litigants. In
IE EWorkin accentuates the argumentative character of legal
practice. Interpretation aims at making the object or practice
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interpreted the best it can be (LE:77), and this presupposes that
one not question the interpretative activity, and that one have
the means to identify the practice.
The conception and ideology of law Eworkin proposes, Law as
Integrity, "argues that rights and responsibilities flew frcan
past decisions and so count as legal, not just when they are
explicit in these decisions but also when they follow from the
principles of personal and political morality the explicit
decisions presuppose by way of justification" (p.96). As regards
clear cases, Eworkin thinks there are few of these. Law as
integrity holds out to judges a programme for hard cases which is
interpretive (226) asking them "to assume, so far as this is
possible that the law is structured by a coherent set of
principles about justice and fairness and procedural due process,
and it asks them to enforce these in the fresh cases that came
before them, so that each person's situation is fair and just
according to the same standards" (243). Law "expects" the judges
to be committed: engages.
Eworkin claims that "law as integrity explains and justifies
easy cases as well as hard ones; it also justifies why they are
easy", easy cases are only special cases of hard ones (266) but
the answers to easy cases are obvious whereas the answers to hard
cases are interpretive, and the requirements of choosing the
interpretation that best fits the existing practice along with
the further requirements of law as integrity limit the scope of
225
discretion considerably. In TRS (337) Eworkin says that most
writers do seem to conceive of reasoning in clear cases as quasi-
deductive in character.
A further distinction between clear and hard cases, perhaps
subsumable under other distinctions, holds at the moral or
ethical level. Lyons explicitly (1984: IV) and MacCormick
implicitly (LRU: I) talk about what we might call Harder Easy
Cases; cases that are from a legal point of view logically easy,
but are hard from a moral point of view, because established
rules of law sometimes have unfortunate or regrettable
implications. Lyons criticises the doctrine of legalistic
justification and holds that one cannot justify decisions in
logically easy cases merely by invoking rules of law. He claims
that the distinction between legal and moral justification should
be downplayed.
At a more heuristic level, Susskind (ESL: 6.6.) distinguishes
between potentially and retrospectively clear and hard cases.
This distinction could also be classified alongside same of the
other levels of the distinction. A case would be clear
retrospectively when a court's finding confirmed our legal
conclusions on same matter because the solution was not
contentious, and retrospectively hard when the court implies an
exception in a case that was potentially (semantically) clear.
Susskind says that few cases are judicially resolved in
retrospectively clear situations, for legal advisers will
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invariably settle beyond the courts. Susskind's remark
presupposes that the area of the law in such cases is civil law.
Most criminal cases on the other hand, and probably
administrative law cases as well, would follow this retrospective
clarity scheme (Bankcwski and Hutton; 1987 referring to Scottish
lcwer courts).
Potentially clear or hard cases are really predictions on
the behaviour of the courts e.g. that if the case comes before
the court it will be decided in one particular way. Susskind's
distinction is not very helpful because it mixes elements of the
different levels of distinction and because it does not
distinguish between the different areas of the law.
3. The implicit recognition of the clear case v. hard case
distinction in European Community law. As has been mentioned above,
the clear case v. hard case distinction has been primarily made by
legal doctrine, but one can find versions of it implicit in different
legal materials and practices, and explicit in some rulings of the
EGT, as will be seen in the following sections.
(a) The distribution of the workload of the ECJ between the full
Court and its Chambers indicates that there are same cases which
are considered more important than others. At the moment there
are four chambers of three judges or two chambers of five judges
(each Chamber, like the full Court, is assisted by an Advocate
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General). At the request of the Court, the chambers undertake
preliminary examinations of evidence in particular cases, and
they can hear and decide:
(1) cases brought by a servant of a Community institution
against that institution (though these will be, as from now,
decided by the CFI),
(2) references for preliminary rulings,
(3) any actions brought by natural or legal persons the nature
or circumstances of which do not necessitate a hearing by
the full Court; e.g. ECSC cases or competition cases
(brought by the Commission against an undertaking or
viceversa) which will also be decided by the new CFI. If a
Member State or a Community institution is party to this
type of action it can insist on a hearing by the full Court
(Lasck and Bridge; 1987: 252).
Thus, except in cases brought by a Member State or a Community
Institution - which are presumably the politically "important"
cases - the Court may refer to Chambers any of the (a), (b), (c)
cases where, in the words of the rules of procedure, "the
difficulty or the importance of the case or particular
circumstances are not such as to require that the Court decide it
in plenary session... At any stage in the proceedings the Chamber
may refer to the Court a case assigned to or devolving upon it,
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if it considers that the case raises points of lav requiring
decision by the full Court" (emphasis added). In my submission,
these criteria for the division of labour between the full Court
and the Chambers provide same ground to the idea that the
distinction between clear and hard cases is implicit in the
procedural organisation of the EGJ.
Further ground for that idea can be obtained from the recent
proposals for reform concerning the organisation of the ECU,
proposals which were subsumed in the Single European Act 1986
(SEA). In the past, reform proposals largely focused on the
Court's jurisdiction over staff cases which often involve complex
issues of fact and occupy a disproportionate amount of the
Court's time (1978 Commission proposal to establish a special
Administrative Tribunal; Lasok and Bridge; 1987: 285-286). In my
opinion, the use of Expert Systems designed for Community staff
law would free the Court from much of its present routine work.
Article 168A of the EEC Treaty, added by article 11 of the
SEA, foresees the possibility of attaching "to the Court of
Justice a court with jurisdiction to hear and determine at first
instance, subject to a right of appeal to the Court of Justice on
points of law only..., certain classes of action or proceeding
brought by natural or legal persons". An action of annulment
raised by a Member State may be a very clear case in law; its
importance, meriting the full court, is political, not
necessarily legal: "that [new] court shall not be competent to
hear and determine actions brought by Member States or by
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Community Institutions or questions referred for a preliminary-
ruling under Article 177" (Art. 168A; emphasis added). Implicit
in the quoted article is a recognition of the existence of
routine cases which could be dealt with by the first-instance
court, and which are deemed clear; and more important cases
involving Member States or Community Institutions along with
harder cases involving interpretation on points of law which
would keep on being decided by the Court of Justice. Thus,
whilst anti-dumping actions could be handled by the CFI by virtue
of article 168 A of the EEC Treaty, that jurisdiction has been
withheld by a Council decision (apparently because of
reservations made by the French government), but this matter is
likely to be re-considered in two or three years.
The Court of First Instance (CFI hereafter) has been
established by a recent decision of the Council (Decision 88/591
1988 QJ L319/1). This CFI will have jurisdiction over staff
cases, same ECSC cases, actions for compensation for a Community
institution's failure to act and actions raised by natural or
legal persons for annulment of a Commission Decision in
competition matters (this jurisdiction might be extended later on
to cover anti-dumping cases, Cue; 1989). The creation of the new
Court was justified by the ECI on the grounds that it was
overburdened and that, partly as a consequence of this, it could
not cope with the fact-finding aspect of cases. This situation
could not be radically improved by mere resort to internal
measures of rationalisation: it is difficult to create more
chambers and the duration of the oral procedure has already been
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strictly limited. The new system in first instance is given the
means and the time necessary for establishing the facts in a way
offering the same procedural guarantees as the national judicial
systems. The ECT is predominantly a court of "Pure" law,
especially new with the establishment of the CFI, a court meant
to establish the facts and to apply the law to the facts
established. But the CFI is a court of law, and not an
administrative body (Due; 1989). The possibility of appeals from
decisions of the first instance court constitutes a recognition
of the notion of prdblematised cases. Appeals to the Court of
Justice are limited to points of law, on the grounds of lack of
competence, breach of procedure and infringement of Community
law.
The acte clair doctrine has it that when a norm is clear, no
interpretation is required. The formulation and development of
this doctrine constitute one of the most interesting
jurisprudential issues of European Community law. The doctrine
itself is a technique common in French law; ordinary methods of
interpretation of statutes or legal acts do not apply properly to
an act drafted through diplomatic process; apparent obscurities
in meaning might be the result of compromise between negotiators
for which there might be no reliable source of information.
Lacking this, the courts have to question the negotiator with
wham they are entitled to deal i.e. the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs. In France, the doctrine of sens clair has became a
means of strengthening the position of the judiciary against the
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intervention of the executive in the administration of justice,
because the ordinary courts apply for guidance on the
interpretation of a question relating to an international Treaty
to the government when the problem touches upon Public
International Law, public international order or public
international interests, but not when the problem concerning
private law is regarded as clear by the courts.
The doctrine confirms the legal brocard "interpretatio
cessat in Claris" or "clara nan sunt interpretanda", generally
accepted in legal theory (Wrdblewski; 1984), but its ideological
function can be expressed by reading the brocard as "in Claris
non fit justificatio" in the sense that, when a court considers
that a disputed norm is clear (on a prima facie reading of it),
then reference to such norm is regarded as a sufficient authority
reason for a decision, obviating the need to justify the relevant
reading of that norm, which thereby becomes the major premise. It
is also used as a criterion for the distribution of the work
involved in judicial decision-making, especially where
interpretation and application are assigned to different courts.
Ihis idea is explicitly recognised by many an ECJ judge.
The acte clair doctrine can be used to cover a variety of
purposes: ruling out dilatory manoeuvres by parties, avoiding
procedural complications or loss of time, or by-passing the
authority vested with the right of interpretation (Pescatore;
1972 b). A national judge might hesitate before adjourning a
procedure for the best of two years to wait for an interpretation
by the ECJ. The judge may well be tempted to interpret the rule
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him or herself on the basis of claritas (EXie; 1989). As former
ECJ president Kutscher has said (1976: II.2.)/ it can be assumed
that there will, as a rule, be no application to the ECU for
interpretation if the meaning of the text is "clear" in the sense
that the literal interpretation gives an unambiguous meaning and
it stands up to an examination in the light of other methods of
interpretation, should that be necessary (in other words, there
is a situation of clarity on a prima facie reading or sensu lato
interpretation of the text). In a way, sens clair and sense
litteral are not synonyms (Mertens de Wilmars; 1976: IV): "anche
i termini piu chiari ed evidenti sono sovente suscettibili di piu
significati, cossiche si deve riconoscere che la lettera del
testo nan esaurisce tutta 1'interpretazione ma le serve soltanto
di base" (Monaco; 1972: 21.).
The acte clair doctrine was first recognised in EC law by AG
Lagrange in Da Costa in 1963 (cases 28-30/62, [1963] ECR 31).
This case was almost identical to van Gend en Loos, where a Dutch
court made a preliminary reference asking the ECJ whether article
12 of the EEC Treaty had a direct effect within the territory of
a Member State, so that the nationals of such a State could, on
the basis of that article, lay claim to individual rights which
the courts must protect. That question was directly addressed -
a few weeks earlier - by the ECJ in van Gend en Loos and was
answered in the affirmative. In da Costa the ECJ ruled that
there was no ground for giving a new interpretation of article
12. In the grounds for da Costa the ECU said that the authority
of an interpretation under article 177 already given by the Court
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may have the effect of negating the obligation otherwise imposed
by Article 177(3) on the Member State courts of last instance,
that is, the obligation to bring the matter before the EGJ. This
obligation is aimed at ensuring uniformity of interpretation and
application of Community Law in the Member States and that aim
would not be severely curtailed in those cases in which the
question raised is materially identical with a question which has
already been the subject of a preliminary ruling on a similar
case. It can thus be seen that the values the EGJ is seeking to
enhance are the uniformity of interpretation and application of
Community law in all the Member States.
The real significance of the da Costa ruling is the
assertion of the authority of the EGJ's jurisprudence. As
Rasmussen (1984) says, the major rationale in da Costa was not
clarity but authority. But clarity was also the rationale in the
conclusions of AG Lagrange: "pour qu'il y ait lieu a la mise en
route de la procedure de renvoi d'une question prejudicielle pour
interpretation il faut evidemment qu'on se trouve en presence
d'une question et que cette question soit relative a
1'interpretation du texte en cause: sinon, si le texte est
parfaitement clair il n'y a plus lieu ci interpretation, mais ci
application, ce qui ressortit a la competence du juge charge
precisement d'appliquer la loi. C'est ce qu'on appelle la
theorie de l'«acte clair». Bien entendu il peut y avoir des cas
douteux, des cas limites; dans la doute, evidemment, le juge
devrait pronnoncer le renvoi...[clarity as rationale] ...une
disposition obscure par elle-meme, mais dont le sens a ete
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constamment interprets de la meme maniere par le juge competent a
cet egard, est assimilable a une disposition n'ayant pas besoin
d'interpretation" (authority as rationale).
ICC (case 66/80 [1981] ECR 1191) extended the Da Costa
principle (there is a situation of clarity where there is a
material identity of the actual question of interpretation with
the question of interpretation which the Court has previously
solved) to questions of validity. The Court held that it rests
with the national courts to decide whether there is a need to
raise once again a question about validity which has already been
settled, where the Court has previously declared an act of a
Community institution to be invalid. The Court recognised that
there might be such a need especially if questions arise as to
the grounds, the scope and possibly the consequences of the
nullity established earlier (the problem of validity itself would
not be disputed in that second reference unless the first
reference found the act valid and the second reference attacked
it on different grounds). The rationale in this judgment is also
to establish the authority of the ECJ and thus to ensure the
uniform application of Community law; but the way this rationale
operates is through the idea of material identity of questions as
a ground for clarity, and in this sense, it could be argued that
the ECJ has been constrained by practical necessity to elaborate
a doctrine of precedent, with the proviso that it does not accept
a strict rule of binding precedent; national courts remain free
to raise again the same problem and ask for reconsideration.
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The paradox is that throughout the 1970s the authority of
the EGJ was challenged especially by the Conseil d'Etat and less
frequently by the Bundesfinanzhof precisely by means of the acte
clair doctrine. These courts made references to the EGJ only in
technically complex matters, but reserved for themselves
questions of fundamental Importance on the grounds that what the
Community treaties provided on those subjects was already clear:
matters of principle such as the supremacy of Community law, the
delimitation of competences between the Communities and the
Member States, the nature and effects of directives, etc. (Bebr;
1983: 3.). This is precisely what CILFTT (case 283/81 [1982] ECR
3415) tried to remedy, seeking to persuade national courts to
show more constraint in their decisions about whether they may
dispose of an interpretative issue on their own initiative
(Rasmussen; 1984).
In CILFTT, the Corte Suprema di Cassazione made a reference
to the EGJ for a preliminary ruling on the interpretation of
article 177 (3). The Commission argued that if a provision of
Community law is quite unequivocal, there arises no question of
interpretation and thus there is no need to seek a preliminary
ruling. In one of the most interesting conclusions ever
addressed to the Court, AG Capotorti argued strongly against the
acte clair doctrine. In his opinion, it is not possible to
distinguish between application and interpretation of a norm
since after all, "e l'interprete cne, svoigendo il sue compito,
accerta se una norma sia chiara od oscura" (Raccolta [1982] at
3436). The Advocate General did not distinguish different
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concepts of interpretation, and he was taking what Wrdblewski
calls interpretatio sensu largo to be interpretation tout court.
Capotorti also referred to the theretofore "aberrante"
application of the doctrine by domestic courts in relation to
article 177, aberrations which culminated in Cohn-Bendit (Rec.
Lebon, 1978, 524), where the Conseil d'Etat interpreted article
189 (EEC Treaty) in a way which denied direct effect to
directives, "in netto constrasto con la ben nota giurisprudenza
della nostra Corte" (at 3437). This position of the French court
makes a little more sense when regard is had to the French text
of article 189 (see chapter 7 on direct effect of directives).
The Court ruled in CILFIT that even in the absence of
relevant case law, "the application of Community law may be so
obvious as to leave no scope for any reasonable doubt as to the
manner in which the question raised is to be resolved" (ground
16, emphasis added), and thus article 177(3) does not constitute
an absolute obligation to submit a preliminary question. With a
view to minimising abuse of acte clair, the Court laid out
certain criteria as to when a preliminary ruling should be sought
by the domestic courts of last instance:
(1) the question has to be relevant, in the sense that the way
in which it is answered will have same bearing on the
outcome of the cause,
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if the question raised is materially similar to a question
that has already been the object of a preliminary ruling in
a similar action or if there is a "giurisprudenza costante"
of the Court - whichever the type of action originating it -
solving the point of law even if the questions of the action
are not strictly identical, then there is no obligation to
make a reference to the Court (authority as the main
rationale!), and
when there is no reasonable doubt as to the correct solution
to the question in the application of Community law (clarity
as the rationale!), which means that:
(a) the court of the Member State is convinced that the
matter would be equally obvious to the courts of other
Member States and to the EGJ (this requirement seems
unrealistic, wyatt; 1983) and
(b) account is had to the special features of
interpretation of Community law - (i) linguistic
peculiarities, a terminology peculiar to Community law,
specific content of legal notions used in Community
law, (ii) the need to place each provision in its
context and (iii) to interpret it in a systematic and
teleological way taking into account the dynamic aspect
of Cammunity law.
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Most doctrinal discussions of sens clair or acte clair have
turned upon the theoretical possibility of clarity. For scsne
authors, clarity is impossible in theory: in order to decide that
there is clarity one has already effectuated an interpretation
(Tarello; 1980, van de Kerchove; 1986). This view depends on the
functional analogy between interpretation and understanding. The
view adopted in the present work follows Wrdblewski in
distinguishing different levels of interpretation and in
establishing a distinction between interpretation stricto sensu
and understanding. Within this distinction one can still talk
about clarity fron a pragmatic point of view: there are certain
situations where communication is fairly unprablematic although
doubts could in theory arise. Notwithstanding the interest of
these theoretical discussions, which are taken up in other parts
of this work, few authors would deny that the acte clair doctrine
is operative in practice. The question then becomes what is the
purpose of this doctrine? As was hinted above, there are two
main ideological functions of this doctrine. Its first function
is to put an end to disputes: argumentation cannot go on forever.
Legal justification requires the external justification of the
premises of a legal decision. The major premise will refer to a
source of law, a legal norm. Stating that a given provision or
text contains a clear norm is a way of avoiding or terminating
argumentation regarding its validity or its meaning; a clear norm
counts as an authority reason. The situation of isonorphy -
between the facts of the case as re-interpreted and re-formulated
into the minor premise and the universal ised factual description
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in the protasis of the major premise - makes subsumption, and
thus internal justification, possible.
The other function of the doctrine is to provide criteria
for the distribution of the work between different courts where
interpretation and application are organically distinguished.
Several situations arise at this point. The national court may
have no genuine doubts as to the interpretation or the validity
of a Camntunity law provision, or it might try to avoid a given
EGJ interpretation relying on clarity as an excuse not to make a
reference. There can be situations where the meaning or validity
of a provision of Community law was originally a problem, but the
EOT has pronounced on the question and removed the doubts. In
such situations, the domestic court might not want to raise the
issue again, although this always remains a possibility in
theory. The most serious problems will arise when a court has
doubts as to the meaning or the validity of a provision of
community law but still decides not to make a reference to the
ECJ probably because of the amount of time it will have to wait
for the ruling (18 months). In my opinion, the ECJ is aware of
this danger, and its recent structural reforms are a pointer to
that awareness. If national courts capitalise on the
interpretation of Community law then the uniformity of
interpretation of this law throughout the Community will be
jeopardised, a risk the ECJ wants to avoid at all costs. The
authority rationale of acte clair becomes clearer under this
light: if the ECJ has already made a ruling on a given question,
then there is no need for national courts to request a new
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interpretation. If the norm in question is clear and clearly
applies to the case then the national court can interpret it but
always remembering that the interpretation of Oammunity law has
specific characteristics. This is precisely the message of
CILFH1. It is only in case of genuine doubts as to the meaning
or interpretation of Cammunity law that the ECJ is eager to
retain the sole competence to solve such problems. The Court is
no longer "jurisdiction-hungry".
The acte clair doctrine can be used by both domestic courts
and the ECJ:
(1) Domestic courts will hold that the meaning of a norm is
clear (for the purpose of application in the given case) so
as to avoid making a reference to the ECJ and thus apply the
norm directly. In these situations, the problematisation of
the disputed norm will normally came from one of the parties
to the case, but it might also originate in the court. If
the domestic court is puzzled, then it will probably refer
the question to the ECJ. If the parties raise a doubt the
national court might point to previous ECJ preliminary
rulings on the same question, or point to the clarity of the
norm. In both these cases it will rely on acte clair,
although the first situation is similar to precedent,
authority being its main rationale. In the second case the
court might consider that the application of Community law
to the case at hand is fairly urproblematic and does not
call for strict interpretation. But there is a third
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possibility whereby the court might be puzzled and still opt
not to refer the question of interpretation or validity to
the ECU. This can happen for a variety of reasons: lapse of
time, the question is not essential to decide the case, or
when the domestic court suspects that the interpretation the
ECU would give would diverge from the interpretation it has
in mind. In this last situation an interpretation in the
strict sense is being carried out by the domestic court, and
if recourse is had to acte clair, the doctrine is used as a
rhetorical device to disguise interpretation and to avoid
argumentation and justification. Seme of the judgments of
the French Conseil d'Etat can be seen in this light (see
also Ch 7 on the direct effect of directives).
The ECJ can also rely on the doctrine of acte clair. In
preliminary rulings the ECU can point to previous rulings
which decide the same or a similar question. The main
rationale of acte clair in this type of ECU decisions is
authority. Since the reference to the ECU has been for a
ruling on interpretation or validity, the Court will usually
operate an interpretation in the strict sense when the
question raised is novel; the Court will not rely on clarity
in these cases: the reception of the preliminary ruling by
the domestic court will be the more successful the more
reasons or grounds are provided by the ECJ for its ruling:
authority reasons will be based on a jurisprudence constante
de la Cour, and where no authority reasons are available,
242
legal reasoning and argumentation will be used to support
the ruling on interpretation or on validity. In direct
actions the ECJ will apply Cammunity law. If a dispute as
to the validity or interpretation of Qamrtunity law arises
(decisions of validity and interpretation) the ECJ can point
to its own previous decisions on essentially similar cases,
or it can recognise that there is a doubt and proceed to
interpret the problem text in the strict sense using the
arguments of interpretation as expounded in chapter 7. The
third option for the ECJ is to point to the clarity of the
legal norm which is seen as applicable to the case at hand.
Here again we find two situations. The ECJ might really be
of the opinion that the meaning of the norm for the purposes
of application is clear in the given context of
communication. In this situation there is a sensu largo
interpretation or understanding of the norm, and the
heuristic or psychological process of arriving at the
decision and the process of presentation or justification of
the decision would overlap. An internal-rational control of
the decision would in this case be considered sufficient by
the legal audience. Of course reference to the clarity of
the norm and of the situation will have the effect of
terminating possible disputes or argumentation as to the
meaning or applicability of the norm in question, but the
statement by the Court that the norm is clear is not uttered
with that intention, it is a felicitous sincere statement.
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The value of sincerity is downgraded in those
situations where the ECJ is puzzled but will not accept that
it is. Clarity will here be used as a device to disguise
interpretation. A heuristic approach to decision-making
would reveal a situation of doubt and the recourse to
different interpretative techniques in order to solve the
doubt, but the presentation of the decision to the public
only talks about clarity. The decision is justified as if
there were no problem regarding the formulation of the
premises leading to the decision, and only an internal
rationality control is possible in practice. This situation
(as the one mentioned above) can be severely criticised from
the critical rationed standpoint of the theory of practical
discourse introduced in chapter 5, and also from the
standpoint of acceptability and legitimacy of decision¬
making both in their ideal-normative version and in their
sociological version.
DEDUCTIVE JUSTIFICATION
The possibility of deductively justifying a judicial decision
largely depends on the availability of a legal rule applicable to the
case at hand. A legal rule can be properly conceptualised as a legal
production formulated in a hypothetical way: if certain circumstances
obtain (i.e. operative facts in the form of precise conditions and
qualifications, antecedent or protasis) then certain normative
consequences are to follow (consequent or apodosis) or in symbols:
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A(x) Fx —> OCX
When the operative facts are satisfied, it can be claimed that the
legal rule provides for its own application. This operation of
application - subscription - works on the basis of a simple deductive
inference (Susskind; 1987: 5.4. and MacCormick; unpublished).
The judicial decision will be justifiable internally when the
subscription is formally correct. Such subscription makes a
transformation from an institutional "is" to an institutional "ought"
possible. The extraction of an individual norm from a general norm is
not a logically pure operation. It implies a non-equivalent
transformation at the level of norms and it requires a commitment on
the part of the judicial organ, a human decision (an act of the will
as Kelsen would say). Such decision can be justified as a rational
decision according to the principle of urriversalisability. If the
court can establish in a given case that the facts of the present case
are an instantiation of the general and universal description of the
operative facts in the antecedent of the legal rule, then the court
can decide that the relevant normative consequence provided for in the
legal rule does follow. The real issue is the qualification of the
"facts" i.e. bringing the particular within the universal.
It is the subsumption of observed particulars under universalised
predicates which is decisive for deductive reasoning. The antecedent
of the legal rule expresses the conditions and qualifications of the
operative facts in terms of universal and highly general categories,
whereas the facts of any case that comes before the court can be
described in a highly specific way. Out of the potentially
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inexhaustible descriptions of the facts of the case, the legal
reasoning agent selects the relevant description of facts with a view
to subsumption, and formulates those facts in legally relevant
language.
Subsumption is not always unprcblematic. Sometimes the operative
facts of the legal rule are formulated in a very general way and
interpretation is necessary to decide whether the facts of the case at
hand can be regarded as an instance of the general expression of the
legal rule (see Chapter 7). Apart from this problem, there is another
which also questions the mechanic features of subsumption: "the
formulation of any legal rule has to be read as subject to possible
further exceptions ... in the light of relevant principles already
established and of possible new ones" (MacCormick and Weinberger;
1986). Thus any conclusion drawn out from a rule may be subject to
same implied exceptions, because rules are not absolutely independent
and self-sufficient legal productions: they call for human decisions
as to their application and they are part of a legal order, they enter
into systemic relations with other legal rules and legal norms.
The availability of legal rules allows for the legal conclusion
to be drawn on the basis of those legal rules and of the facts of the
case at hand, through the process of subsumption i.e. through the
application of deductive logic. In the judicial decision other
factors may be taken into account which qualify or reiterate the
derived conclusion. Legal reasoning as used in the argumentation of
the parties or in the justification of legal decisions always is
partly deductive. In clear cases it is mainly deductive. The
judicial decision cannot "follow" from the reference material - legal
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rules and legally relevant facts - if it does not conform to criteria
stating what reference may be relied upon and to rules regulating in a
loose way the use of arguments: how to use the legal sources, hew to
individuate and to interpret rules. These criteria usually constitute
underpinning reasons in legal decision-making; they underpin the
conclusion derived from a legal rule or a set of legal rules (OLR:
57). As Susskind puts it, the steps leading to the conclusion
including those underpinning reasons can be expressed as follows (ESL:
5.5., with same adaptations for the rule A(x) Fx —> OCx):
(1) if we take it to be axiomatic that the facts of the case are
an instance of Fx: Fa, and
(2) if we accept the validity of the rule of inference: "if Fx,
then a rule that has Fx as its antecedent is applicable",
and
(3) if we accept the validity of the legal rule A(x) Fx —> OCx,
and
(4) if we accept, in virtue of same acceptable rule of conflict
resolution, that rule's precedence over any other rules or
norms having A(x) Fx as their antecedents, then we may
conclude
247
(5) A(x) Ex —> OCx is the applicable valid rule. This would be
the major premise of a decisory legal syllogism. "A(x) Fx"
represents the antecedent or operative facts expressed in a
universal way; "OCx" represents the normative consequence
that the legal rule - as reformulated by the court -
provides for the operative facts. "O" expresses a deontic
element definable in terms of normativity: Cx ought to (or
can, or cannot) be the case.
(6) the minor premise of the syllogism would be (1); Fa
(7) Conclusion OCa.
1. As a scheme of reasoning, the legal syllogism is an adequate
device to justify the judicial decision as a rational decision. As
Wrdblewski (1974: 7.-9.) says, the operation of a legal syllogism by a
reasoning agent presupposes that schemes of inference can be used in
the law, in other words, it presupposes that a syllogism be accepted
as a legal inference-making device. Depending on which legal rule
applies to the facts of the case, depending, that is, on hew precise
and complex such legal rule is in its provision of legal consequences,
the form of the legal syllogism will vary accordingly. A complex
decisory syllogism will be adequate for the justification of a
judicial decision that applies complex legal rules (ibid: 16.-17.):
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(1) operative fact x Fx has legal consequences CI, C2, ... Cn
[x Fx —> 0 (Cxi, Cx2, ... Cxn) ]
(2) Fa, an instance of operative fact Fx, has occurred in time
and place
(3) Fa has legal consequences CI, C2, ... Cn
[Fa —> O (Cal, Ca2, ... Can)]
(4) characteristics Rl, R2, ... Rn of fact x Fx imply the
election of corresponding consequences CI, C2, ... Cn
[x Rxl, Rx2, ... Rxn —> Cxi, Cx2, ... Cxn]
(5) Fa has characteristic Ra2
(6) The instance Fa has legal consequence C2
Conclusion: 0Ca2
The more complex the legal rules and the facts of the case, the
more intricate and complex the legal syllogism. In many instances
different syllogisms may be chained to one another in a way such that
the conclusion of Syllogism 1 becomes the major premise of Syllogism
2, and so on.
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q —> (p —> OG)
Q
F —> OG
A(x) Fx —> OGx
|h
OGa
This may happen when more than just one legal rule applies to the
case at hand - different legal rules regulate different aspects of the
case - or in the presence of implied exceptions, or of intricate
operative facts as provided for in the legal rule (Expert Systems can
prove to be extremely helpful here because they can save time
performing these tedious operations).
The specific area of law the Court is deeding with has a bearing
on the possibility to use legal syllogisms in order to arrive at or
justify a decision. In the context of European Community law there
are same areas and same jurisdictions where decisory syllogisms cannot
be used - preliminary references under article 177 of the EEC Treaty:
the rulings of the ECJ in those cases only provide for an
interpretation of same norm of the Community legal order, but do not
apply such norm to any case, the task of application and subsumption
being left to the referring domestic courts. Even under different
headings of the jurisdiction of the EGJ, the availability of legal
rules that provide for specific consequences will determine the
complexity of the decisory syllogism.
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2. The idea that the judgments of the EGJ are deductively arrived at
is not rare amongst EC law scholars, and this is not surprising when
one further considers that the ECJ is a collegiate Court, but it is
seldom developed in detail. Thus in a textbook on the EGJ one can
read: "The European Court's judgments are abstract and syllogistic,
rather than concrete and discursive ... Whatever the hidden
reservations or concealed dissents, the judgment moves syllogistically
to its logical conclusion ... The judgment remains a single coherent
whole" (Brown and Jacobs; 1983: 276, 234 and 39). But although an
example of a ruling of the EGJ is included in that work, these views
are unfortunately not elaborated upon. It might be useful to attempt
at an explanation of just how a judgment of the European Court of
Justice can be deductively justified along the lines suggested above.
For this purpose I have chosen at random a judgment from the last
available volume - at the time of drafting this chapter May 1988 - of
the European Court Reports [1986] ECR 1247, case 237/84 Commission v.
Belgium (action under art. 169 EEC Treaty).
(a) Facts of the case
The Commission of the EC brought proceedings before the EGJ
against the Kingdom of Belgium claiming that Belgium failed
properly to implement the second subparagraph of art.4(1) of
Concil Directive 77/187 on the approximation of the laws of the
Member States relating to the safeguarding of employees' rights
in the event of transfer of undertakings, businesses or parts of
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businesses. Belgium would thus have failed to fulfil its
obligations under the EEC Treaty. Article 4(1) of Directive
77/187 provides:
The transfer of an undertaking, business or part
of a business shall not in itself constitute grounds
for dismissal by the transferor or by the transferee.
This provision shall not stand in the way of dismissals
that may take place for economic, technical or
organisational reasons entailing changes in the
workforce.
Member States may provide that the first
subparagraph shall not apply to certain specific
categories of employees who are not covered by the laws
or practice of the Member States in respect of
protection against dismissal.
In accordance with subparagraph 2 of this article, Belgium
by Royal Decree of 19-April-1978 giving force to Collective
Bargaining Agreement No. 32, of 28-February-1978 (art.7) -
excluded three categories of employees from the application of
article 4(1, first subparagraph) of Directive 77/187: (1)
employees undergoing a trial period, (2) employees who had
reached the age of retirement, (3) and persons bound by a
student's employment contract.
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(b) Arguments of the parties
The Commission submitted that the Belgian provision has the
effect of excluding from the protection afforded by article 4(1)
of the Council Directive categories of employee whose exclusion
is not covered by the derogation set out in Article 4(1, 2nd
subparagraph) since each of those categories of employee are
protected by some period of notice, eventhough the periods of
notice due to them are shorter than those due to other categories
of workers, and the derogation of article 4(1, 2nd subp.) should
be interpreted strictly so as to cover only employees who have no
protection at all under national law against dismissal. The
Commission thus proposed a strict literal interpretation.
The Belgian government contended that interpretation and
offered a purposive construction of the Directive provision, the
aim of which would be to dissuade employers from dismissing
employees thus interrupting their working life. But according to
the Belgian government no such dissuasive effect would exist in
the case of the categories of employees in question.
(c) The Court of Justice dismissed the objection of the Belgian
government (paragraph 12 of the judgment) and used (rather than
choosing, the Court automatically used) a literal - as well as a
systemic - interpretation from the scheme of the Directive.
Article 4(1) of the Directive "applies to any situation in which
employees affected by a transfer enjoy some, albeit limited,
protection against dismissal under national law with the result
that) under the directive /tha£)t protection may not be taken away
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from them or curtailed solely because of the transfer" (paragraph
13). In its ruling the Court declared that "by failing to adopt
within the prescribed period all the measures necessary to comply
in full with article 4(1) of the Council Directive 77/187 ... the
Kingdom of Belgium has failed to implement its obligation under
the EEC Treaty".
In order properly to understand the ruling one ought to keep
in mind that the present application is under article 169 of the
EEC Treaty which provides:
If the Commission considers that a Member State
has failed to fulfil an obligation under this Treaty,
it shall deliver a reasoned opinion on the matter after
giving the State concerned the opportunity to submit
its observations.
If the State does not comply with the opinion
within the period laid down by the Commission the
latter may bring the matter before the Court of
Justice.
By a norm transformation this norm - art.169 (2) - which is
basically a procedural norm can be constructed as the major
premise; it can be read to say that the Court of Justice may give
a declaratory ruling to the effect that a Member State has failed
to fulfil an obligation under the EEC Treaty. This would be a
very general, implied and unexplicit consequence of a combination
of utional operative facts:
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(1) reasoned opinion of the Commission to the Member State,
(2) the Commission considers the Member State has not complied
with the opinion and brings the matter before the EGJ,
(3) the Court deliberates on the merits of the case. This is
also an implied and unexplicit part of the antecedent. The
Court confirms or disconfirms the opinion of the Commission.
The minor premise would be a statement to the fact that
Belgium's failure i^^e^^tojmplem^^article 4(1) of Council
Directive 77/187 is an instance of non-ccmpliance with the
Commission opinion. (But there is no obligation to comply with
the opinion of the Commission, which may be wrong, only with the
Treaty.) Underpinning facts to the case, necessary to formulate
the minor premise, are the facts that the Commission delivered a
reasoned opinion to Belgium and that the Commission considers
that article 7 of the Belgian Royal Decree 19-April-1978 fails to
implement the protection afforded by article 4(1) of the
Directive. The Commission has thus brought the matter before the
Court of Justice.
In order to operate the subsumption which leads to the
conclusion, the Court must be persuaded that the facts of the
minor premise are an instantiation of the operative facts of the
major premise: Belgium is a Member State and the Commission
considers that a Member State has not complied with its reasoned
opinion. The real problem turns on the question whether the
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disputed Belgian provision amounts to a failure to implement
article 4(1) of the Directive, and in particular whether the
exclusion of those three categories of employees, who are granted
by Belgian legislation same degree of protection, albeit limited,
against dismissal is in accordance with article 4(1, 2nd subp.)
of the Directive; the most important question concerns the
classification of the facts which is previous to the subsumptory
operation. That classification involves in the present case an
interpretatio sensu largo.
The Court upheld the Commission's complaint and therefore
drew the conclusion that Belgium had failed to fulfil its
obligation under the EEC Treaty. But this is a mere declaratory
ruling as far as its effects are concerned (Lasok and Bridge;
1987: 262). What exactly is the obligation referred to in the
declaratory ruling of the Court? Article 5 of the EEC Treaty
provides a clear answer:
Member States shall take all appropiate measures,
whether general or particular, to ensure fulfilment of
the obligations arising out of this Treaty or resulting
from actions taken by the institutions of the Community
• • •
Article 171 provides a clear answer as well. In the case at
hand Council Directive 77/187 is an action taken by the Council -
which is a Community institution - and Belgium - vhichris a
Member State - has an obligation to Implement legislation in
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accordance with the provisions laid down in that Directive. But
according to the Commission - and the Court - Belgium has failed
adequately to do so and has consequently failed to fulfil its
obligation under the EEC Treaty. One can thus see hew different
norms of the EEC Treaty and of legislation undertaken under it
enter into "logical" relationships or connections, and how the
different - institutional - facts that obtain in a concrete case
can be subsumed into the different norms that are interrelated in
their application.
As has been pointed out article 169 of the EEC Treaty has an
implied consequent which also is the explicit operative fact of
another EEC Treaty article (171) which reads:
If the Court of Justice finds that a Member State
has failed to fulfil an obligation under this Treaty,
the State shall be required to take the necessary
measures to comply with the judgment of the Court of
Justice.
In our present case the antecedent of this legal norm has
been instantiated by the ruling of the Court. The conclusion
follows that Belgium is required to take the necessary measures




(1) A(X) Fx —> OCX
(2) Fa
(3) OCa
The minor premise of this second syllogism is the conclusion of
the first syllogism (based on art. 169). Here we find a simple
chain of syllogisms.
3. Sometimes, syllogisms will be used in order to decide one or a
part of the claim(s) in dispute. Thus in U.K. v. Council (Battery
hens, see infra), in order to decide whether UK's submission that the
General Secretariat of the Council had no authority to alter the
wording of a Directive is well founded, the Court establishes the
major premise elaborating or reading a legal norm from articles 9 and
15 of the Rules of Procedure of the Council: the Secretary General or
its staff are not authorised to make substantive alterations or
corrections to texts adopted by the Council of Ministers. This legal
norm is clear for the ECJ: the Secretariat's discretion to correct
spelling and grammar mistakes cannot extend to the content of the
measure in question, be it the preamble (statement of reasons) or the
main body of the measure. (This already constitutes an interpretation
of the legal texts with a view to their application.) The statement
of reasons was prepared pursuant to article 190 EEC and is an
essential part of a measure which makes review by the Court possible.
The Court formulated the minor premise in the following way: in the
present case it is clear that the alterations made to the notified and
published version of the Directive go beyond simple corrections of
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spelling or grammar. The conclusion was not difficult to draw.
Council's claim that the alterations were purely formal and did not
affect the substance of the measure and thus were acceptable and fell
within the discretion of the General Secretariat was rejected by the
Court.
4. In conclusion it can be said that although the Court's rulings
and their expressed reasonings are informal, and although not all of
the premises that lead to the decision are explicitly stated, still
the Court's ruling can be re-presented and justified ex-post in a
deductive form (MacCormick; unpublished). In most cases courts'
reasonings are enthymematic i.e. there are missing premises, necessary
to deduce the conclusion of the reasoning. These enthymemes may be
obtained from logical relations and implications that hold between
legal norms, once one accepts the viability of entailment relations
between legal norms or of legal inferences. These are quasilogical
and systemic. As Wroblewski says (1974: 9.) such legal inferences are
always possible in legal orders: whereas one could find norms
prohibiting the use of same forms of non-deductive reasoning - e.g.
analogical reasoning is not permitted in criminal law if it leads to
incrimination - one does not find any norm in the legal order
prohibiting the use of such systemic inferences between norms.
That norms can enter into logical relations (and can thus have
logical consequences) is an opinion shared by many authors whose views
on the logic of norms do not always coincide. Thus Weinberger and
Alchourron-Bulygin seem to agree that "norms have logical consequences
such that not only the contents of valid imperatives but also the
259
contents deduced from valid normative premises are valid" (Weinberger;
1985). This is the so-called transitivity of validity from positive




JOSnFTCftTICN IN HARD CASES
HARD CASES AND INTERPRETATION: THEORETICAL REMARKS
The distinction between clear cases and hard cases has already
been dealt with in Chapter 6. A pragmatic approach to the distinction
might lead to the realisation that most cases can be problematised in
the law when certain conditions obtain. The result of such
problematisation is the engagement in a special sort of social action
i.e. legal interpretation. Of course interpretation is endemic to
communication and there is always same form of interpretation present
in law as a form of normative communication; but it might be useful to
make a distinction between different stages or levels of
interpretation (see Chapter 3). In the present chapter we shall be
concerned with interpretation in the strict sense, i.e. the type of
interpretation that occurs when there is a doubt as to the elaboration
and choice of a legal norm that might apply to the case at hand or a
doubt as to the meaning to be ascribed to same legal provision which
is seen as tendentially covering the facts of the case at hand, facts
which are themselves reinterpreted or reconstructed with a view to the
application of the legal provision in question (see the discussion of
the hermeneutic circle in Chapter 3).
The conditions which lend themselves to problematisation by the
parties to a legal dispute can be called hard-case-situations, namely:
the appreciation that there is a gap in the law, or that there is a
conflict between tendentially applicable provisions (antinomies sensu
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largo), or the realisation that there is ambiguity, vagueness,
penumbra or obscurity in same legal provision seen as applicable to
the disputed case or upon which the interpreting court has been
requested to make an interpretative decision. The appreciation that
there might be a gap or an antinomy in the law is the result of an
interpretative process itself, and the solution given to the problem
can also be seen as the product of an interpretatory activity. A
distinction is often made between interpretation as process or
activity and interpretation as result or product which is usually the
formulation of a legal norm. What usually happens in clear cases is
that the provision which is originally seen as applying to the problem
case does not lend itself to problematisations by the parties, there
is a situation of isomorphy or clarity and if there is any
interpretation here, it will consist in a re-iteration of the
provision in question, which will then qualify as the applicable legal
norm.
Gaps and antinomies are dealt with in Chapter 1, but the way in
which the ECJ deals with these hard case situations is analysed in the
present chapter the purpose of which is to explain hew ECJ decisions
in hard cases are (internally and externally) justified. The model of
justification advanced in Chapter 5 and developed for clear cases in
Chapter 6 argues for the possibility of an overall deductive
justification which secures the internal rationality of the
justification: the decision can be obtained from the premises. But
the problem in hard cases is precisely the formulation of the premises
(the present work concentrates on the normative premises), and this
leads to the question of external justification. Decisions in hard
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cases can also be internally justified through a deductive scheme, as
in fact most of them are (see chapter 5 and part III of the present
chapter). But the main issue is here the formulation of the
applicable norm. Logic can be of interest to jurists, not so much
during their interpretative activity but rather after interpretation
i.e. after a determinate and unambiguous meaning has been attributed
to normative statements (Guastini; 1980). In preliminary references
to the ECJ requesting the interpretation of the treaties or the
pronouncement upon the validity and interpretation of acts of the
Community institutions, the decision of the Court turns precisely
around the formulation and clarification of legal norms of Community
Law, and the question of the derivability of the decision is obviated
since there is no application of the law proper.
Since preliminary rulings, at least in the last decade, make up
more than half of the Court's workload, and this proportion is likely
to increase with the establishment of the Court of First Instance
(which does not have competence to mate preliminary rulings), it seems
adequate to concentrate on the issue of external rationality in the
law: the justification of the interpretation of the proposed legal
norms and of the choice of applicable legal norms by the Court of
Justice. In this first Part, theoretical questions are tackled: on
the relationships between theories of the sources of law and theories
of interpretation, on so-called doctrines or rules of interpretation,
on the origins of interpretational problems, etc.
Part II analyses what the ECJ does in hard case situations. I
have selected what can be called directives, criteria or guidelines
for dealing with hard case situations - how to fill in gaps, how to
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deal with apparent conflicts of norms, how to proceed in cases of
vagueness or ambiguity of legal provisions - as explicitly stated or
implicitly used by the ECT, and I have complemented and compared my
own findings with those of other scholars of the ECJ on the one hand,
and with the views of same ECJ judges on their own interpretative
methods and criteria as can be found in their doctrinal publications,
on the other. Part II offers a list of such criteria and provides
instances in which they are adopted. Some of these criteria are
first-level criteria; they orient the interpreter towards arguments
that can be used in Interpretation or gap-filling e.g. semiotic,
systemic and functional arguments, and guide the interpreter in the
use of those arguments. Others are second-level criteria; these give
same advice on how to deal with first-level criteria e.g. whether
preference should be given to functional over semiotic criteria, and
so on. In my analysis of 66 ECJ judgments, I have mainly followed
Wroblewski' s theory of interpretation (1985) and secondly the views of
MacCormick and Bankowski on the subject (unpublished work). The other
main candidate theory for the analysis of interpretative judgments was
Tarello's (1980) as applied by Ezquiaga (1987) to the judgments of the
Spanish Constitutional Court, but Wrdblewski's theory is more coherent
with the reconstructivist approach to legal justification which is
followed in the present work.
Part III selects what can be seen as "model-justifications".
Part II provides isolated instances of how this or that criterion is
followed to solve a particular hard case situation found in a given
case, and although it is full of examples from various cases, it does
not provide an illustration of how a whole judgment is justified by
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the ECT. Justificatory arguments mutually support each other and the
final decision is justified not by this or that particular argument
(reason) to be found in the judgment, but rather by the coherent set
of all the arguments (reasons) which appear in it. Same judgments
where this mutually supportive structure of justificatory arguments is
patent are introduced and analysed in Part III. They can be regarded
as model in the sense that they are justifiable within the law. This
claim is in great part prescriptive: I decide or contend that they can
be so regarded, but I believe my contention can find some support from
the criteria that have been sorted out in Part II. These criteria are
put forward as a rational reconstruction of the ECJ judgments
analysed. So I believe my claim is not deprived of seme descriptive
import. My analysis will have descriptive value insofar as it
explains and renders meaningful the interpretative and justificatory
practice of the EGJ. This can be checked by those who are acquainted
with EC law and with the EGJ (those internal to the EC system). But
the analysis also has a critical content because one can assess the
work of the ECJ according to what I take to be their own standards and
criteria for dealing with hard case situations.
1. Origin of hard case situations
A hard case usually involves a doubt regarding the formulation of
the premises that will lead to a decision in the law (the conclusion
of a practical syllogism). The establishment of the so-called major
premise can be hard either because there does not seem to be a norm
that clearly cavers (in its protasis) the facts of the case at hand or
because, although there is a norm that covers such facts in its
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protasis, that norm lacks an apodosis providing the normative
consequences that ought to follow from those facts (normative gaps).
The establishment of the major premise can also be hard when there are
several norms the protases of which tendentially apply to the case at
hand. In these situations, the deciding organ will have to choose one
of the possible norms (situations of antinomy stricto sensu when the
apodoses are contradictory and situations of antinomy sensu largo or
simply "conflicts of norms" when the apodoses are just diverse). The
third and perhaps most important source of a hard case is the
situation where there is a doubt as to the meaning of a legal
provision which, on a first reading - interpretatio sensu lato - seems
to cover the case at hand or upon which an interpretation is requested
- as in the case of a preliminary reference (article 177).
One interprets texts formulated in legal language when
pragmatically these texts are not clear enough for the purposes of
communication in specific contexts (Wrdblewski; 1985 b). Legal
language, a type of ordinary language, is a fuzzy language. Because
of the vagueness and open texture of language, same words appearing in
legal provisions do not always have a determinate meaning, and the
parties to a dispute contend for differing meanings. At the time of
legislation certain cases are regarded by the legislators as being
covered by the protases of the norms they are enacting. With the
course of time, new cases may arise which are somehcw similar but not
quite the same as those the legislators had foreseen. There can be
problems of classification of the facts of a case! does p'', of the
present case, count as an instance of p, which appears in legal norm
N? Same legal provisions provide open lists in their protases so that
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tiie elements which are enunciated in the list only have an
exemplifying function. The dispute might then turn upon the question
of whether the case at hand can be covered by the general concept
exemplified by the list. On other occasions it is not clear whether
the list provided in a legal provision is open (illustrative) or
closed (exhaustive). Problems may also originate from the collective
character of norm-enacting organs (collective will of the law-maker)
and from the ambiguous character of the final text of the norm as the
result of compromises and negotiations.
Same words have an open texture concerning their reference: there
are things (factual situations or states of affairs) which are clearly
covered by the word or terms used in a norm (positive core-reference)
and situations clearly excluded by the term (negative core-reference),
and finally there are situations for which there is a doubt as to
their being covered by the term (penunbra area). "En toute hypothese
les acceptions usuelles d'un terms, en raison de leur indetermination
semantique fondamentale ne sauraient jamais fournir qu'un noyau de
signification permettant d'identifier avec une certitude des
«situations-types» mais inapte a decider si des situations limites
rentrent ou non dans 1'extension des concepts signifies par ces
termes. Dans le domain juridique les consequences sociales qui
dependent d'une qualification exigent precision, a priori par le
legislateur ou a posteriori par le juge" (van de Kerchove; 1978: II-
2.(c)). Finally, there can also be syntactical ambiguities (e.g.
arising from a mistaken use of functors and quantifiers). In order to
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solve all these problems the interpreter has recourse to the legal
contexte d'enonciation and to the legal contexte d'application of the
terms and phrases in question (van de Kerchove; 1986: 223-228).
Determining the meaning of a linguistic egression is not a
purely factual question (mere recourse to ordinary usage of the
expression), but a question of evaluation and choice. Surely enough,
it will be very difficult for the interpreter to depart from the
ordinary linguistic usage of a social group and from previous
interpretations already proposed and settled by other interpreters,
especially by those in position of official authority. Interpretative
discourse is not descriptive, it is normative. Law (the legal norm)
is the result of a collaboration between the norm-creating agent and
the norm-applying (norm-interpreting) agent. As Ricoueur has pointed
out, there is a necessary dissociation between what the speaker means
or is trying to convey and what the speaker's statement means. The
distance between the two opens up a permanent dialectical process
(1976: 29). There is no discovery of the meaning of a text. The
interpreter will affirm ("constater") the prima facie meaning that
springs from a legal provision (clarity) or "constater" the existence
of a doubt, (s)he will ascribe a meaning to the provision in order to
formulate the norm, and (s)he finally can propose or suggest a new
interpretation.
2. Justification in hard case situations
Justifiability in the law can be reached when certain tests are
successfully overcame: universalisability, consistency, coherence and
consequential tests (IRCT, and chapter 5 above). The proposed
268
formulation of the legal norm has to be universalisable in form and it
has to be consistent with the other norms of the legal order in which
it operates i.e. it must not contradict any other norm of that order.
These tests are common to justification in both clear and hard cases,
and they apply as a binary code: universalisability is not a matter of
degree (whereas generality is), nor is consistency (whereas coherence
is); they apply in an all-or-nothing fashion. The requirement of
coherence and the consequential test are especially relevant in hard
case situations. The legal order is seen as a more or less coherent
set of norms, based on same principles which hierarchically order and
structure the different norms of the set. Such systemic features as
consistency and coherence partly determine the process of
interpretation. That is why it is important not to ignore the
relationships between the systemic features of the legal order and
interpretation as an activity. Consistency concerns legal norms in
their strict sense (legal rules) whereas coherence operates at the
level of principles as rationalisations of sets of rules.
Interpretation is also influenced in part by the functional context in
which it takes place: thus the meaning ascribed to a provision should
not lead to results (implications within the law) that are incoherent
or not consonant with the system of law, and it should not lead to
undesirable consequences (behavioural outcomes) in the law's
environment. The role of values and ideology involved in the
consideration of the law as a coherent system or in the evaluation of
consequences as desirable or undesirable is very important.
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The testing cut of these requirements of justification is often
carried out through the Popperian criterion of non-falsification. In
the law, this criterion takes the form of the apaqogic argument or
argumentum ad absurdum: the interpreter postulates as a hypothesis a
meaning different or opposite to the one (s)he intends to ascribe to
the provision in question and then draws consequences from that
hypothesis and tries to show that those consequences are either
inconsistent or not very coherent with the legal order or else that
they are undesirable according to certain institutionalised values.
In other words, one eliminates the alternative meanings proposed by
the parties, and one tries to persuade the legal audience that the
adopted interpretation does no violence to the legal order and that
its consequences are at least not undesirable. Several arguments
(reasons) will be offered by the interpreter in support of the
proposed interpretation. These arguments mutually support each other
in order to persuade an audience that the proposed interpretation is
more coherent and fits better with existing law and leads to better
results than other rival interpretations (coherence and consequences
are graduable).
3. Sources of law and sources of interpretation
"II existe un lien necessaire entre la nature d'un ordre
juridique et les methodes d1 interpretation des regies qui le
constituent" (J. Mertens de Wilmars; 1986: III, and in a similar vein
H. Kutscher; 1976: 1-1.). The features of the European Community
legal order are examined in Chapters 1 and 2. Those systemic and
institutional (legal and socio-political) features largely influence
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tiie interpretation of Community law, and same of those features are
themselves the result of a dynamic and creative interpretation of the
Treaties by the ECU. Chapter 2 also provides a classification of the
sources of EC law. Those sources can, from the standpoint of legal
interpretation, be ought-sources, should-sources, may-sources and may-
not-sources. Interpretation at the ECU will characteristically turn
on same aspect of community law, most notably the Treaties, but it can
also turn around the interpretation of the law of Member States as in
cases where the compatibility of Member State law with Community law
is in question or where same general principles of the law of a Member
State are under consideration (e.g. article 215(2) and cases involving
fundamental rights among other instances).
Since all Cammunity authority derives from the Treaties, the ECU
will always take the Treaties into account, as well as Caramunity
legislation (regulations, directives and decisions), and it should
take into account sources of Community law that do not have a binding
force e.g. the jurisprudence constante of the ECJ. The Court of
Justice may take into account recommendations and opinions and
preparatory materials (e.g. proposals of the Commission and opinions
of the European Parliament) in the interpretation of Community
legislation as it did in UK v. Council (Battery Hens, case 131/86
[1988] CMLR 364), comparative law materials (according to Mertens de
Wilmars; cp.cit., these figure especially in the submissions of
Advocates General - an excellent example being AG Warner's submissions
in Hoffmann-La Roche, case 85/76 [1979] ECR 461, where the state of
the right to be heard in the different legal orders is analysed - and
in the discussions between the judges more than in the final written
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judgments; but there are interesting exceptions like AM & S, case
155/79 [1982] ECR 1575 where the Court used a comparative approach
examining the legal orders of the Member States on the question of
protection of letters, briefs etc. exchanged between lawyer and
client), its own previous judgments, declarations and resolutions of
the Community institutions and even academic writings, which are
sometimes referred to by Advocates General as in the ICC case (66/80
[1981] ECR 1191). Gravier (case 293/83 [1985] ECR 593) is an
interesting case where the EGJ reasons from such may-sources. The ECJ
cannot, in the interpretation of the Treaties, rely on preparatory
work. This work has not been published and it is not generally
accessible. It is therefore ruled out for constitutional reasons
(Judge Kutscher; 1976: II-4.). A common practice of Member States or
Community institutions cannot be taken into account if it derogates in
any way from Community law, but the ECJ has made reference to the
practice of the institutions in order to shew that the Court's
interpretation has in fact followed both the legislative scheme of the
Treaty and the consistent practice of the Community institutions (G.
Slynn in Bieber-Ress? 1987: 137).
General principles of law as guides to interpretation. The
concept "general principles" has been used by the ECJ in two ways:
(a) as general concepts relating to the institutional features of the
EC. These have a weak normative character but they are of great
assistance in interpretation of the Treaty provisions on the
distribution of competences and on the obligations of the Member
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States. Same examples are the principles of solidarity (EEC:
art. 5), of community preference (EEC: art. 44(2)), of unity of
the market (EEC: arts 30 and 36)
(b) as binding, not necessarily written, general norms ("rules" per
Mertens de Wilmars) which must be effectively observed if
actions of the community authorities are to be lawful. Seme
examples are the respect for fundamental rights, the principle of
non-discrimination, principles of proper administration, and the
principle of legal certainty (Judge Mertens de Wilmars; 1982: 9-
16). Procedural Rights constitute very important principles of
this kind. They are also important as providing a foundation or
justification for legal argumentation as a special case of
general practical discourse. In the Community legal order, one
of the most important procedural rights is the right to be heard
(droits de la defense) as elaborated in cases Transocean Marine
(case 17/74 [1974] ECR 1063), Hoffmann-La Roche and AM & S (cases
85/76 and 155/79, supra).
General Principles of Law can be used in order to fill in gaps in
the law, in order to provide further (subsidiary) arguments for a
proposed interpretation where the justification is based on more
precise legal norms, and in order to guide interpretation functioning
as protected reasons or legal norms (ought-sources). The German
Insurance and Co-insurance case (205/84 [1987] 2CMLR 69) provides an
illustration of how the principle of consumer protection is regarded
by the EGT as guiding the interpretation of general insurance cases.
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Same criteria used by the EGJ for reasoning from principles (weighing
and balancing principles) are provided in Part II (see also Chapter
2).
4. Rules, doctrines and criteria of legal interpretation
In same legal orders one can find certain posited legal norms
which discipline legal interpretation. These norms are sometimes
called "rules of statutory interpretation". In the UK most of these
canones are judge-made and they are closer to principles than to rules
in the strict sense. They are vague and normatively ambiguous. They
do not do away with leeway of discretion (Twining and Miers; HID: 10.-
(d)). Guidelines to interpretation are contained in the
Interpretation Act 1978 (and The Interpretation of legislation Bill
1981). As Miers and Page explain (1982: 183-4), there are same
characteristic interpretative arguments - arguments from the language
and purpose of the act, from statutory or judiciary interpretative
guidelines and from judicial authority - but there are few criteria
determining the weight and priority to be attached to these arguments.
The judiciary have not developed any systematic methodological
principles specifying how their interpretative tasks are to be
performed i.e (ibid; 196-8) specifying the conditions under which the
various forms of argument will be authoritative (what I would call
first-order criteria), or formulating priority rules in the event of
conflict between them (second-order criteria). The situation as
regards the ECJ is quite different.
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In other legal systems one finds rules on legal interpretation
inserted in privileged sources of law. The Preliminary Title of the
Spanish Civil Code (Ch. II on the application of norms) provides
fairly detailed guidelines for interpretation of legal norms: "Las
normas se interpretaran segun el sentido propio de sus palabras, en
relacion con el contexto, los antecedentes historicos y legislatives,
y la realidad social del tiempo en que han de ser aplicadas,
atendiendo fundamentalmente al espiritu y finalidad de aquellas" (art.
3(1)). Such provisions do not eliminate discretion, but one could
argue that they channel it. One can similarly find interpretative
guidelines in International Law e.g. the Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties 1969 (arts. 31-33) which provides a general rule of
interpretation (art. 31(1)), same complementary means of
interpretation (art. 32), and same precise rules for the
interpretation of treaties which have been authenticated in two or
more languages (art. 33; see in general Gonzalez Campos et al; 1983:
IX).
By contrast, one does not find Community law provisions
concerning interpretation. In that sense, Community law is not
"reflexive law". Article 164 states, in a rather succinct and
oracular way, that "[t]he Court of Justice shall ensure that in the
interpretation and application of this Treaty the law is observed",
(the other language versions point directly to the rule of law
principle: le respect du droit). Having regard to this normative
state of affairs it might be useful to take a look at what are usually
called "doctrines" of legal interpretation. Same such doctrines are
academic writings by scholars who either provide a quasi-descriptive
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account of the ECJ's approach to interpretation (e.g. Vaughan's Law of
the EC: 2.266 et seq.) or make proposals on how interpretation at the
ECJ should proceed (prescriptive approach). Other academic writings
can be seen as de facto authoritative statements. Judge Kutscher's
paper at the Judicial and Academic Conference on the ECJ (Luxembourg,
1976) can still be regarded as the source for a proper understanding
of the Court's jurisprudence (Judge Mertens de WiLmars (1986: I).
Kutscher said (1-1.) that the ECJ shared with national courts a
reluctance to give in its judgments general rulings on the basic
questions of the methods of interpretation. The Court leaves this to
jurisprudence. This view can perhaps be restated after the ground¬
breaking ruling in CILFIT (see belcw). European jurisprudence, he
said, has not so far developed any doctrine of legal interpretation
conforming to an opinio communis. Nevertheless there is a common body
of scarcely disputed concepts of the methods of interpreting written
law also applied by the ECJ as well as by the national courts of the
Member States:
You have to start with the wording (ordinary or special
meaning). The Court can take into account the subjective
intention of the legislature and the function of a rule at
the time it was adopted. The provision has to be
interpreted in its context and having regard to its
schematic relationship with other provisions in such a way
that it has a reasonable and effective meaning. The rule
must be understood in connexion with the economic and social
situation in which it is to take effect. Its purpose,
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either considered separately or within the system of rules
of which it is a part, may be taken into consideration.
Considerations based on comparative law are admissible or
necessary. In new fields of law the court must feel its way
from case to case (continental legal thought is fully
conversant with reasoning from case to case) (Kutscher;
1976: 1.5-6).
The approach chosen in the present work tries to sort out from
the jurisprudence of the EGJ what could be called guidelines or
criteria for dealing with hard case situations or "directives of
interpretation" (Wrdblewski; 1985). These criteria sometimes operate
in a weakly normative way, as directives or guidelines: they are
expressly identified and formulated by the Court and have a latent
function of guiding ulterior interpretations. This directive character
can be clearly seen in CILFTT. On other occasions the ECU does not
explicitly formulate guidelines but simply makes use of them in its
interpretations. In this second case the criteria followed can only
be seen in operation and they are formulated doctrinally following the
method of rationed, reconstruction.
Thus in Costa v ENEL (case 6/64 [1964] ECR 585), the Court does
not explicitly state any interpretative guidelines but proceeds to
examine articles 102, 93, 53 and 37 according to their terms (texte),
context (contexte) and aims or objectives of the Treaty (but); whereas
in Van Genu en Loos (case 26/62 [1963] ECR 1), the Court stated that
in order to ascertain whether the provisions of a Treaty extend so far
as to confer on nationals of Member States rights which national
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courts must protect (the question of direct effect), "it is necessary
to consider the spirit, the general scheme and the wording of those
provisions". In seme cases the Court uses criteria previously
expressed by itself in a different judgment. Thus in Commission v
Germany (VAT on Post, case 107/84 [1985] ECR 2663) the Court
implicitly followed the guidelines expressed in Commission v UK (case
100/84 [1985] ECR 1177): "in the case of divergence between the
language versions the provision in question must be interpreted by
reference to the purpose and general scheme of the rules of which it
forms a part". In this last judgment the Court had mentioned the
particular case from which the directive was extracted (case 30/77 R.
v. Bouchereau [1977] ECR 1999). All the Court did in the German case
was ask itself whether there were other conclusive factors demanding
an interpretation which would go beyond the wording of the provision,
whereas the guidelines were explicitly taken up by Advocate General
Darmon and by the German Government in their submissions.
Continental Can (case 6/72 [1973] ECR 215) is an interesting case
because it is an action under article 173 (not a preliminary reference
for interpretation) and in it the Court recognises that it is facing a
situation of doubt which calls for interpretation: whether the word
"abuse" as vised in article 86(1) refers only to practices of
undertakings or also to changes in the structure of undertakings which
lead to competition being seriously disturbed in a substantial part of
the common market. In order to answer this question, says the court,
one has to go back to the spirit, general scheme, and wording of
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article 86 as well as to the system and objectives of the Treaty;
these problems cannot be solved by comparing this article with certain
provisions of the ECSC Treaty.
AG Lagrange was very explicit in Bosch (case 13/61 [1962] ECR 45)
where he stated a second-level criterion of choice between first-level
criteria in order to decide on the direct applicability of article 85:
"il faut se referer, tout camme on le fait en cas d'abscurite ou de
contradiction dans 1'interpretation des textes internes, au contexte
ou a 1"esprit du texte. L'interpretation litterale ne cree pas la
clart6 que l'on cbtiendra en partant du sens et du but de 1'article 85
[this provision is based "sur le principe fixe a 1"article 3(f)"]. Ce
n'est que dans le contexte de 1'article 85(3) que l'on pourra
apprecier si les effets favorables sont tellement preponderants que la
non-application de 1' interdiction de 1'article 85(1) est justifiee".
The Court's guidelines for interpretation are authoritatively
stated in CILFTT (case 283/81 [1982] ECR 3415). Notwithstanding what
has already been said about this judgment in the previous chapter
(acte clair doctrine), I will here report what the Court says about
"the particular difficulties to which its [EC law's] interpretation
gives rise" (motif 17):
(a) "To begin with, it must be borne in mind that Community
legislation is drafted in several languages and that the
different language versions are all equally authentic. An
interpretation of a provision of Community' law thus involves a
comparison of the different language versions [18]
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(b) It must also be borne in mind, even where the different language
versions are entirely in accord with one another, that Cammunity
law uses terminology which is peculiar to it. Furthermore, it
must be emphasized that legal concepts do not necessarily have
the same meaning in Community law and in the law of the various
Member States [19]
(c) Finally, every provision of Cammunity law must be placed in its
context and interpreted in the light of the provisions of
Cammunity law as a whole, regard being had to the objectives
thereof and to its state of evolution at the date on which the
provision in question is to be applied" (20).
(a) and (b) point to linguistic criteria. Criterion (b) is
interesting in that it reveals a zeal for uniformity of
interpretation of Cammunity law: it tries to re-affirm the autonomy of
Cammunity law and warns against possible attempts to use arguments
from municipal sources which could hinder such uniformity. Criterion
(c) summarises second-level directives of procedure found in many a
judgment and adds a further criterion: the dynamic approach to the
interpretation of Cammunity law. All of these criteria are the
subject of Part II, to which I now turn.
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THE COURT'S INTERERETATIVE CRITERIA
Seme second-level criteria have already been advanced in Part I,
and criteria for the situations of isamorphy have been analysed in
Chapter 6. The main idea expressed therein was that even if the
wording used seems to be clear, it is still necessary to refer to the
spirit, general scheme and context of the provision; a fortiori if the
wording is unclear (Vaughan; 1986: 2.266). Thus the literal meaning
of a provision gives way to the arguments from the general scheme and
context of application. This is the most important criterion an the
choice of interpretative methods. The second-level criteria for the
use of first-level criteria are those of extensive interpretation: the
Community Treaties, as the constitution of the Community are to be
interpreted broadly using methods of constitutional interpretation
(and not methods of interpretation characteristic to international
law) (H. Kutscher; 1976: II-6-a-l.), and its corollary criterion i.e.
that exceptions to fundamental Community principles are to be narrowly
interpreted (see, in general, jurisprudence on article 36).
M. Dumon (1976: IV-1.) has pointed out that until 1963, the ECJ
based its interpretation mainly on the wording, the context and the
objectives of the Treaty provision, and that since 1963, the order of
those words in the formula changed to "spirit, general scheme and
wording" of the provision. However the importance of this observation
should not be exaggerated. It can be seen at work in van Gend en
Loos, but it is not followed in all judgments. Thus in Defrenne II,
in order to decide on the direct effect of article 119, the Court said
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the provision had to be interpreted in the light of (1) the nature of
the principle of equal pay, (2) the aim of this provision, and (3) its
place in the scheme of the Treaty.
More important than the formulae actually expressed is the idea
that the Court usually has recourse to three types of first order
criteria in typical hard case situations - (1) semiotic or linguistic
arguments, (2) systemic and context-establishing arguments, (3)
teleological, functional or consequentialist arguments - and that
preference is usually given to systemic-functional criteria. The
requirement of article 164 "impose le recours aux diverses mdthodes
d'interpretation qui - isolement ou cambinees - peuvent assurer la
coherence de cet ordre juridique couplet et la Cour de Justice se
refers frequemment «aux termes, a 1'dconcmie et ct 1'esprit de la
disposition en cause, canpte tenue du systeme des Traites et des
finalites qui lui sont prcpres" (Martens de Wilmars; 1986: VI).
1. Semiotic Criteria of Interpretation
These can also be called linguistic criteria or directives since
they draw arguments from semantic and syntactical features of legal
language and from a comparison of the different language versions in
which Qmnnturiity law is authentic. Legal acts are seen as special
types of speech acts, and semiotic criteria are drawn from the
locutionary and illocutionary force of those acts in order to
interpret their meaning for legal purposes. Semiotic criteria for the
determination of the applicable norm usually operate through the acte
clair doctrine. Here I concentrate on criteria for interpretation
stricto sensu of norms already selected for application.
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Court commentators have concentrated on the divergences between
the different language versions of Community law provisions and
on the "ordinary meaning" question. The only cases where a
textual construction still prevails concern reference to the
linguistic version of the Treaties and Qsnmunity acts and to
tariff classification cases due to the highly technical character
of the regulations involved (Bredimas: 2-I-C). In Bosch (case
13/61 [1962] ECR 45), the question turned on the interpretation
of beeintrachtigen as against affecter in article 85(1). As
Mertens de Wilmars says (1986: IV), when the textual divergence
is not great, e.g. only one language version leads to doubt, the
residual convergence of the other versions is an important
textual argument, which is still to be controlled by a
consideration of the aims of the problem provision (Stauder, case
29/69 [1969] ECR 419) .
Kutscher mentions Mij PEW International (case 61/72 [1973]
ECR 301) as the source for the following criterion: no argument
is to be drawn from linguistic divergences nor from the
multiplicity of verbs used since the meaning of provisions must
be determined with respect to their objectives. The Court
accords only limited significance to literal interpretation;
differences of interpretation arising from the multilingual
nature of Community law are frequently solved by resort to an
examination of the objective of the provision in question and of
its place in the system of the Treaty (1976: II-3.). If the
divergences between the language versions are considerable, the
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interpretation of the texts is done "en fonction des finalitds et
de l'^concmie generale des dispositions dont 1'article releve"
(Mertens de Wilmars; 1986: IV).
In Parliament v. Council (case 13/83 [1985] ECR 1513) the
Court recognised a situation of doubt regarding the
interpretation of article 175 whose wording, in the German and
Ditch versions, seems to call for an interpretation which
presupposes the existence of a failure to adept the specific
measure. The Court did not find that argument to be conclusive
since the other language versions are so worded as to allow the
inclusion of a less clearly circumscribed failure. This liberal
interpretation, which extends the grounds for bringing an action
against the Council or the Commission for a failure to act and
thus implicitly points to the principle of admissibility of
actions, is further justified by the purpose of article 175,
which would be frustrated if an applicant were not able to refer
to the ECJ the failure of an institution to adept several
decisions where their adoption is a Treaty obligation on that
institution (apagogic argument). The other side of the coin of
the mentioned principle of furthering admissibility of actions
against a Community institution is the often criticised extension
of jurisdiction by the ECJ. The latest Parliament case
(CCmitology, case 302/87, supra) can be read as a self-restraint
by the Court on this issue ("docket-control" in operation).
Commission v. Germany (case 107/84, supra) is another case
where language versions seem to diverge. In same of the language
versions the expression "public postcil services" contained in
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article 13 A(l) of Directive 77/338, may be understood, when
considered in isolation, as referring to all postcil activities,
the syntax of the whole phrase clearly shews that the words in
fact refer to the actual organisations which engage in the supply
of the services to be exempted. The said provision contains a
classification by example; "postal services", in the organic
sense of that expression, does not cover e.g. a transport
undertaking which merely carries out transports long-distance
between two post-offices. Most provisions of the said article
define the bodies which are authorised to supply the exempted
services. It is thus incorrect to argue (as the German
Government tried to argue here) that the services are defined by
reference to purely material or functional criteria. After this
semiotic argumentation which combines syntactical aids,
classifications of facts and conceptual thinking (organic versus
functional criteria) the Court then proceeds to a systematic and
teleological approach.
(immunity notions and ordinary meaning
The need for a uniform interpretation and application of
Community law within the entire Community is translated into a
semiotic first-level criterion of interpretation: notions and
concepts appearing in EC law are to be given "Community law
meaning" i.e. a meaning which springs from the system of
Community law and from the objectives of the Treaties. Even
concepts borrowed from the various legal systems of the Member
States can have a specific meaning in Community law, except when
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an express or implied reference is made to national law. This
view is generally held by ECU scholars and judges (Bredimas;
1978: II.l.A, Vaughan; 1986: 2.276, Kutscher; 1976: II.5.b. and
Mertens de Wilmars; 1986: IV).
Ordinary meaning and the meaning of notions of domestic law
yield to the specific meaning of notions of Cammunity law. The
ECU generally gives words their usual meaning (in the field
referred to by the provision) or it selects the meaning or
language version which allows the most liberal solution, as in
Stauder (case 29/69, supra), a case concerning the free
distribution of butter among old-age pensioners. A further
criterion can be extracted from Germany v. Commission (case
107/84, supra): the meaning which a term has in ordinary language
is to be preferred unless the context otherwise requires (and
unless it has a specific meaning in Community law). The Court
sometimes makes explicit reference to the "ordinary meaning" of a
word, as it did in Luticke (case 51/70 [1971] ECR 121). This
notion of the "ordinary", "plain" or "usual" meaning is related
to the idea of ordinary linguistic competence.
"In seme cases, reference to the literal meaning of the text has
been sufficient to establish its true [sic] construction, but
literal analysis of the text is not always appropriate in view of
the nature and scheme of the measure in question or the
circumstances in which the provision was adopted" (Vaughan; 1986:
2.266). Adhering to the literal meaning can sometimes be seen as
a type of self restraint. This can be quite clearly seen in
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Marshall (case 152/84, [1986] ECR 723). The issue was the
horizontal direct effect of directives, and the Court decided
that a directive may not of itself impose obligations on an
individual: a provision of a directive may not be relied upon as
such against that individual (horizontal direct effect), but it
can be relied upon against a state authority (vertical direct
effect).
The vertical effect of directives had been clearly affirmed
in Ratti (case 148/78 [1979] ECR 1629) where the ECJ reasoned
from its own settled case-law that, whilst under article 189
(EEC) regulations are directly applicable and consequently
capable by their nature of producing direct effect, that does not
mean that other categories of acts covered by that article can
never produce similar effects. The Court, in other words, was
precluding recourse to a contrario reasonings from article 189.
In order to affirm vertical direct effect of directives the Court
has gone beyond the wording of article 189 whilst in order to
deny horizontal direct effect of directives it has chosen to
interpret the article in a narrow way.
Article 189 (as regards directives) says: "A directive shall
have general application. It shall be binding, as to the result
to be achieved upon each Member State to which it is addressed,
but shall leave to the national authorities the choice of form
and methods" and in its French version: "La directive lie tout
Etat rnembre aestinataire quant au resuitat a atteinare, tout en
laissant aux instances nationales la competence quant a la forme
et aux moyens". As was seen in the previous chapter, the French
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Conseil d'Etat has resorted to the acte clair doctrine with a
view to ignoring the Court's case law on the direct effect of
directives; in its opinion, directives clearly cannot have direct
effect. Thus we have a norm (article 189 on directives) which
can be interpreted in at least three different ways: (1) no
direct effect, (2) vertical direct effect only, (3) vertical and
horizontal direct effect. The choice of one interpretation among
those possible ones is clearly guided by certain evaluations
which do not appear in the judgments. This state of things can
be criticised from the standpoint of rational practical discourse
theory. The EGJ has chosen the middle way and has justified its
rejection of the third way by claiming that it was strictly
adhering to the wording of article 189. This reference to the
wording can be seen as a rhetorical argument from authority.
Problems of evaluation and qualification of facts are amongst the
most pervasive sources of hard-case situations. Van EXiyn (case
41/74 [1974] ECR 1337) is an interesting example. Article 3 of
Directive 64/221 provides that measures restrictive of the free
movement of persons taken on grounds of public policy or public
security shall be based exclusively on the personal conduct of
the individual concerned. The Court decided, and made no attempt
to justify this decision, that membership of associations which
reflect participation in the activities of an organisation as
well as identification with its aims and its designs may be
considered a voluntary act of the person and as part of the
individual's personal conduct. The role of evaluative choices is
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again very weighty, but the grounds for such choices do not make
their way to the judgments. This situation can be criticised
from the standpoint of critical rationality.
In Opinion 1/75 ([1975] ECR 1355) the Court faced a semantic
problem, i.e. the meaning of the fuzzy word "agreement", and said
that article 228(1) loses the expression "agreement" in a general
sense to indicate any undertaking entered into by entitites
subject to international law which has binding force whatever its
formal designation. This wide interpretation has the latent
function of extending the Court's jurisdiction. Article 228
regards the negotiation by the Commission, the consultation of
the Assembly and the conclusion by the Council of agreements
between the Community and one or more States or an international
organisation. This provision goes on to say: "The Council, the
Commission or a Member State may obtain beforehand the opinion of
the Court of Justice as to whether an agreement envisaged is
compatible with the provisions of this Treaty ..."
Problems of classification-qualification appear in almost
all cases, but it is difficult to sort out criteria of
classification from them. A typical area is the qualification of
the statements of reasons by the Commission in justification of
its decisions on competition and state aids as being sufficiently
or else insufficiently motivated. Another typical area is the
classification of a natural or legal person as being directly and
individually concerned by a decision, in the form of a regulation
or a decision, addressed to another person (right of action under
article 173). In Cofaz (case 169/84 [1986] ECR 391) the Court
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said that the applicants had adduced pertinent reasons to show
that the Commission decision may adversely affect their
legitimate interests by seriously jeopardising their position in
the market in question, and that the contested decision was of
direct concern to the applicants since it had left intact all the
effects of the tariffs set up, whilst the procedure sought by the
applicants would lead to the adoption of a decision to abolish or
amend that system. Another interesting example of evaluation of
facts is Malzena (case 39/84 [1985] ECR 2115) where the ECT
considered that a disparity of 5.9 per cent, between the monetary
compensatory amount fixed for maize and the monetary compensatory
amount fixed for the various products obtained by processing
maize was negligible.
2. Systemic and contextual criteria
The main idea of context-establishing arguments is that a legal
provision is properly understood only when it is placed in a wider
context. This idea is especially operative in situations of
interpretation stricto sensu. Other systemic criteria resort to
("quasi-logical") systemic arguments that draw inferences from norms
(per analogiam, a fortiori, lex specialis, lex superior, a contrario,
etc.) and which are resorted to mainly in the situations of gap or
antinomy. The requirements of consistency and coherence can be seen
as regulative principles in the justification from systemic-contextual
criteria. In Commission v. U.K. (Equal pay, case 61/81 [1982] ECR
2601), the Court said that the interpretation proposed by the UK
government - that the introduction of a job classification scheme was
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at the employer's discretion - was not consonant with the general
scheme and provisions of Directive 75/117 and that it amounted to a
denial of the very existence of a right to equal pay for work of equal
value where no classification had been made. This notion of
"consonance" is closely related to the notion of coherence.
These requirements have been mentioned by same scholars and ECT
judges in their doctrinal work. Bredimas (1976: II.I.C) explains that
even in cases where the Court adhered to a literal construction, it
was anxious to have recourse to a whole series of arguments in order
to establish that the solution arrived at was the result of a coherent
system wanted by the Treaty and integrated in a logical way in its
provisions. Judge Kutscher talks about something very close to
coherence when he says that the judge can succeed in the gap-filling
function only by having recourse to the scheme, the guidelines and the
principles that can be seen to underlie the broad plan and the
programme for individual sectors; such schematic interpretation which
sees the rules of (immunity law in relation with each other and with
the scheme and principles of the plan cannot escape a certain
systematisation. Kutscher also stresses the importance of consistency
when he holds that schematic interpretation of a provision must not
stand in contradiction to other rules of the Community legal system,
which is to be regarded as a unity (1976: II.6.b). The idea was first
expressed by Pescatore (1972 a: IV-II-3.a.): "la mdthode systematique
s'appuie sur les elements de systeme que fournit le droit
cammunautaire: econamie generale des textes, structure
institutionnelle, amenagement des pouvoirs (en conjonction eventuelle
avec les dbjectifs), notions generales et idees directrices des
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Traites. II y a la toute une architec±ure coherente et d'ailleurs
bien reflechie dont les lignes, fermement tracees, demandent a etre
prolonguees".
(a) Establishing the Context
Contextual criteria make vise of the sedes materiae argument. The
text under consideration (materia) can be a paragraph or a
sentence of an article of a Community legal document, in which
case its nearest wider context (sedes) is the rest of the
article. The problem text can be a whole article, in which case
its nearest wider context will be the section of the chapter in
which it is placed, then the whole chapter, the title, the whole
Treaty or item of Community legislation - regulations,
directives, decisions, etc - including the preambles or annexes
contained therein. Thus materia and sedes can have different
levels of generality.
The context can further be extended to the other Community
Treaties, and to all sources of Community law dealing with a
similar subject e.g. reference to the legal acts that regulate
the Common Agricultural Policy en bloc when interpreting a
provision of a regulation of a given agricultural market
(analogical arguments will be very important at this context-
establishing point, and will be used implicitly, although there
are same cases where the Court has explicitly refused to accept
analogical reasonings).
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In seme cases the determination of meaning of same ambiguous
expression contained in a norm is justified by recourse to the
scheme of that norm (l'econamie). This would be the lowest
degree of generality of the context of a norm. Thus, in
Molkerei-Zentrale (case 28/67 [1968] ECR 143), the Court decided
that by the expression "internal taxation imposed directly or
indirectly on similar domestic products", article 95(1) refers to
all taxation which is actually and specifically imposed on the
domestic product at all earlier stages of its manufacture and
marketing or "which corresponds to the stage at which the product
is imported from other Member States. The words "directly or
indirectly", taking account of the general scheme of article 95,
must be widely interpreted. A very high level of generality of
context can be seen at work in Commission v. France (Code du
Travail Maritime, case 167/73 [1974] ECR 359) where article 84(2)
was placed against the background of Title IV, part II and the
general scheme of the Treaty: the rules governing the Common
Transport Policy fulfil and complete the fundamental rules of
articles 2 and 3, and article 84(2) cannot affect the application
of fundamental Treaty rules - such as the rules on the free
movement of workers - to sea and air transport, even when the
specific provisions of the Common Transport Policy do not apply
in those sectors. The highest level of generality of context I
have detected has been the reference in Arbelaiz-Emazabel (infra)
to the changes that were taking place in the international law of
the sea.
293
Contextual criteria can also be followed in order to
determine the applicable norm. In KLopp (case 107/83 [1984] ECR
71), the Court filled a gap by weighing two principles
extracted from the context of article 52(2): in the absence of
<fv"
specific Community rules on the matter, each Member State is free
to regulate the exercise of the legal profession in its
territory, but that rule does not mean that the legislation of a
Member State may require a lawyer to have only one establishment
throughout the Community territory. In Opinion 1/75 (supra) the
Court provided a contextual criterion for the assessment of
possible antinomies: the compatibility of an international
agreement with the provisions of the Treaty must be assessed in
the light of all the rules of the Treaty; both those rules which
determine the extent of the powers of the Community institutions
and the substantive rules.
(b) Systemic Criteria
These provide guidance for the process of reasoning from legal
norms, i.e. for drawing inferences from legal norms. They have
also been called quasi-logical criteria. The idea is that
" [r]ules laid down by the founding treaties or secondary
legislation contain, by implication, the rules without which the
instrument in question would have no meaning or could not be
reasonably and usefully applied" (Vaughan; 1986: 2.277). I have
sorted out nine types of argimvent that follow systemic criteria:
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a fortiori argument: this is an argument based on the ratio
of a norm and, like the analogical argument, it is often
used as a self-integration instrument to fill in gaps. The
ECJ has made use of this argument in e.g. the German
Insurance and Co-insurance case (case 205/84, supra): The
requirement of establishment in a Member State, as a
condition for the provision of services in that Member
State, is incompatible with articles 59 and 60 as regards
the insurance sector in general. A fortiori as regards co¬
insurance.
argument from analogy:
(a) this type of argument also refers to the ratio of a
norm, but it extends this ratio to a situation which is
relevantly similar to the protasis of that norm. This
argument is often used in order to fill in gaps. In
Cofaz (case 106/84, supra), the gap consisted in that
article 93(2) recognises in general terms that the
undertakings concerned are entitled to submit their
comments to the Commission, but the article does not
provide any further details. In Timex (case 264/82
[1985] ECR 851) the Court had said that if the
undertakings concerned had played a considerable role
in administrative proceedings, they could be recognised
the right to institute proceedings under under article
173 (2). In Cofaz the Court extended the ratio of Timex
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to a situation which it evaluated as being relevantly
similar: the same conditions apply to undertakings
which have played a comparable role in the procedure
referred to in article 93(2) provided that their
position in the market is significantly affected by the
aid subject to the contested decision.
(b) By contrast, reasoning from analogy was ruled out in
Mblkerei-Zentrale (case 28/67, supra): it is not
possible to base an argument - contrary to the
interpretation of article 95 as it follows from Luticke
(infra) - on a comparison of the rights conferred by
this provision on individuals and the powers conferred
on the Community institutions. They have different
objects, aims and effects (the ratio is different in
both situations). Of course, since arguments from
analogy depend on the fuzzy notion of "relevant
similarity", it is not possible to determine beforehand
when the Court will accept an argument from analogy,
and when it will not. The role of evaluations of the
legal field is very important here.
a pari, or comparative arguments: in these arguments other
legal orders are looked at with a view to finding out how
they regulate the situation the court is facing. An
interpretation based on a comparison of the relevant legal
systems is only rarely found in the EGJ judgments - two
296
interesting exceptions being AM&S (case 155/79, supra) and
Hauer (infra) where the limitations to the right of property
in the constitutions of the different Member States are
examined. Comparative arguments are not so rare in the
opinions of Advocates General - as per AG Warner in
Transocean Marine (case 17/74, supra) - and less seldom in
the submissions of the parties and of the Commission. Yet,
within the ECJ a considerable amount of time and energy is
devoted to comparative law, though it is not reflected in
the judgments; a comparison of national legal provisions
makes the outlines of the problem which has to be solved
stand out more clearly and contributes to mastering better
the essential issues in a case (Kutscher; 1976; II-5-A-b, B-
a and b and see chapter 3).
conceptual arguments, and arguments about relations between
norms; in Opinion 1/75 (supra) the Court says that the
apparent gap in article 228 - that it does not lay dcwn a
time limit for the procedure - can be explained because the
procedure is of a non-contentious character. In Reyners
(case 2/74 [1974] ECR 631) the Court said that article 52
contains an obligation of a precise result (freedom of
establishment) which is to be facilitated, but not
conditioned, by the measures foreseen in articles 54 and 57.
This can be expressed as the directive that fundamental
treaty rules are not to be deprived of effect by the lack of
further developing measures which might have been foreseen
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by the Treaties. One could also include under this heading
the directive that exceptions to fundamental rules
(principles) found in the Treaties are to be interpreted
strictly.
a contrario argument: by means of this argument any
hypothesis is rejected which is seen as diverging from the
solution expressly provided in the norm. In van Gend en
Loos (case 26/62, supra) the Court held that article 12
contains a negative prohibition without qualification or
reservation: its implementation does not require any-
legislative intervention on the part of the Member States.
By contrast, the Court said in Salgoil (case 13/68 [1968]
ECR 453) that no argument a contrario could be drawn from
articles 32 (in fine) and 33 (1 and 2, 1st subparagraph)
because these provisions, which should be looked at as a
whole, give discretion to the Member States and the Treaty
provides no indication as to how that discretion should be
exercised. One can extract from here the criterion that a
contrario arguments can be used when the norm from which the
negative inference is drawn can by itself directly regulate
same situation. An interpretation deduced from the absence
of an express statement in a legal provision is acceptable
only in the last resort, when no other interpretation
appears to be adequate or compatible with the text of the
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provision, its context and its objectives (Vaughan; 1986:
2.277). This can also be seen in Ratti (case 148/78, supra)
in relation to the direct effect of directives.
(6) the lex specialis standard is often found in EGJ judgments:
this criterion for dealing with antinomies allows the judge
to ascribe one of the conflicting norms the value of a
principle and to ascribe the other norm the value of an
exception (Guastini; 1988). An example of a Treaty norm
which the Court regards as being specialis is article 38(2)
which gives precedence to specific provisions in agriculture
over general provisions relating to the establishment of the
common market (UK v. Council, Battery Hens, case 131/86,
supra). But this standard yields to the lex superior
standard, as in Liiticke (case 51/70, supra) where the Court
said that article 97 constitutes a special rule for adapting
article 95, but cannot influence its interpretation. The
criterion would then be that a special provision for a
peculiar situation cannot affect the interpretation of a
general and permanent rule of Community law (such as article
95 which, in fiscal matters, constitutes the indispensable
foundation of the common market).
(7) the lex superior standard for dealing with antinomies has
already been mentioned in (iv) and (vi) above, in relation
to norms of the same legal order: norms of a fundamental
importance (basic principles) take precedence. As Guastini
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(ibid) explains, the standard can lead to the elimination of
one of the conflicting norms (this will often be the case in
antinomies between norms of Community law and norms of
Member State law) or to the restrictive interpretation of
the hierarchically inferior norm in such a way that it is
made compatible with the superior norm usually of the same
legal order. The former use can be seen in the important
judgments which declare the primacy and precedence of
Community law over national law such as Costa v. ENEL (case
6/64, supra) and Simmenthal (case 106/77 [1978] ECR 629),
the ruling of which reads: "A national court which is
called upon, within the limits of its jurisdiction, to apply
provisions of Community law is under a duty to give full
effect to those provisions, if necessary refusing of its own
motion to apply any conflicting provision of national
legislation, even if adopted subsequently, and it is not
necessary for the court to request or await the prior
setting aside of such provisions by legislative or other
constitutional means". The latter use can be seen in
Petroni (case 24/75 [1975] ECR 1149) where article 46(3) of
Regulation 1408/71, which sets limits to the possibility of
aggregating different periods for entitlement to pensions
under regimes of different Member States, is restrictively
interpreted so that it be compatible with article 51 of the
EEC Treaty, which calls for measures which will "secure for
migrant workers and their dependants (a) aggregation, for
the purpose of acquiring and retaining the right to benefit
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and of calculating the amount of benefit, of all periods
taken into account under the laws of the several countries
II
• • • •
criteria for the distribution of competences between Member
States and the Cammunity have been developed by the
jurisprudence of the EGJ in order to deal with apparent
gaps. Such gaps have a dynamic character in Community law;
they arise in a particular dialectical process of
distribution of competences which is never set once and for
all. Thus the Court said in KLopp (case 107/83, supra) that
it follows from article 52 that in the absence of specific
Community rules, each Member State is free to regulate the
exercise of the legal profession in its territory. There is
a large grey area in between the area where the Cammunity
clearly is competent and the area where clearly it is not.
Member States may agree that co-operation is necessary, but
it may be open to discussion whether this co-operation
should be carried out through the ordinary means of
international co-operation or within the framework of the
Cammunity legal system (Gulman; 1987). Schermers (1987)
says that the ECJ has not followed any model according to
which it has taken its decisions on the distribution of
competences; it has operated pragmatically, case by case.
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(a) The criterion adopted in ERIA (case 22/70, supra) is
that once a Community common policy has been initiated,
Community competence pre-empts Member State competence.
A further criterion consists in looking at the
possibility of discretion being exercised by the Member
States: in the absence of any Community provision on
the method of calculating the fixing of groups of
products and the establishment of average rates, this
remains at the discretion of Member States exercised
under the supervision of the Commission (Molkerei-
Zentrale, case 28/67, supra). A further criterion may
be extracted from Gravier (case 293/83 [1985] 3 CMLR
1): even when a certain subject-matter does not fall
under Community competence (educational policy), there
might still be aspects related to that subject-matter
which are not foreign to Community law (such as access
to and participation in teaching and training courses
especially as regards vocational training).
(b) Similar problems about the distribution of competences
might arise in relation to antinomies. The Court said
in Ratti (case 148/78, supra) that after the period
prescribed for the implementation of a directive has
lapsed, a Member State cannot apply its internal law -
even if it provides for penal sanctions - when it has
not been adopted in compliance with the directive, to a
person who has complied with the requirements of the
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directive. On the other hand, when the sphere of
competence falls within the Member State, and when
there is not an appreciable "Camrraonity element" in the
matter in question, then the law of the Member State
clearly applies.
Finally, the Court has dealt with some cases where the
conflict occurred between Community legal norms and norms of
legal orders other than those of the Community or of the
Member States, and the difficulty lay in the determination
of the applicable legal norm. In Arbelaiz-Emazabel (case
181/80 [1981] ECR 2961), the Court received a request for a
preliminary ruling on the validity of Regulation 2160/77
against the background of international obligations entered
into, prior to the entry into force of the EEC Treaty, by
virtue of bilateral agreements between France and Spain
concerning the right of fishermen of Spanish citizenship to
fish in French territorial waters (the agreements concerned
mainly Basque fishermen with Spanish citizenship). The
Court opted for the validity of the said Regulation and
tried to justify its decision by alluding to the changes
that were taking place in the international law of the sea
and to the need to preserve marine biological resources
(this could be included in the next section as a functional
justification). In Wood Pulp (cases 89 ete./85, liassjyCHLK
90i ) the Court said that the contested Commission
decision did not infringe the Free Trade Agreement between
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the Cammunity and Finland because articles 23 and 27 of the
said agreement "presupposent que les parties contractantes
disposent de regies qui leur permettent de sanctionner les
ententes qu'elles considerent camme incampatibles avec
1'Accord". There is thus no antinomy because the said
Agreement does not exclude the application of the Community
rules on competition.
Teleo-systemic criteria
These criteria combine systemic and functioned., teleological or
consequentialist criteria and they are very common in the
jurisprudence of the Court. They refer to the aims or objects of
a legal provision as inferred frcm its context, or to the aims of
a group of legal norms seen in their interrelationships. As
Mertens de Wilmars has said (1986: VI) this method consists in
"degager la ratio leqis de la systematique et des abjectifs de la
legislation en cause". The importance which the Court gives to
systemic and teleological interpretation is related to both the
systemic features of the Cammunity legal order and the dynamic,
teleological character of the Cammunity project. I shall here
give two examples which show hew this mixed criterion is used.
In van Binsbergen (case 33/74 [1974] ECR 1229) the ECJ dealt
with the question whether article 59 is a directly effective
provision. The Court first referred to the whole Chapter on
services, taking especially into account the reference by article
66 to the chapter on freedom of establishment. It held that
article 59, interpreted in the light of the general provision of
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article 8(7), expresses the intention to abolish restrictions on
the freedom to provide services. The Court went on to declare
that article 59 was, at least in part, directly effective.
In Danish Goldsmiths (case 142/77 [1978] ECR 1543) the Court
received a request for an interpretation of (inter alia) the
concept of "internal taxation" within the meaning of article 95
in relation to the Danish legislation on the control of articles
of precious metal. The Court said that it follows from a
comparison of articles 95 and 96-98 that the aim of the Treaty in
this field is to guarantee generally the neutrality of systems
of internal taxation with regard to intra-Ccaonmunity trade, and
that it therefore seems necessary to interpret article 95 as
meaning that the rule against discrimination also applies when
the export constitutes the chargeable event; "it would in fact be
incompatible with the system of the tax provisions laid down in
the Treaty to acknowledge that Member States, in the absence of
an express prohibition laid dcwn in the Treaty, are free to apply
in a discriminatory manner a system of internal taxation to
products intended for export to other Member States. It is
appropiate to hold, as the Court has already indicated in case
51/74, that article 95, considered in conjunction with the other
tax provisions, must also be interpreted as prohibiting any tax
discrimination against products intended for exports to other
Member States". Many of the criteria analysed above are made use
of in this judgment.
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3. Dynamic criteria
(a) These criteria differ from most of the previous ones in that they
approach the text under interpretation or the determination of
the applicable norm from a dynamic perspective. Semiotic
criteria look at the linguistic features of the language which
legal norms use. Contextual criteria lay the emphasis on the
static perspective; they place the text under interpretation in a
spatial context (sedes). Systemic criteria are used with a view
to drawing inferences from different norms which are
interrelated. I have classified under the general term "dynamic
criteria" three types of arguments: functional, teleological and
consequentialist arguments. These arguments are related to the
dynamic context in which norms operate: arguments are drawn from
the value-laden conception that norms are to be interpreted in
such a way that they function effectively (functional arguments),
or from the objectives which same norms of the legal order either
formulate explicitly or are seen as pursuing (teleological
arguments) and finally from the consequences to which the
proposed interpretation for those norms leads (consequentialist
arguments).
Weinberger holds that teleology is inherent to law: "Die
Rechtsordnung und die einzelnen rechtlichen Bestimmungen haben
einen teleologischen Hintergrund: das Recht strebt gewisse Zwecke
an" (1979: 305). The importance of dynamic criteria is generally
recognised by scholars of the EGJ and by its own judges. This
can be explained by the fact that the purposes of the Treaties,
and especially of the EEC Treaty, are clearly expressed. In
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other words, "les Traites sont petris de teleologie": they set
the aims to be achieved - the achievement of a caramon market -
the ultimate objective of the founding fathers contained in the
Preamble - political union - and the means to bring about those
aims - the establishment of autonomous and independent
institutions (Pescatore; 1972b). Teleology is a means-end
relation dependent on subjective will (Weinberger; 1979: 295).
It is sometimes expressed in the maxim ut res magis valeat quam
pereat, and in the Treaties this will is translated into clear
objectives.
Community norms are greatly determined by what the Treaties
intend to achieve (Bredimas; 1978:2-III-A.2 and B.3). The task
of the Community is to achieve progressive integration (article
2). This task amounts to a Community principle, and article 164
requires an interpretation of Community law geared to the aims of
the Treaty, it requires a dynamic and teleological interpretation
(Kutscher; 1976: II-6-c). Robert Lecourt (1976; III-2-II) has
expressed the view that the general principle of legal certainty
requires that the Court adhere to the objectives fixed in the
Treaties.
A very common form of argument used in justifications based
on dynamic criteria is the apagoqic argument. This argument
purports to shew that the interpretation proposed by same party
leads to undesirable consequences, or goes against the objectives
of the provision or against the more general objectives of the
307
Community, or that it does not facilitate the useful effect of
the provision under interpretation. Apagogic and
consequentialist arguments usually go hand in hand.
Opinion 1/75 (supra) contains two interesting uses of this
argument form. Interpreting articles 112 and 113 (1 and 2) the
Court said that any unilateral action by a Member State would
lead to disparities in the conditions for the grant of export
credits, calculated to distort competition between undertakings
of the various Member States in external markets (undesirable
outcome). The Court said that strict uniformity of credit
conditions granted to undertakings in the Community is necessary
(this is the desirable outcome against which the former one is
contrasted). The Court also held that articles 113 and 114 show
clearly (acte clair again!) that the exercise of concurrent
powers between the Member States and the Community in this matter
is impossible; accepting the contrary view would amount to
(implications in the law!) recognising that in relations with
third states, Member States may adopt positions which differ from
those which the Community intends to adopt, and would (1) distort
the institutional framework, (2) call into question the mutual
trust within the Community, and (3) prevent the Community from
fulfilling its task in the defence of the common interest.
The argument can also be seen in Leonesio (case 93/71 [1972]
ECR 287). The Court met the Italian objection - that the
Regulation in question did not create the right to payment of the
subsidy where the national legislature had not allocated the
necessary funds - by counterarguing that if the objection were
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upheld, it would have the result (undesirable outcome!) of
placing italian farmers in a less favourable position than their
counterparts in other Member States, in disregard of the
fundamental rule requiring the uniform application of Regulations
throughout the Community.
Another feature that dynamic criteria often reveal is the
process of weighing and balancing principles: the proposed
interpretations might further different principles and objectives
and the Court then has to weigh them up. On other occasions
consequentialist arguments are backed by certain evaluations or
policy reasons (sometimes called substantive reasons) different
from the principles just mentioned (see below).
The use of dynamic criteria by the ECJ
A decision justified by reference to dynamic criteria is found in
Simmenthal (case 106/77, supra) in which the Court stated the
doctrine of primacy and precedence of Community law over the
conflicting law of the Member States. The Court held that to
recognise legal effect in statutory provisions in an area of
Community competence would amount to denying the unconditional
character of the obligations unconditionally and irrevocably
entered into by the Member States by virtue of the Treaty, and
would thus question the very bases of the Community. The
effectiveness (effet utile) of article 177 would be thwarted if
the national judge were prevented from applying Community law in
accordance with a decision or the case law of the ECJ. This is
one of the most adventurous decisions of the ECJ; it amounts to
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establishing a hierarchical order in areas of Community
competence: lex superior (Cammunity law) deroqat inferiori.
(This had already been established in Costa v. ENEL, and what
Simmenthal did was to re-emphasise the precedence of Community
law over national law in a response to the position adopted by
the Italian courts, namely the Corte Costituzionale.) Ihe
justification of this decision is attempted by reference to the
effet utile criterion: full effect should be given to Community
law, or as former EGT president Lecourt put it "1'effet utile ...
c'est pour le juge 1'obligation d'appliquer et interpreter toutes
les dispositions des Traites de maniere telle que dans 1'ensemble
du damaine devolu a la regie commune celle-ci puisse developper
11integrality de ses consequences cammunautaires de droit ou de
fait, actuelles ou potentielles, sans etre genee, ni a plus forte
raison entravee, par aucun obstacle juridique national ou
expressement reserve" (1976: 240).
(1) Effet utile is the most usual functional criterion to which
the Court resorts in its interpretations. To give only two
more examples, in Molkerei-Zentrale (case 28/67, supra) the
Court held that the prohibition of article 95 would lose the
effect, which it derives from the Treaty, if the force of
this prohibition depended on national implementing measures;
and in van Binsbergen (case 33/74, supra) it held that a
requirement that the person providing the service must be
habitually resident within the territory of the Member State
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where the service is provided may, according to the
circumstances, have the result of depriving article 59 of
all useful effect.
Other functional criteria often refer to the needs of
the Cammunity institutions. Thus, in France, Italy and
United Kingdom v. Commission (cases 188-190/80 [1982] ECR
2545) the applicant governments claimed that the Commission
had exceeded the limits of the discretion conferred upon it
by article 90(3) in issuing Directive 80/723 on the
transparency of financial relations between Member States
and public undertakings. The Court justified the Directive
by pointing to the need for the Commission to seek
information on such financial relations by establishing
common criteria for all Member States and for all
undertakings. In Dansk Denkavit (case 42/83 [1984] ECR
2649) the Court issued a functional criterion of
interpretation: the reasons for which Member States may
consider it necessary to prescribe periods which are no
longer or shorter than, or even the same as those applied
under the internal system of taxation cannot be taken as a
criterion for interpretation of a directive.
Teleoloqical criteria refer to the objectives of a legal
provision or act or Treaty and assess the adequacy of
further acts of implementation or simply related acts as
means to the realisation of those objectives. In Commission
v. U.K. (Equal Pay, case 61/81 [1982] ECR 260) the Court
311
said that the essential purpose of Directive 75/117 is to
implement the principle of article 119 - i.e. that men and
women should receive equal pay for equal work - and that it
is the responsibility of the Member States to ensure the
application of this principle by means of appropriate laws,
regulations or administrative provisions in such a way that
all the employees in the Ccanmunity can be protected in this
matter. In Salgoil (case 13/68, supra), the Court said that
it followed from the fundamental principles of the Treaty
and from the objectives the Treaty seeks to attain that the
provisions of articles 31 and 32 (first paragraph) have
entered into the national legal orders and are directly
applicable therein. This view was further justified by AG
Gand with an apagogic argument: it would be contradictory to
admit that the individual benefits from a direct protection
while recognising the Member State a discretionary pcwer to
implement the scheme instituted by the Treaty with respect
to that individual.
Consequentialist criteria
(a) Consequences as repercussions. One of the most
interesting cases where consequences are evaluated is
Defrenne (infra) where the Court limited in time the
effect of the interpretation given to article 119 in
the sense that the judgment could not be invoked in
support of claims for periods of retribution prior to
the judgment. In Worrinqham v. Lloyds Bank (case 69/80
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[1981] ECR 767), the Court explains why retroactive
effects were ruled out in Defrenne: Member States had
persisted over time in practices incompatible with
article 119, and because of mandatory considerations of
legal certainty inherent to the interests of the
parties to the case, and of a complex of private and
public interests. But those conditions do not hold in
the present case; there has been, in the meantime a
jurisprudence of the Court on this matter and many
cases have been decided on the ground of the direct
effect of the said provision. The Defrenne Court
recognised that although the consequences of any
judicial decision have to be adequately weighed, this
could not affect the objectivity of law nor compromise
its subsequent application.
In Foqlia v. Novello (case 244/80 [1981] ECR
3045), the EGJ made it clear that, in talcing into
account the repercussions of its own decisions on
whether it has jurisdiction, it must have regard not
only to the interests of the parties to the proceedings
but also to those of the Community and of the Member
States (in that case an Italian court requested the EGJ
a preliminary ruling on a point of French law). The
Court was careful not to extend its own jurisdiction
into very slippery ground.
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The Commission was conscious of the possible
repercussions (outcomes) of the EGJ's decisions in ICC
(case 66/80, supra) where it argued that the validity
ex tunc of interpretations given under article 177
arises from the essentially declaratory nature of such
judgments; an exception could only be made when the
retroactive application of an interpretation would
bring about serious economic or social consequences.
But the EGT has refused arguments from consequences on
same occasions, as in Molkerei-Zentrale (case 28/67,
supra), where the referring court (the Bundesfinanzhof)
pointed that the interpretation arising from Lutticke
(case 51/70, supra) had resulted in a large number of
applications to the national fiscal court
(repercussions within the legal system!). The ECJ said
that this argument was not, by itself, of such a nature
as to call in question the correctness of that
interpretation.
An argument from consequences as juridical implications
can be seen in van Gend en Loos (case 26/62, supra)
where it is accompanied by an apagogic argument. The
Court said that restricting guarantees against
infringements of article 12 to those procedures
contained in articles 169-170 (actions brought against
Member States by other Member States or by the
Commission for failure to fulfil an obligation under
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the Treaty) would remove all legal protection of the
individual rights of Member State nationals; recourse to
such procedures could be ineffective after the
implementation of a national decision taken contrary
contrary to the provisions of the Treaty. Here we find
juridical implications evaluated with respect to the
principle of legal protection (access to justice) and of
useful effect of procedures.
(4) Van Gend en Loos is a good example of the use of
Teleological-cum-systemic criteria. The Court refers to the
objectives of the Treaty as fixed in its Preamble, and to the
scheme of the Treaty in establishing the Cammunity institutions.
It then mentions the object of article 177, namely, to secure the
uniform interpretation of Cammunity law. This confirms that the
Member States have acknowledged that Community law has an
authority which can be invoked by their nationals. The Court
draws the conceptual inference that if the Treaty imposes
obligations on individuals and Member States, it must also confer
rights on individuals.
(5) Criteria used in the balancing of principles
Arguments from principles can make use of dynamic criteria. Same
of the objectives of the Treaty are expressed as legal principles,
and teleological arguments will often consider those principles as
end-states the Treaty seeks to attain. There are same interesting
cases where the Court has weighed and balanced certain principles.
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The most notorious are those cases where the general principles of
free movement of goods between Member States and freedom to
provide services in other Member States are weighed against
conflicting principles which tendentially justify restrictions on
those freedoms.
Cassis de Dijon (case 120/78 [1979] ECR 649) is a case where
such possible restrictions are considered. The Court held that
obstacles to intraHOammunity trade must be tolerated in so far as
they are necessary to satisfy "mandatory requirements" (the French
version is more revealing): "les obstacles h la cirulation
intracammunautaire ... doivent etre acceptes dans la mesure ou ces
prescriptions peuvent etre reconnues camme etant necessaires pour
satisfaire ci des exigences imperatives tenant notamment a
l'efficacite des controles fiscaux, a la protection de la sante
publique, a la loyaute des transactions ccmmerciales et a la
defense des consammateurs" (Rec. 1979, 649 motif 8) and thus
created a new "category" of exceptions besides the category of
exceptions foreseen in article 36 - which were not properly
extended - : "The provisions of Articles 30 to 34 shall not
preclude prohibitions or restrictions on imports, exports or goods
in transit justified on grounds of public morality, public policy
or public security; the protection of health and life of humans,
animals or plants; the protection of national treasures possessing
artistic, historic or archaeological value; or the protection of
industrial and commercial policy...".
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In a similar vein, the Court held in the German Insurance and
Co-insurance case (case 205/84, supra) that restrictions to the
freedom to provide services in other Member States (e.g. by the
requirement of establishment in the Member State where the
services are provided) can be justified when three conditions
obtained: (1) the existence of objectively justified mandatory
requirements, (2) the observance of the principle of equivalence
i.e. that the public interest is not already protected by the
rules of the Member State where the provider of services is
established and (3) that the same result cannot be obtained by
less restrictive means (principle of proportionality).
Principles can also be weighed in the evaluations of
consequences, as in Portelange (case 10/69 [1969] ECR 309) where
the Court held that it would go against the principle of legal
certainty to draw from the provisional character of notified
agreements (e.g. between undertakings with a view to improving
production), the conclusion that until the Commission pronounces
upon them - by virtue of article 85(3) - their efficacy is only
partial. Although the fact that these agreements be wholly
effective might give rise to same inconveniences, the
disadvantages which could follow from the uncertainty of legal
relations based on such notified agreements (if they were only
provisionally effective) would be even greater.
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(6) Policy arguments
Eworkin has made the following distinction: "Arguments of
principle are arguments intended to establish an individual right;
arguments of policy are arguments intended to establish a
collective goal. Principles are propositions that describe
rights; policies are propositions that describe goals" (TPS: 90).
Arguments from policies are similar to teleological arguments (as
analysed by e.g. Weinberger; 1979: XI), they can involve three
levels of discussion: (1) are the means effective?, (2) are they
desirable? and (3) are the goals desirable? By asking (3) we are
already entering the realm of arguments from principle, for
desirability of goals will make reference to principles from which
desirability is assessed (LRIT: 262-263). "Policy arguments are a
genre of justification for judicial decisions in which the merits
and consequences of ccaipeting substantive reasons are evaluated
within the limitations which are imposed on judicial freedom of
action" (Bell; 1983: II-F), and in this sense they are close to
consequentialist arguments.
Hauer (case 44/79 [1979] ECR 3727) is an interesting case
where there is recourse to a policy argument. The Court used
systemic-cum-dynamic criteria placing the norms of Regulation
1162/76 in the wider context of the common organisation of the
wine market, which is directly connected to the structural policy
of the Ckrmmunity in this sector. If one considers its Preamble
and the economic situation in which it was adopted (surplus of
production), one can see that the Regulation pursues two aims: (1)
to address the problem of overproduction and (2) to allow the
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Community institutions to implement a policy which will favour
high-quality production. After carrying out a comparative
analysis of hew the right to property is limited, under different
circumstances, in the constitutions of all the Member States, the
Court considers that pursuing the policy of curbing production
can, in the present case, justify a limitation on the plaintiff's
right to property since those limitations (1) are not
disproportionate, (2) they do not pre-empt the right to property
(only the right to use it certain ways) and (3) they are justified
by the general interest of the Community.
A policy argument was also used in Nold II (case 4/73 [1974]
ECR 491) where the Court held that the imposition of the
conclusion of a fixed two-year contract stipulating the purchase
of at least 6000 metric tons of coal per annum for the domestic
and small consumer sector could be justified on the grounds of
technical conditions appertaining to coal-mining and of the
particular economic difficulties created by the recession in coal
production.
MODEL JUSTIFICATIONS
Justificatory arguments do not appear in isolation; they mutually
support each other, and the final decision is justified not by this or
that particular argument or reason to be found in the judgment, but
rather by the cumulative weight of all the arguments brought together
in the Court's opinion as a coherent whole. In this final section of
the present chapter, I would like to provide four examples of judgments
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which I consider to be legally justified and internally rational, i.e.
rational within the law according to the model of legal rationality put
forward in Chapter 5. In a certain sense, all final judicial decisions
are justified in the law; they are authoritative. But not all final
decisions are justified in the same way. From the standpoint of a
theoretical model of rational justification one can distinguish between
more rational and less rational justifications in the law, just as one
can apply the same analysis in order to assess legal argumentation - as
based on e.g. ideal procedural rules like the right to be heard and
other precedural rights - as a special case of general practical
argumentation. Thus, the model has critical potential. The four
judgments I have selected can be considered rationally justified
according to such a model.
(a) Continental Can (case 6/72 [1972] ECR 157)
This case concerns an action under article 173 brought by
Europemballage Corporation and Continental Can against a
Commission Decision (9-12-1971) regarding the application of a
procedure under article 86 (abuse of a dominant position). The
Commission had decided that, by acquiring 80 percent, of the
shares of Thamassen through the intermediary of Europemballage
Corp., Continental Can Company, based in New York, had infringed
article 86 of the Treaty. The ECJ annulled the decision of the
Commission on the ground that it had not stated legally sufficient
reasons (it did not prove that competition was so essentially
affected that the remaining competitors could no longer provide a
sufficient counterweight). The following argumentation which I
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have chosen as a model justification concerns the part of the
judgment where the Court deals with article 86 and with the notion
"abuse of a dominant position" (part C); the rest of the judgment
is also interesting in that the Court addresses all the grounds of
action of the applicants.
The Court recognised a situation of doubt regarding the
interpretation of article 86. The question was whether the word
"abuse" at the beginning of that article refers only to practices
of undertakings (this was the contention of the applicants) or
also to changes in their structure which lead to competition being
seriously disturbed in a substantial part of the common market.
In order to solve that doubt, the Court said, one has to go back
to the spirit, general scheme and wording of article 86 as well as
to the system and objectives of the Treaty.
Following its own (second-level) directive, the Court placed
article 86 in the Chapter on competition, and explained that the
competition policy is based on article 3(f) according to which the
activities of the Community shall include the institution of a
system ensuring that competition in the common market is not
distorted. The Court countered the claim of the applicants - that
this article merely provides a general programme devoid of legal
effects - by arguing that the article considers the pursuit of the
objectives which it lays down to be indispensable for the
achievement of the Community's tasks (teleological argument). As
regards aim (f), the Treaty in several provisions contains more
detailed regulations for the interpretation of which this aim is
decisive. The Court added that since article 3(f) seeks to ensure
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that competition in the caramon market is not distorted, it
requires a fortiori that competition must not be eliminated. The
Court further refers to article 2 which sets as one of the tasks
of the Community the promotion of a harmonious development of
economic activities. Articles 85-90 lay down general rules with a
view to safeguarding the principles and attaining the objectives
set out in articles 2 and 3.
The Court then resorts to an apagogic dynamic argument:
article 85 prohibits certain decisions of ordinary associations of
undertakings restricting competition without eliminating it. If
article 86 was read as permitting that undertakings should reach a
dominant position that rendered competition practically
impossible, then the entire competition law would be breached and
this would jeopardise the further functioning of the common
market. Articles 85 and 86 cannot be interpreted in such a way
that they contradict each other because they serve to achieve the
same aim. The Court also refers to a historical-dynamic argument
controlled by a literal criterion: the endeavour of the authors of
the Treaty to maintain real or potential competition was
explicitly laid down in article 85(3) which does not recognise any
exception from the prohibition of eliminating competition.
Walt Wilhelm (case 14/68 [1969] ECR 1) also concerns competition.
What was requested from the Court was a preliminary ruling on the
interpretation of articles 3(f), 5, 7 and 85 of the Treaty, and
article 9 of Regulation 17/62. The issue here was the
compatibility of different legal regimes (at the Member State
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level and at Community level) on the control of practices
restrictive of ccsnpetition. The Court held that such different
regimes can coexist subject to the condition that the application
of national law must not prejudice the full and uniform
application of Community law or the effects of the measures taken
or to be taken to implement it (functional criterion).
This was presented as the only right answer; the Court said
that any other interpretation would be incompatible with the
objectives of the Community - to eliminate the obstacles to the
free movement of goods - and the character of its rules on
competition (apagogic argument and reference to legal norms).
Article 85 regards cartels in the light of the obstacles which may
result for trade between Member States. The same agreement may be
the object of two sets of parallel proceedings; and article
87(2,e) confirms this view: it confers on a Community institution
the power to determine the relationship between national laws and
the Community rules of competition (it is indirectly confirming
the supremacy of Community law). The admissibility of such double
procedures results from the particular system of distribution of
competences between the Community and the Member States in the
present subject matter.
The Court was aware of the possible consequences of its
decision and evaluated them according to a general legal
principle: if the possibility of two procedures being conducted
separately and pursuing different ends were to lead to the
imposition of consecutive sanctions, a general requirement of
natural justice such as that expressed in article 90(2) of the
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ECSC Treaty, demands that any previous decision must be taken into
account in determining any sanction which is to be imposed. The
Court recognised the existence of a gap when it said that so long
as no Regulation had been issued pursuant to article 87 (2,e)
there were no means of avoiding such a possibility of consecutive
sanctions in the general principles of Ccoranunity law (the gap was
thus filled by reference to the principle of natural Justice, and
not to the principle of non bis in idem, as the plaintiff had
argued, since this principle - as AG Roemer explained - is
applicable only within the framework of a particular legal
system). The Court also held that all article 7 prohibits is that
Member States apply their law on cartels differently on the ground
of the nationality of the parties concerned.
(c) Defrenne (case 43/75 [1976] ECR 455) has already been mentioned
above when discussing consequentialist criteria. The Court ruled
that article 119 has introduced into the law of the original
Member States of the Community the principle of equal pay for men
and women and has by itself conferred rights on the workers
concerned, rights which domestic courts must protect. In order to
decide on the direct effect of that article, said the Court, it
had to be interpreted in the light of (1) the nature of the
principle of equal pay - which forms part of the foundations of
the Community because of the fundamental nature of the provision -
(2) the aim of this provision - to abolish competitive
disadvantages and to attain a social aim set in the Preamble of
the Treaty and manifest in the insertion of the article in a
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chapter whose first article (117) marks "the need to promote
improved working conditions and an improved standard of living for
workers" - and (c) of the place of article 119 in the scheme of
the Treaty.
The Court reasoned from dynamic criteria in an apagogic
argument: the effectiveness of article 119 cannot be affected by
the fact that the duty imposed by the Treaty has not been
discharged by the Member States. To accept the contrary view
would be to risk raising the violation of the right to the status
of a principle of interpretation, and this would contradict
article 164. The ECT held that article 119 also has horizontal
effects: since it is mandatory in nature, the prohibition of
discrimination applies also to agreements intended to regulate
paid labour collectively, as well as to contracts between
individuals, and this direct effect cannot be affected by any
implementing provision (lex superior).
A very interesting decision on consequences was taken by the
Court. The question was whether the interpretation given of
article 119 could be invoked (retroactively) in support of claims
for periods of retributed employment prior to the judgment (in
cases brought after the judgment). The Court stated a guideline
for the choice of consequences which can at the same time be
regarded as a criterion of interpretation: the practical
consequences of any judicial decision must be carefully taken into
account, but not so far as to diminish the "objectivity" of the
law and to compromise its future application on the ground of
possible repercussions (consequentialist and functioned criteria
325
are balanced here). The Court considered it appropiate to take
exceptionally into account the fact that Member States have
continued with practices contrary to article 119.
The Court uses the word "exceptionally" and this reveals the
dislike for the criterion of subsequent practice of the Member
States which somehow deviates from the Treaty; in fact this
criterion was rejected in later cases concerning article 119 (e.g.
Worrinqham v. Lloyd's Bank, case 69/80, supra). But in the
present case the Governments of the UK and of the Republic of
Ireland had produced evidence before the Court concerning the
negative consequences that would follow if retroactive effect was
recognised in the preliminary ruling. The decision on
consequences was further controlled by a principle-oriented
criterion: as the general level at which pay would have been fixed
cannot be known, important considerations of legal certainty
affecting all the interests involved, both public and private,
make it impossible in principle to re-open the question as regards
the past.
Reyners (case 2/74 [1974] ECR 631) concerns a preliminary ruling
on the interpretation of articles 52 and 55 of the Treaty. The
case is especially interesting in that it shows how counsel's
legal reasoning is modelled upon judicial legal reasoning; in
other words, the criteria of interpretation used and expressed by
the ECJ in former judgments work in practice as directives of
interpretation. The parties argue from the spirit of the Treaty,
from literal interpretation, from the character, the aim and the
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effet utile of the provision, from a comparison with other Treaty
articles, from the objectives and the system of the Treaty, and
from the principles set out therein. The Commission even adopted
a second-level criterion found in the jurisprudence of the ECT:
that one may draw arguments neither from the intention of the
drafters of the Treaty nor from the preparatory materials; such
arguments cannot prevail over the wording of the Treaty.
The Court addressed most of the arguments of the intervening
parties restating them, and then recognised the situation of doubt
as to which activities could be excluded from the general
principle of freedom of establishment: the question in Reyners is
whether the profession of avocat implies an exercise of public
authority and can thus constitute an exception to article 52
subsumable under article 55, which reads: "The provisions of this
Chapter [right of establishment] shall not apply, so far as any
given Member State is concerned, to activities which in that State
are connected, even occasionally, with the exercise of official
authority...". The Court interprets article 52 by referring to
article 7 which prohibits all discrimination based on nationality,
and to the system of the chapter on the right of establishment
explaining the relationship between the different articles
contained therein with a view to sorting out the function of the
chapter: to eliminate obstacles to that right and to introduce a
number of provisions in the Member States in order to facilitate
the effective exercise of that right. The Court says that the
rule of equal treatment of nationals of a Member State in the
territory of another Member State is one of the fundamental legal
327
provisions of the Community and can be directly invoked by
nationals of all other Member States. Article 52 lays down an
obligation to achieve a precise result the attainment of which is
to be facilitated, but not conditioned, by the setting up of a
programme of progressive measures. This view is in accordance
with article 8(7) (test of consistency).
The Court then interprets article 55 by referring to its
text, to the fundamental principle of non discrimination on the
grounds of nationality (principle of national treatment) and to
the second-level criterion of interpretation according which
exceptions to fundamental principles are to be interpreted
strictly. The Court dealt with a gap: in the absence of those
harmonising directives referred to in article 57, the exercise of
the legal profession is regulated by the law of the Member States,
but the effectiveness of the Treaty (effet utile) must always be
respected.
Finally, the Court faces a problem of qualification-
evaluation of the legal profession (profession d'avocat): do the
most typical activities of the legal profession count as
"activities connected, even occasionally, with the exercise of
official authority"? The Court thinks not. The second dispositif
of the decision is quite explicit: "The exception to freedom of
establishment provided for by the first paragraph of Article 55
must be restricted to those of the activities referred to in
Article 52 which, in themselves, involve a direct and specific
connexion with the exercise of official authority; it is not
possible to give this description, in the context of a profession
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such as that of avocat, to activities such as consultation and
legal assistance or the representation and defence of parties in
court, even if the performance of these activities is compulsory
or there is a legal monopoly in respect of it".
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CONCLUDING REMARKS
Throughout the present work I have tried to explain (from a
certain theoretical standpoint) how the European Court of Justice
seeks to justify its decisions i.e. what reasons and arguments it
offers in support of its conclusions.
Why do we expect the ECJ and all other courts to give "good"
reasons for their decisions? Should we? These are very interesting
questions of Political Ehiloscphy which have been dealt with only in
passing in the present work, but they have not been finally answered.
The minimalist reply would run: the Treaties establishing the European
Cammunities require the ECJ to justify its decisions. Given this
legal requirement I have tried to explain hew the ECJ does precisely
that. The maximalist reply would run: the need to give "good" or
"correct" reasons in support of a legally relevant decision is a
feature of rationality and rational action, and it is a demand of
contemporary Western legal and political culture, of which the ECJ is
an exponent.
But which reasons are to count as "good"? The ECJ tries to
justify its decisions, but are its decisions "really" justified? This
is a tricky question. Formulating it implies that one is located in a
privileged epistemic standpoint. What are "good" reasons? Different
candidate theories will reply differently:
(1) According to one conception of justification, "good" reasons are
those which achieve acceptability i.e. those reasons that
persuade a given audience or, at least, do not provoke a negative
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response from the relevant legal and political environment. The
problem with this conception is that it makes the practice of
decision-making dependent on persuasive success. If the concept
of a universal audience is proposed as correction to this
conception, then it loses empirical import: what is the universal
audience? how do we know whether the universal audience has been
persuaded? etc.
(2) According to other conceptions, "good" reasons are "just" or
"richtig" reasons. But the problem remains: what are "just"
reasons? Unless one holds a cognitivist standpoint one cannot
give a definite answer. I hold a non-cognitivist standpoint on
axiological matters: it is not possible to know with certainty
and in absolute terms what are "good" or "just" reasons. One
could, at the most, try to explain which reasons are considered
"good" in a given culture and in a given society. But even then
one has to be extremely careful because modern societies are
pluralistic: different philosophical traditions co-exist in open
societies. One could, perhaps, argue that this or that legal
order embodies this or that politico-philosophical tradition,
but, in my submission, even that would be problematic.
(3) I have adopted a different approach. Following the method of
"rational reconstruction'' I have tried to investigate which is
the doctrine of justification operative in the practice of the
European Court of Justice and I have used this rationally
reconstructed doctrine to assess actual justifications offered by
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the Court. In other words I have tried to assess the ECJ by its
own standards. I am in favour of treating the practice of giving
"good" reasons (in a relativised sense) as a process of open and
rational communication (general practical discourse) and of
treating the rules and principles that guide that practice as
pragmatic conditions of communication and these rules and
principles themselves constitute a further standard from which to
assess actual practices of justification. The theory of general
practical discourse (of communicative action) is a necessarily
ideal (transcendental) theory.
What does the European Court of Justice consider to be "good"
reasons? Which is the operative doctrine of justification at the ECJ?
(1) The main feature of legal justification is that in order to be
legally justified, a judicial decision has to connect in same way
with enacted law (reasons or arguments of authority). Sources of
law will always be referred to in judicial justification. In so-
called "clear cases" the connection with a source of law will
usually be fairly straightforward and unproblematic (I insist
that one can only give an ex post qualification of a case as
being clear but that certain types of cases have a higher
probability of being decided as clear cases). In these cases,
the mention of the applicable legal norm will usually constitute
a contextually sufficient justification. In so-called "hard
cases" the connection with an applicable (valid) legal norm is
also necessary, but this connection is more problematic, and it
M ^ / . ,
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is usually supported by further reasons and arguments i.e. by
canones of legal reasoning (e.g. criteria of interpretation) and
by substantive reasons.
Substantive reasons are the hardest to analyse. In general it
can be said that the EGT will try to connect values and
axiological premises with authority reasons (e.g. with basic
norms to be found in the Preamble and opening articles of the EEC
Treaty). But the most interesting substantive reasons are those
which originate in principles which did not originally appear in
the Treaties e.g. Human Rights (in their liberal, social and
cultural versions), the protection of the environment, consumer
protection, etc. The acceptability approach is most relevant in
such cases; it could be argued that same of these values have
made their way into EC law (through judicial decision-making and
through legislation) when there has been an "adequate"
(rational?) consensus concerning their urgency within the
different audiences to which decisions are addressed.
In Chapters 1 and 2, I have tried to identify the sources to
which those arguments of authority refer, and the way in which those
sources can be re-arranged into something which resembles a legal
order. Chapters 6 and 7 have explained same of the canones of legal
reasoning used by the ECJ. In Chapters 3-5, I have looked at the ECT
as a social agent considering judicial decision-making and judicial
justification as a very important form of social action. In opting
for this or that reason of authority and in interpreting the
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applicable legal norms (s) in a certain manner or in opting for this or
that substantive reason, the ECT is engaging in a very important form
of social action: it is either furthering (almost re-iterating) the
work of the Community law-maker (s) - who hold primary authority - in
those situations where leeway is minimal or where interpretatio
restrictiva is chosen, or it is cooperating with the legislator (as in
a joint venture) in an active and engaged way in those situations
where leeway increases and interpretatio extensiva is chosen. But in
both situations the Court is engaging in social action.
The present work suffers from, at least, three shortcomings:
(1) there is little or no consideration of decisions of evidence
(facts in the law and narrative coherence),
(2) no empirical research has been done in the line of participant
observation,
(3) I have not been able to read works on EC law written in seme of
the languages (official and non-official) of the EC.
But I hope that the present work will, at least, have achieved
the following aims:
(1) persuade experts in EC law that legal philosophy (namely, but not
only, analytical jurisprudence and the institutional theory of
law) has something interesting to offer concerning an
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I personally consider this work as a programme for further study
and research. There are three main areas in which I would like to
pursue my own research: analysis of more judgments of the ECU and
other sources of EC law using the techniques introduced in this work -
analytical jurisprudence, and rational reconstruction - with a view to
describing more chain-novels; carrying out research using the method
of participant observation (and discussions with those who work at the
ECU); and broadening the context of the present work to include
similar works on the other supranational European Court i.e. the
European Court of Human Rights and on European Constitutional Courts.
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understanding of the legal order of the EC, the problems involved
in decision-making, and the justification of judicial decisions
(e.g. acte clair doctrine and criteria of interpretation) and
tell legal philosophers about a fascinating legal order in which
to test their own theories, a legal order which bears many
interesting features awaiting jurisprudential discussion. To
name only a few:
- the acte clair doctrine
- the distinctions between clear cases and hard cases
- chain-novels as in the Parliament cases discussed in
Chapter 3 or in the area of the requirement of
establishment related to the freedom to provide services
or in the relationships between articles 30 and 36 of the
EEC Treaty on the one hand and mandatory requirements on
the other
- problems of interpretation: different levels of
interpretation, the distinction between interpretation and
application, criteria of interpretation(first and second
degree directives)
- sources of law and theories of the legal system
- the problems involved with state-oriented theories of law
- legal positivism as an approach to the study of law (in
this sense, at least, legal positivism is not state-
oriented)
- general legal principles
- problems of leeway and discretion.
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